Multinational Corporate-Investment and Womens' Participation in Higher-Education in Noncore Nations

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Citation
Multinational Corporate Investment and Women’s Participation in Higher Education in Noncore Nations

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This article posits a theoretical connection between multinational corporate (MNC) investment and women’s participation in higher education in noncore nations. It suggests that because MNC investment encourages a “breed-and-feed” ideology for women, the prejudicial hiring of men in high-status occupations, and the lack of state regulation of gender discrimination, its presence skews the demand for higher education away from women. Panel regression analyses of data from 66 noncore and 44 peripheral nations indicate considerable support for this position.

Numerous recent studies have examined the worldwide expansion of enrollments at all levels of education since the 1950s (see S. M. O’Connor 1988 for an account of growth in preschool enrollments). Some of this work has focused on the consequences of expansion for economic development. Of particular interest is Benavot’s (1989) indication that women’s education may actually be more salient than men’s for economic growth. Most of the cross-national work (see, for example, Meyer et al. 1979; S. M. O’Connor 1988; Sica and Prechel 1981), however, has focused on the determinants, rather than the consequences, of the world educational revolution. Among this work are studies, such as Meyer et al.’s (1979), that suggest how little economic dependency may have to do with variations in the number of people receiving formal education, even in noncore nations. But little effort has been directed to questions of qualitative change, particularly to the question of whether a nation’s position in the world-system may influence gender differences in access to education. The research presented here begins such an effort by examining how women’s chances of obtaining a higher education and perhaps, by extension, their chances of contributing to the economic and political development of noncore nations have been influenced by national economic dependency.

A good deal has already been written about the economic and cultural dependency of universities in noncore nations and the implications of this dependency for the economic and cultural dependency of the peoples of noncore nations (see, for example, Altbach 1987; Arnove 1980; Berman 1979; Mazrui 1978; Silva 1980). But do these implications extend with particular force to women who may be otherwise qualified for a university education but are denied access because of structural barriers created by, say, foreign investments? The dependency/world-system perspective has already been used to examine cross-national patterns of differential gender access in other fields (see, for example, Clark 1989; Clark 1991; Clark, Ramsbey, and Adler 1991; Semyonov and Shenhav 1988, Ward 1984, 1985), but, to date, it has not been applied to gender differences in access to education.

In this article, I examine the effects of foreign investment on women’s relative participation in higher education in noncore nations. In so doing, I posit theoretical links between multinational
corporate (MNC) investment and such participation, while acknowledging the likelihood that other national characteristics (such as economic development, ethnolinguistic divisions, and religious culture) condition such linkages. I then test the plausibility of these links through a multivariate, panel regression analysis of available data from approximately 1960 to 1985.

**DEPENDENCY, GENDER, AND EDUCATION**

Economic dependency is conceptualized here primarily in terms of MNC investment. Although other conceptualizations of dependency exist in the literature—notably, trade dependency, which focuses more exclusively on the nature of trade relations between core and noncore nations, conceptualizing dependency in terms of MNC alone makes increasing sense, "given the changing nature of international economic exchanges or core-periphery relations during the last two or three decades" (London and Williams 1988, p. 754). Moreover, Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) demonstrated that after the mid-1960s (the beginning of the period examined in this study), noncore nations became increasingly dependent on MNC investment and less reliant on alternative types of economic dependency.

The initial impetus for higher education in many noncore nations occurred in the waning years of colonial regimes and at the inception of independence, when the need for local elites in both government and industry became obvious (Smock 1981). Mazrui (1978, pp. 339–40) captured a sense of the role played by MNCs in the spread of higher education at the beginning of the neo-colonial period in the following passage, based on his experiences in Africa:

> Ironically, the importance of Western education for Western investment in Africa grew with the development of African nationalism. Western education helped to stimulate local nationalism, and nationalists demanded the establishment of local plants. Once the plants were established, the need for manpower increased. Multinational companies in Africa, however, discovered early the advantages of employing indigenous managers who understood local markets and could buffer local hostilities. Nationalism demanded the Africanization of as many jobs as possible, and multinationals were compelled to appoint local people to higher and higher staff levels. Increasingly, faces behind managerial desks were African and members of boards of directors included coopted Africans who lent legitimacy to the companies' operations. Local, Westernized manpower, difficult to find in the 1940s, became abundant because of the success of African universities in socializing local personnel to Western ways. In successfully performing this task, the universities have served to consolidate economic dependency.

Assuming that the general outline of this description applies to noncore regions outside Africa (and work by Cardoso 1973, Cardoso and Falletto 1979, and Evans 1979, for instance, indicates similar developments in Latin America, despite the long-time formal independence of those nations), the major question for this article is this: Were men or women more likely to be the "beneficiaries" of the increased opportunities for higher education brought about by the MNC investment in noncore nations that has characterized the past 25 years? Is there anything in the logic of multinational capitalism that undermines women's chances to take advantage of those opportunities? Several students of women's participation in the "world division of labor" have provided the foundation for an affirmative answer to this question.

Three strands of the general argument made by these students, all suggesting why MNC investment may be responsible for denying women equal access to higher education, are pertinent here. The first states that MNC investment often entails ideological changes that impede women's progress. Numerous authors, beginning with Boserup (1970), have argued that dependent development, not development per se, is frequently responsible for a decline in women's status in that it lowers women's relative access to educational, economic, and political resources (see also, Meillassoux 1981; Nash and Fernandez-
Kelly 1983; Sen and Grown 1987; Tinker and Bramsen 1976; United Nations 1980; Ward 1984). In particular, economic dependency is sometimes accused of fostering Western definitions of women’s proper place as being within the domestic realm, as long as women remain available for unremunerative labor (see, for example, Elu de Lenero 1980; Saffioti 1978; Van Allen 1976; Ward 1984). It has been suggested that a version of the Victorian notion of women’s domestic roles as “breeders and feeders” led planners from core nations, elites in peripheral nations, and newly proletarianized women and men to ignore women’s often-significant socioeconomic and political roles in peripheral nations (Ward, 1984, p. 18). London (1988), in particular, showed that MNC investment augmented fertility in noncore nations. This ideology may be the most salient barrier to women’s access to higher education, since it is most apt to influence women’s attitudes about the appropriateness of higher education.

Another related barrier is the patriarchal control that is engendered in the workplace by increased MNC investment. On the job, patriarchal control is used to balance women’s roles as producers and reproducers for capitalist markets in goods and labor. Men are more likely to become managers and professionals because women, though they are often needed by MNCs as cheap labor, are also needed to reproduce cheap labor and hungry consumers. Thus, constraints are placed on women’s access to the more influential positions from which their retirement to reproductive roles would engender difficulty. Clark (1991) argued that although this interest obtains for capitalist enterprises everywhere, it is most likely to overwhelm countervailing interests in nations that are dependent on MNC investments because the governments of these nations will have made the greatest concessions to MNC requirements for profitable environments. And, as London and Williams (1988) implied, successful noncore governments (ones that “win” the competition for MNC capital) will have created such environments by, among other things, limiting regulations on gender discrimination.

Limited governmental regulations against gender discrimination are likely to be a third related barrier to women’s access to higher education in these noncore nations. Once again, the question is which noncore nations are most likely to have won the competition for MNC investments. In terms of J. O’Connor’s (1973) theoretical distinction between the accumulation and legitimation functions of all states, noncore states that attract the most foreign capital are most likely to discipline relevant work forces and to limit regulations, thereby emphasizing their ability to accumulate capital, even when doing so means not increasing social harmony and thereby deemphasizing their legitimacy interests. Numerous authors (see, for example, Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983) have argued that when it comes to MNC investment, especially in manufacturing, the most “relevant” work force in noncore nations is the cheapest and most malleable: women. Anything that would be a threat to the malleability of this work force, like the provision of higher education, is likely to pose a threat to accumulation-oriented states.

It is undoubtedly an oversimplification to assign a one-to-one correspondence between the three aforementioned barriers and the subpopulations that are affected. It may be useful, for heuristic purposes, however, to think of the more general ideological barriers as providing disincentives for women to pursue higher education, of the more specific barriers to high-status jobs as providing relative incentives for men to do so, and of the government-regulations barrier as offering university officials no incentive to locate qualified women.

**SPECIFICATION OF THE MODEL**

The basic model employed here is designed to examine the effects of MNC investment on women’s relative participation in higher education in noncore and peripheral nations, while controlling for other variables that are likely to condition that effect. The theoretical argument just outlined focuses on change
in that participation, and change is addressed here through the use of a panel-regression analysis, in which the dependent variable, women's relative participation in higher education (HIED), measured at one time, is regressed on itself and other independent variables at an earlier time. Panel-regression analysis provides estimates of the effects of the independent variables on change in the dependent variable, even if these estimates are made conservative by the usually high correlation between the dependent variable and itself at the two points in time (cf. Hannan 1979). Thus, the association of MNC investment and of other independent variables is apt to appear lower here than if one could control the biases created by panel analysis.

The analysis is based on data for as many as 66 noncore and 44 peripheral nations (see the Appendix). Snyder and Kick's (1979) classification was used to group nations. Centrally planned, or Communist, states were not included because their inclusion spuriously inflates the controlled association between MNC investment and women's access to education, even though it may reinforce the hypothesized significance of governmental regulation.1

The dependent variable, HIED, is defined as the ratio of women's rate of enrollment in higher education to men's and, to meet the requirements of panel regression, is measured at two points in time: a lagged measurement in 1960 and the actual dependent variable in 1985. The data are from Sivard (1985). The length of the lag period, 25 years, is appropriate because the effects of dependency are known to act slowly (see Bornschier and Chase-Dunn 1985). Still, the only date for which the measure of MNC investment is available is 1967, and most other independent variables are measured in 1965. Perhaps, then, the reader will best conceive of the lag period used here as the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, the postcolonial period for many of the nations in the sample and the period for which it has been suggested that MNC investment was a pervasive influence in noncore nations.

MNC investment is measured as the ratio of a nation's stock of foreign investments in extraction and manufacturing (the secondary sector) to the square root of kilowatt hours multiplied by population (measured in 1967). Numerous case studies (see, for example, Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983) and one cross-national panel analysis (Clark, in press) have indicated that MNC investment in the secondary sector of noncore nations has been particularly reliant upon unskilled female labor, so it is expected to be particularly conducive to the kinds of barriers to female participation in higher education mentioned earlier. The measure used here is from Ballmer-Cao et al. (1979) and is logged to correct for skewness.

**CONTROL VARIABLES**

Although my focus is on the effects of MNC investment on women's relative participation in higher education, one should have faith only in findings that reflect control for effects of variables that may condition this main effect. The literature on increases in educational enrollments, generally, is suggestive: Various authors have noted the importance of national development, ethnolinguistic divisions within a nation, and the extent to which Islam is a dominant religion. My analysis includes these variables as controls.

Many theories imply that economic development fosters educational growth (see Meyer et al. 1979, for a list of such theories). The proposition that seems most relevant here is that advanced

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1 Reflecting their aversion to capitalist intervention, centrally planned states did not report significant levels of MNC investment in the 1960s, but reflecting relatively deep ideological commitments to gender equality, they reported high levels of participation by women in higher education in both 1960 and 1985. In analyses (not reported here) that included these states, the controlled associations between MNC investment and gains in women's access to higher education were considerably higher than the ones reported here. But the additional association is assumed to have been the spurious result of the Communist rejection of MNC investment and promotion of women's rights.
industrial economies have more resources to allocate to education, both as an investment and as a consumption good. From the point of view of women in higher education, one may expect that the patriarchal nature of most societies would require that only when seats in universities become relatively plentiful and, by societal standards, inexpensive, that the “risk” of permitting women to “consume” them would seem acceptable (see, for example, Wang 1982). In any case, I expect that women’s relative participation in higher education will increase with economic development and I measure economic development, conventionally, as the per capita gross national product (GNP). Data on GNP per capita are for 1965, and the variable (hereafter referred to as LGNP) is logged to correct for skewness.

Some authors (see Meyer et al. 1979; Warren 1973) have argued that ethnically heterogeneous societies are more apt than are ethnically homogeneous ones to find increasing educational opportunities costly and politically difficult. Given the patriarchal nature of most societies, it would seem that when men from various ethnic groups are competing for scarce university positions, women from these groups may have to wait longer for positions than they otherwise would. Thus, women’s relative share of higher education is likely to be negatively associated with significant ethnic divisions in a nation. Ethnic heterogeneity is measured by Taylor and Hudson’s (1971) index of ethnonlinguistic fractionalization (ETHNOFRAC). Higher scores on this index indicate greater ethnonlinguistic diversity.

Authors, such as Bowman and Anderson (1982), Goode (1970), and Peshkin (1978), have noted that women in Muslim societies have particular difficulty overcoming conservative traditions and thus entering educational institutions at all levels. These authors are often hesitant to suggest that the purdah’s restrictions keep women from education altogether, but all imply that education, however defined, is apt to be qualitatively different for men and women in orthodox Muslim societies. Therefore, I expect that women in Islamic nations will have lower relative participation rates in higher education than will women elsewhere. I have designated a nation “Islamic” if more than 50 percent of its population was described as Islamic in the World Almanac (1987). ISLAM is treated as a dummy variable in the following analysis, with a nation rated 1 if it is Islamic and 0 if it is not. An alternative measure of the presence of Islamic populations, the percentage of the population that is Islamic (from Taylor and Hudson 1971), was used in parallel analyses not reported here. The results of these parallel analyses were essentially the same as those reported in this article.

Finally, some account of the hypothesized linkages between MNC investment and women’s relative access to higher education is possible. Although only imperfect measures of any of these linkages—“breed-and-feed” ideologies, discriminatory hiring for high-status positions, and the absence of state actions for gender equality—exist at this time, two of them may be approximated without an inappropriate loss of cases because of deficiencies in the data. Thus, although a breed-and-feed ideology is not directly measurable, fertility, a likely consequence of such an ideology, is. Moreover, London (1988) showed that MNC investment had a positive long-term effect on fertility. His indicator, and the one used here, is the crude birthrate (CBR), which is measured here in 1985 (data from the World Bank 1987) since the effect of fertility upon women’s relative access to higher education is apt to be almost immediate, insofar as women who are bearing children are much less likely than are other women to pursue

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2 Discrimination against women in high-status positions has been variously measured (see, Clark 1991; Semyonov and Shenhave 1988), but can only be done for 18 of the 44 peripheral nations involved in the current analysis. There is some modest support for the hypothesis linking MNCINV and HIED85 through occupational discrimination (in analyses not reported here involving one of these measures), but the small number of cases involved renders all such analyses suspect at this time.
higher education. My expectation is that the association between MNC investment and women’s relative access to higher education will appear diminished when fertility is controlled.

Data on state actions on behalf of gender equality are also difficult to come by, but, again, some likely consequences of such actions are measurable. One such consequence, at least insofar as its absence reflects probable governmental indifference, is the substantial presence of women in primary and secondary schools. This consequence is of particular interest, since it is also likely to condition the number of eligible female applicants for higher education, given that in most societies a minimum standard of eligibility is some previous formal education (see Inkeles and Sirowy 1983). One would expect that women’s relative participation in higher education would be directly associated with women’s relative participation in primary (PRIM) and secondary (SEC) education at earlier times. PRIM and SEC education is measured in 1965 and taken from data from the World Bank (1987). In the event, these two variables are highly correlated with each other and each with HIED, so because PRIM is more highly correlated with HIED, PRIM is used in analyses reported here. My expectation is that when women’s relative participation in primary education is added to the models outlined earlier, the apparent association between MNC investment and women’s relative access to higher education will be diminished.

**RESULTS**

Trend data suggest that enrollment rates for males in higher education were consistently higher than enrollment rates for females in both 1960 and 1985 and for core, peripheral, and semiperipheral nations alike. Women did make gains in all three types of nations during the period, but their gains in core nations, where the ratio of female rates to male rates more than doubled (from 38:100 in 1960 to 78:100 in 1985), exceeded their gains in semiperipheral nations (where the ratios rose from 46:100 to 77:100) and far exceeded those in peripheral nations (where the ratios rose only from 35:100 to 49:100). These facts alone make plausible the argument that dependency was negatively associated with gains in women’s relative participation in higher education, but they are also consistent with other hypotheses presented earlier, so further examination is necessary.

Table 1 reports intercorrelations among the main variables used in the panel regression analyses. Since the focus of this article is on noncore societies, the correlations reported are for noncore (peripheral and semiperipheral) nations, though they are representative (in direc-

| Table 1. Pearson Correlations Among Variables: Noncore Nations* |
|-------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Variables         | 1  | 2  | 3  | 4  | 5  | 6  | 7  | 8  |
| 1. HIED85         | .33 |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 2. HIED60         | .33 | (72)|    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 3. MNCINV         | -.02 | .20 |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| 4. LGNP           | .37 | .30 | .36 |    |    |    |    |    |
| 5. ETHNOFRAC      | -.44 | -.27 | -.03 | .40 |    |    |    |    |
| 6. ISLAM          | -.31 | -.31 | -.19 | -.08 | .00 |    |    |    |
| 7. PRIM           | .75 | .55 | .06 | .38 | -.34 | -.54 |    |    |
| 8. CBR85          | -.65 | -.62 | .03 | -.53 | .47 | -.29 | -.61 |    |
| Mean SD           | 53.2 | 37.0 | 62.2 | 3.1 | 43.8 | .32 | 70.1 | 43.0 |
| Number            | 92  | 72  | 81  | 93  | 95  | 105 | 92  | 86  |

* Number of cases in parentheses.
tion and in magnitude) of those for all nations and for each stratum of the world system (core, peripheral, and semi-peripheral nations). The most striking result in Table 1 may be that among the independent variables employed in the panel regression, HIED60 does not have the strongest zero-order association with HIED85—an almost unheard-of finding in panel-regression analyses. Women's participation in higher education is obviously unusually volatile, unusually subject to the ebb and flow of social, political, and economic currents. In fact, the correlation between HIED60 and HIED85 (r = .33) is dwarfed by the association of HIED85 and PRIM (r = .75) and the CBR in 1985 (r = -.65). Apparently, academic ineligibility and high fertility are both reasons why women were not occupying more university seats in 1985. This sign must be seen as hopeful, since virtually everywhere, women made great gains in primary and secondary education in the past generation (see Bowman and Anderson 1982; Smock 1981), as well as in the reduction of fertility.

But which variables have the greatest controlled associations with change in women's relative participation in higher education? The thesis of this article is that MNC investment in the secondary sector should be one of them, and the analyses reported in Table 2 bear this expectation out. Table 2 examines models involving noncore nations (Equation 1) and peripheral nations (Equations 2-5). Equation 1 in Table 2 suggests that among all noncore nations, MNC investment in the secondary sector (MNCINV) had a negative and statistically significant association with increases in women's relative participation in higher education among noncore nations. In fact, the controlled association of all independent variables is consistent with the hypotheses outlined earlier: change in women's relative participation in higher education is negatively, and statistically significantly, associated with MNCINV, ETHNOFRAC, and ISLAM, and positively associated with LGNP.

Equation 2 in Table 2 examines the same model using only peripheral nations, a sample in which the effects of MNC investment should, if anything, be stronger, since the governments of these nations, lacking other resources, must be most sensitive to MNC needs if they are to succeed in the competition for foreign capital. Here, the negative impact (beta = -.22) of MNC investment on women's relative gains in higher education is more substantial than it was for noncore nations as a whole (beta = -.15).

The support provided in Equations 1 and 2 of Table 2 for the thesis advanced in this article does not seem to be contingent on the extraordinary effects of regression outliers. An examination of outliers and of the Cook's D max statistic (see Norusis 1985, pp. 30-32) for all nations (D max = .13), for noncore nations (D max = .21), and for peripheral nations (D max = .28) suggests that no outliers had an undue influence on the associations mentioned before.

The support for the dependency hypothesis is contingent, however, on the

| Table 2. Panel Regression of HIED85 on MNCINV and Other Predictors |
|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|------------------------|
|                       | Noncore Nations        | Peripheral Nations     |                       |                       |
|                       | (1)                    | (2)                    | (3)                    | (4)*                   | (5)*                   |
| HIED60                | .57****                | .56***                 | .42**                  | .58***                 | .42**                  |
| MNCINV                | -.15*                  | -.22*                  | -.19*                  | -.23*                  | -.15                   |
| LGNP                  | .16*                   | .17                    | .16                    | .17                    | .09                    |
| ETHNOFRAC             | -.20**                 | -.26**                 | -.21*                  | -.24*                  | -.22*                  |
| ISLAM                 | -.23**                 | -.25**                 | -.11                   | -.25*                  | -.21*                  |
| PRIM                  |                        |                        |                        | .35**                  |                       |
| CBR85                 |                        |                        |                        |                       | -.24                   |
| R²                    | .75                    | .69                    | .74                    | .68                    | .70                    |
| Number                | 66                     | 44                     | 44                     | 42                     | 42                     |

*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.

*Two cases for which fertility data are unavailable have been deleted.
measure of dependency that is used. In analyses not reported here, two measures of trade dependency were substituted for MNC investment, but neither “foreign trade structure” nor “commodity concentration” (see Ballmer-Cao et al. 1979) for data and descriptions of the variables were found to have significant effects on change in the relative participation of women in higher education. Apparently the “new dependency” (based on MNC investment), found to be more salient than the “traditional trade dependency” for national development by Bornschier and Chase-Dunn (1985) in the postindependence period, has also been more important for women’s access to higher education. It turns out, however, that not all MNC investment is of equal significance. In analyses not reported here, for instance, a measure of MNC investment in agriculture, rather than in secondary-sector activities, showed no significant effect. An apparent paradox emerges: Only the form of economic dependency that has been shown to be associated with relative gains in women’s employment in manufacturing in noncore nations (Clark, in press; Nash and Fernandez-Kelly 1983) seems to have had a substantial negative impact on women’s relative access to higher education. It may be that only when women become proletarianized on a large scale that extraordinary measures toward their social control—special ideologies, lack of access to high-status jobs and to higher education, and limited governmental regulations against gender discrimination—become necessary.

Two major reasons why MNC investment should have a negative effect on women’s relative participation in higher education are its associations with breed-and-feed ideologies and with governmental disinterest in gender equality. The plausibility of these linkages will be strengthened if the association between MNCINV and HIED85 is found to be lower in models involving measures of fertility and women’s relative access to primary education than it is in comparable models without such measures.

Some support for the plausibility of these linkages is evident in Equations 3–5 in Table 2. Equation 3 replicates the analysis depicted in Equation 2 for peripheral nations (the class of nations for which the dependency hypothesis most clearly applies), but adds the control for PRIM in 1965. The controlled association between MNCINV and HIED85 is, as expected, lower (beta = -.19) than in Equation 2 (beta = -.22). Assuming that PRIM is a sensible indicator of governmental efforts to create gender equality, this finding accords nicely, if modestly, with the theoretical suggestion that the effect of MNC investment on women’s relative access to higher education partially reflects its attraction to areas in which governmental interference in the labor market is low. A comparison of Equations 2 and 3 also suggests that much of the association between several other control variables (notably ISLAM and ETHNOFRAC) and HIED85 is also explicable in terms of PRIM.

A comparison of Equations 4 and 5 indicates similar support for the theoretical suggestion that MNC investment’s effect on women’s relative access to higher education partially reflects its positive influence on fertility. Equation 4 replicates Equation 2, deleting the two cases for which data on fertility in 1985 are unavailable. Here the controlled association between MNCINV and HIED85 is about the same (beta = -.23) as it was in Equation 2. Equation 5 introduces the control for CBR85 and shows that when this control is introduced, the association between MNCINV and HIED85 declines substantially (to beta = -.15).

CONCLUSION

The findings indicate that MNC investment has played a role in slowing the entry of women into higher education in noncore nations. When dependency is measured by MNC in secondary-sector activities and panel regression analysis is used for the largest available sample of noncore and peripheral nations over a long lag period, the result is clear: MNC investment had a significant negative effect on women’s relative gains in higher education.

This article advanced the argument that this effect has been accomplished
through the impact of MNC investment on at least three intervening variables: (1) an ideology that effectively discourages women from pursuing advanced degrees by encouraging them to breed and feed, (2) men’s disproportionate access to high-status positions that encourages men to seek such degrees, and (3) the absence of governmental regulations against gender discrimination. Elaborations of the article’s basic analysis suggest the plausibility of two of these mechanisms, though the measurement strategies employed render them more suggestive than compelling at this stage. A case study approach (à la Ward 1990 on women’s work) may now be a fruitful way of developing more precise models of women’s relative participation in higher education.

Which noncore nations, then, are most likely to provide women with substantial opportunities for higher education and perhaps for altering the gender composition of the cultural gatekeepers? The foregoing analysis suggests that they will be those nations that are least dependent on foreign private investments in secondary-sector activities and have the least divisive ethnic diversity, the highest concentration of females at earlier levels of the educational system and in high-status occupations, and the highest per capita wealth. Certain trends in noncore nations, such as vastly increased levels of female participation in primary and secondary education and decreased fertility, permit hope for better prospects for women in higher education. Against these trends, however, must be weighed the ever-increasing reliance of many noncore nations on MNC.

**APPENDIX**

Nations Included in Multivariate Analyses*

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* * Signifies peripheral status, ** signifies semiperipheral status.

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