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The Tanzimat and the Problem of Political Authority in the Ottoman Empire: 1839-1876

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The

Tanzimat

And the Problem of Political
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Ottoman Empire,

1839-1876

Kevin Goodwin
History Honors Thesis
May, 2006

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Note on Transliteration

This thesis has an abundance of names and technical terms which are transliterated from Arabic and Turkish. As the location of the subject of the study is the Ottoman Empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, I have chosen for the most part to use the Turkish form of the Arabic technical terms and names. As I do not know Turkish, I have followed the spelling and /or form most commonly used in my sources. In certain instances I have written a technical term in Arabic as well, but only for purposes of clarification. and thereafter in writing the technical term I have used the Turkish form.

Chapter I

Prelude to the Tanzimat: Early Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1774-1839

Introduction

By the end of the eighteenth century the wealth and power of the Ottoman Empire was dissipating at an ever increasing rate. At one time the Ottoman Empire was considered the “terror of Europe.”¹ Now, at the close of the eighteenth century no major European power was fearful or even concerned with the military power of the Ottoman Empire. In the nineteenth century the weakness of the Empire became the essential concern of its rulers and they embarked aggressively on a series of reform programs which they hoped would restore its power. The focus of this essay is to examine one of the most important nineteenth century reform programs undertaken anywhere in the Muslim world, the *Tanzimat*. Of special focus will be the policies, adopted by the ruling elite, and the political ideas, expressed by the intellectuals of the Empire, all with the goal of restoring the Empire’s power. The *Tanzimat* took place against the background of a half century of reform efforts which provide essential background and context for the *Tanzimat* itself. And it is to this period that we turn to first.

The Failure to Reform under Selim III (1789-1807)

This period of early reform was marked by a critical event in 1774. In 1774 the Ottoman Empire and Russia signed a peace treaty which ended a six-year war, 1768-1774, the *Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji*.² This treaty marked another defeat in a series of defeats during the eighteenth century by European nations, and was a catalyst which brought the Empire rapidly spiraling downward. *Kuchuk Kainardji* was forced on the

¹ Bernard Lewis, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (New York and London: Oxford University Press, 2002), 23.

² Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire (New York: Perennial, 2002), 404.

Ottomans due to enormous Russian military pressure upon the Empire, and it became clearer, to at least some Ottoman statesmen, that something had to be done in order for the Empire to recover and return to its greatness of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. *Kuchuk Kainardji* was, to the Ottoman point of view, calamitous. The most devastating component of the treaty was expressed in Article III, which transferred the Crimea, under Ottoman control for nearly two centuries, to the Russian Empire. This allowed Russia to intervene easier in the Empire, especially in newly independent Crimea, and, to draw upon an analogy from Russian history, gave Russia an opportunity to acquire another “warm-water” port.

Kuchuk Kainardji changed the balance of power in the region not only between Russia and the Ottoman Empire but also with Europe.³ This unbalance discouraged the Ottoman Empire in its attempt to return erstwhile dominant status in eastern and southeastern Europe. According to Norman Itzkowitz, “If the Empire were to continue to exist, a new understanding of its problems and fresh solutions would have to be found.”⁴ This realization, however, did not fully manifest itself until 1789, when a new Sultan, Selim III, ascended the throne on April 7th, 1789, coincidentally the same year the French Revolution began.

When Selim III took the throne his predecessor, Abdulhamid I, had left a real mess for him. The Ottoman Empire was once again involved in a devastating war against not only Russia, but also against Austria in an attempt to regain the Crimea.⁵ The second

³ Mubadele-An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors, Annotated and translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), 38-39.

⁴ Norman Itzkowitz, Ottoman Empire and Islamic Tradition (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1972), 108.

⁵ Stanford Shaw, Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Sultan Selim III 1789-1807 (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1971), 21.

Russo-Turkish War, 1787-1792, concluded with another debilitating defeat for the Ottoman Empire.⁶ Even though the Ottoman Empire was defeated, the end of the war at least allowed Selim III to concentrate on the problems that were plaguing the Empire, rather than focusing on new wars with European nations.

The two defeats mentioned above eliminated Ottoman control over the Crimea and severely incapacitated Ottoman control over the Black Sea. After the two defeats mentioned above, Selim III realized the Empire needed radical reform. The problem for Selim, as was for his predecessors dating back a century, was how to reform an Empire that had undergone relatively few periods of reforms in its almost six hundred years of existence? Selim knew there were two pathways of reform. The first method of reform was to go back to an imagined “Golden Age.” In this “Golden Age” faith and state, *din ve devlet* in Turkish⁷, were fused together and the *shari’ah*⁸ was used as the legal basis of the state and society. A different approach, which had been hesitantly tried in the eighteenth century, was to reform the Empire based upon Western models rather than Islamic models. No matter which direction Selim would decide to reform the Empire, whether he reformed the Empire by implementing traditional institutions or if he attempted to reform by introducing Westernize ideas into the Empire, this decision by Selim would radically change the Empire’s subsequent history. The decision to reform on

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Shahrough Akhavi, “Dawlah,” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 1:353. In Arabic the term is *din wa dawla*. *Dawlah* traditionally “refers to the concept of state and is a central concept in the discourse of the contemporary Islamists.” In Turkish the term is *devlet*. This term refers only to state and not government.

⁸ Norman Calder, “Law” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 450. The idea of law is articulated usually by two key terms. The first of these is *fiqh*, the second key term in regards to law is *Shari’ah*, which “refers to God’s law in its quality as divine. “It also refers to God’s law as it is with him or with his Prophet, or as it is contained within the corpus of revelation”. The *Shari’ah* displays loyalty and a focus of faith for all Muslims. *Shari’ah* is used here but later on in the paper I will use the Turkish equivalent to *shari’ah*, which is the term *şariat*.

the basis of the latter model was decided, in part, by Selim III. The implications of this approach would mean reform along non-Muslim lines, of all aspects of the Empire not only military and political but social and cultural as well.

The Ottoman elite had long focused on traditional reforms. One key figure who favored the policy to return to this traditional framework was a late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Ottoman statesman named Sari Mehmed Paşa. Sari Mehmed Paşa composed an extensive essay dedicated to the Sultan, in which he advocated that the Empire reform according to traditional Islamic values in contrast to the radical ideas of reforming the Empire according to Western ideas subscribed to by Selim.

Sari Mehmed's full name is Baqqall-oghlu Sari Hajji Mehmed Paşa. He was born in the city of Istanbul around 1656.⁹ Other than this there is not much known about the early life of Sari Mehmed. However, his full name does provide some clues as to his identity. For example, Sari means, "yellow," which indicates that either his hair or his skin was yellow. Sari Mehmed Paşa was an insightful observer of Muslim history and culture in the early eighteenth century. For a good portion of his adult life, Mehmed Paşa had been part of the government of the Ottoman Empire. One of the positions he held was *Grand Vezir*.¹⁰ Within the framework of the Ottoman government there were many *Vezirs*, and the most senior of these *Vezirs* was called the *Grand Vezir*.¹¹ The duty of the *Grand Vezir* was to counsel the Sultan on all matters affecting "The High Ottoman State."

⁹ Sari Mehmed Paşa, *The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors*, trans. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1935), 4. According to Wright, the exact date of his birth is not known, but because of his appointment as an official in a treasury office in 1671, which according to Wright was when he was twelve to fifteen years of age, we can infer that he was born sometime after 1656.

¹⁰ Madeline C. Zilfi, "Vizier," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, 4: 306.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 306-307. This term is derived from the Arabic and Persian "wazir", "vazir", and Turkish "vezir". The term means "bearer of burdens" or "minister." The role of a "vizier" was to advise the Sultan in military and civil matters. The leading deputy was called "Grand Vizier," whose main responsibility was to advise the Sultan.

Throughout his writings, especially in his book entitled The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, Sari Mehmed Paşa's main thesis was the proper way in which governmental officials should act in order to maintain the wealth and power of the Ottoman Empire.¹² Sari Mehmed Paşa believed the Empire deviated from the correct path of Islam, and attributed this to its decline. Specifically, Sari Mehmed believed corruption among the high officials of the Empire was one of the major causes for the downfall of the Empire.

In his book, Sari Mehmed Paşa wrote extensively on the role of the *Grand Vezir*. According to Sari Mehmed, the Sultan must appoint a religiously righteous person to fill the role of *Grand Vezir* because of its importance to the Empire and hence the dynasty.¹³ The *Grand Vezir* must be a person who will fight passionately to destroy illegal practices and injustices. The *Grand Vezir* must also remove all corruption and tyranny from the government. In addition, oppression and stubbornness must be driven out of governmental affairs.¹⁴ In addition to these duties, Sari Mehmed emphasized other important aspects of the character of the *Grand Vezir*. Most important was the need to treat all people the same no matter how rich, powerful, or educated they were.¹⁵ The *Grand Vezir* must treat all people equally because the *şeriat* demands justice. Another obligation was for the *Grand Vezir* to have humility. He should not allow fortune or bribes to sway his opinions in the governing affairs of the Empire. In addition, the *Grand Vezir* should not be thinking of the monetary benefits of his job. Instead he should be

¹² Sari Mehmed Paşa's book The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, was written during the early nineteenth century at a time when the Ottoman Empire was declining in wealth and power. Sari Mehmed wrote this book in an attempt to awaken the Muslim ruling elite as to why the Empire was declining and how to fix the problems within it.

¹³ Mehmed, The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, trans. Walter Livingston Wright, Jr., 64-65.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 65-66.

¹⁵ Mehmed, The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, 66.

thinking about creating remedies and solutions to the problems of the Empire.¹⁶ This was one of the two options Sultan Selim III could have chosen in his attempts of reforming the Ottoman Empire. The ideology of returning to the Golden Age of Islam where faith and state, *din ve devlet*, were amalgamated together in order to create a just, harmonious society based on Islam. After careful deliberation, however, Selim decided this path was not the correct course of action for the Empire to undergo. He came to this conclusion as a result of witnessing the devastating defeats inflicted by the European nations upon the Empire, especially the Crimea.

This decision was not easy for Selim to make as he knew it would anger the religious establishment, the *ulema*, and as a new Sultan, he needed the support of the *ulema*.¹⁷ The support of the *ulema* was required because they held much of the power over many of the institutions of the Empire including, the judiciary, the educational system, and they also held important political positions within the traditional framework of the government.¹⁸ If the *ulema* were not in favor of the reforms put into place by Selim III, he would have had an arduous time in successfully implementing these changes. For this reason the success of the reforms would hinge on their acceptance by the *ulema*. Some members of the *ulema* were opposed to reforming the Empire according to Western ideas because they came from the infidels. However, not all of the members of the *ulema* came to that conclusion. Some members of the *ulema* cited the

¹⁶ Ibid., 68.

¹⁷ Iftikhar, Zaman, "Ulama," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 258-59. *Ulama* is an Arabic term which means "man of knowledge" and is the plural form of the word *alim*. *Ulama* refers to a class of men with knowledge of the *Qur'an*, *Hadith*, and *fiqh*.

¹⁸ Uriel Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and Mahmud II," in The Modern Middle East, ed. Albert H. Hourani, Mary Wilson, and Phillip Khoury (New York: I.B. Tauris and Company, Limited, 2004), 29.

precedents set by Ibn Khaldun,¹⁹ who showed through his writings that the early Arab community withdrew from its original pagan society and assimilated customs, from the Zoroastrian Persians and the Orthodox Christian Byzantines, such as military techniques.²⁰ Consequently, Selim was able to gain the support of the majority of the *ulema* establishment and implement his ideas of reform.

Selim III realized that a process of reform in accordance with Western models of secularization and advancement could not fully manifest itself within the framework of the traditional setting, but must be a gradual process. Hence, the first step taken by Selim was to reform a segment of the military. The majority of Selim's efforts went toward creating a new military system, which was loyal to and only to the Sultan. This new military was given the title of "The *Nizam-i Jedid* Army" or "The New Order Army."²¹ After the defeats of the Empire, described earlier, there was virtually no resistance regarding the creation of a new military system. The only difference of opinion regarding this new system was whether or not it should become part of the old military, the *Janissaries*²², or become an independent formation.

¹⁹ Fuad Baali, "Ibn Khaldun, 'Abd Al-Rahman," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2: 164. Ibn Khaldun was born in 1332 in Tunis and died in 1406. Ibn Khaldun gained much attention with his theories about Arab social structures and their processes. Ibn Khaldun observed the political fluctuations of the Mamluke kingdom in Egypt. Throughout his life he held many prestigious positions such as secretary of state, ambassador, and was at one time a judge. It was these positions that gave Khaldun a perspective on social and political dynamics from which he developed his theories of the rise and decline of states and on the dominant role of the nomads as the state builders and rulers.

²⁰ Heyd, "The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization," 37.

²¹ *Nizam-i Jedid* in Ottoman Turkish meant the new organization, that is the new (military) formation. See Shaw, Between Old and New, 127.

²² William J. Griswold, "Janissaries," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 367-68. The *Janissaries*, or *Yeniceri* in Turkish, were created in the late fourteenth century. Before the creation of the Janissaries the military of the Ottoman Empire consisted of free Muslim Ghazi warriors; however the Janissaries were an elite slave infantry. In return for their military services the members of the Janissaries were given special privileges, such as tax-exempt status. In addition to fighting wars, another purpose of the *Janissaries* was to keep the peace between Muslims and non-Muslims within the borders of the Empire.

The need to keep the *Nizam-i Jedid* independent of the *Janissaries* was clear because of the corruption of the *Janissaries*. The traditional system for the military was based on loyalty. In return for the *Janissaries*' loyalty they were given land to live on. The land received by the *Janissaries* in return for military service was called a *timar*.²³ When Selim needed more money in order to supply the *Nizam-i Jedid*, he confiscated a portion of the *Janissaries*' *timars* and used them to support the *Nizam-i Jedid* by turning them into domains.²⁴

The revenue created by Selim through tax-farming allowed him to implement three key components that were necessary in order for the Empire's military to be reformed. These three key aspects of military reform were: a) the *Janissary* and other military orders must be restored to their original forms, b) modern methods should be introduced under the pretext of restoring them in their original forms, and c) these traditional military institutions and their methods are not capable of reform and therefore must be abolished altogether and modern methods must be introduced.²⁵ The first regiment was created in Summer 1794.²⁶ In addition to training with foreign officers, Selim sent officers to military schools throughout Europe to learn new tactics and weaponry, with emphasis upon learning how military and naval schools were established and improving gun foundries and arsenals within the Empire.²⁷ However, as the *Nizam-i*

²³ Ira M. Lapidus, "Sultanates and Gunpowder Empires: The Middle East", in The Oxford History of Islam, ed. John Esposito (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 377. In exchange for military service, the *Janissaries* were given land grants as the form of income; this land grant was called a "timar."

²⁴ Lewis, The Emergence, 90-92.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 93.

²⁶ Shaw, Between Old and New, 130.

²⁷ Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey, First published (Montreal: McGill University Press, 1964), published in a facsimile edition (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1998), 75.

Jedid forces continued to expand after 1805 problems began to rise.²⁸ For instance, many of the newer recruits were undisciplined, and therefore were also uncontrollable. As a result, changes were made to the organization of the military.²⁹ Some changes included promoting additional officers, and handing out more severe punishments for unruly behavior.³⁰ Though these changes helped to stabilize the *Nizam-i Jedid*, resistance and animosity toward the newly created military system increased. Leading the charge against the *Nizam-i Jedid* were the *ulema*, who saw the changes implemented by Selim as a violation of Islamic law, and of course, the *Janissaries*, who were threatened by the *Nizam-i Jedid*.

This led to open revolt against Selim's policy of westernization, in an event known as the Edirne Incident. The result was that Selim was forced to place command of the *Nizam-i Jedid* in the hands of his opponents, which culminated by May 1807 in his abdication in favor of his cousin Mustafa IV.³¹

The reign of Mustafa IV, 1807-08, was short lived, a time span of only months. During his reign, he was merely seen as a puppet of the conservatives who had placed him on the throne.³² Stating that the creation of the *Nizam-i Jedid* was a violation of Islamic law, Mustafa IV ordered the army to be dismantled and all of the schools and institutions associated with it to be destroyed as well. All of the reforms implemented by Selim III were replaced by traditional models. This led, in turn, to Selim's followers, with the help of a powerful provincial governor, Mustafa Bayrakdar, staging a successful

²⁸ Stanford J. Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 1: Empire of the Ghazis, The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976), 272.

²⁹ Shaw, Between Old and New, 33.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 133.

³¹ Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1: 273-74.

³² Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries, 433.

counter-coup in 1808, overthrowing Mustafa IV. This occurred not before Mustafa's supporters had managed to assassinate Selim, which then led to the elevation of his younger brother, Mahmud II to the imperial throne.³³

The Reign of Mahmud II: The Reform Movement Continues 1808-1839

Mahmud II would rule the Ottoman Empire as Sultan from 1808 to 1839. During the initial years of his reign, he was dominated by his *Grand Vezir* Mustafa Bayrakdar, since it was Bayrakdar who brought him to power and elevated him to the throne.³⁴ Controlling all of the power, Bayrakdar reinstated the *Nizam-i Jedid*, but he kept the new military regime largely out of sight. Yet soon enough the *Janissaries* became once again enraged over the creation of a western style military force which threatened their position and power, and they once again revolted. The end result was the death of not only Bayrakdar himself but of the *Nizam-i Jedid* as well.³⁵ After this was done, the rebels demanded Mahmud to select a new *Grand Vezir* with a similar ideology as their own. Mahmud refused to give in to their demands because he believed doing so would only bring about his demise, as was the case for his brother Selim. Not only did Mahmud not give in to the rebel's demands but he also had Mustafa IV killed, leaving no heir to the throne other than himself.³⁶

Following this development, Mahmud was careful not to openly advocate reforms which would lead to resistance on the part of the *ulema* or the *Janissaries*. He bided his time, moving carefully on the introduction of any new policies, until he was able to decisively confront the conservative forces opposed to a policy of non-traditional reform.

³³ Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 1: 276.

³⁴ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey 2: Reform, Revolution, and Republic (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 1.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 4-5.

³⁶ Shaw, and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 5.

The most impressive reforms implemented by Mahmud were those made to the military despite the revolts of the *Janissaries*. Mahmud had great changes in mind for the military; however, he could not implement any of his ideas until the *Janissaries* were suppressed once and for all. Mahmud got his chance and did not fail in his attempt to reform the military according to Western ideas of training and equipment, as Selim III had attempted. On May 28, 1826 a *Hatt-i Sherif*³⁷ was ordered and the *Nizam-i Jedid* was revived. Mahmud believed the military was the fundamental component to reform in order to bring the Empire back to opulence. By establishing this as the motive in reforming the military, Mahmud received permission from the *Chief Mufti* and the *ulema* to carry on with these reforms.³⁸

Even though Mahmud received support from a majority of the people, the *Janissaries* were upset by this attempt to replace them. On June 14, two days after the *Nizam-i Jedid* began to drill; the *Janissaries* once again staged a revolt. Contrary to the last revolt of the *Janissaries* in 1807, this time the governing officials did not support their cause.³⁹ Gathering a furious mob, the *Janissaries* mutinied on June 15 and marched into the central parade grounds near the palace. It was in this location where the *Janissaries* were ultimately annihilated by the *Nizam-i Jedid*.⁴⁰ In order to make sure the *Janissaries* would never revolt again, all remaining members of the *Janissaries* were sought out and executed throughout Istanbul and the Empire. This event ironically became known as known as the *Auspicious Event*.⁴¹

³⁷Ibid., 490. A *Hatt-i Serif* is a decree written or signed by the Sultan or as it is commonly referred to today as an executive order.

³⁸ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 79.

³⁹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 20.

⁴⁰ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 79.

⁴¹ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 20-21.

Since Sultan Mahmud II was in full control over the government, he could begin to implement the reforms which his brother Selim had begun during his reign as Sultan.

According to Stanford Shaw, unlike his brother, Mahmud realized:

1) reforms, to be successful, had to encompass the entire scope of Ottoman institutions and society, not only a few elements of the military; (2) the only way that reformed institutions could operate was through the destruction of the ones they were replacing, so that the latter could not hinder their operation; and (3) the reforms had to be carefully planned and support assured before they were attempted.⁴²

One of the most significant ideas Mahmud had was his concept of the Ottoman state.

The Ottoman Empire was comprised of many ethnic and religious groups. However, not all people were treated equally by the Ottoman government. Mahmud embraced the radical idea that all people within the Empire should have sovereignty in comparison to the medieval concept of an Islamic Empire. The medieval concept of state was based on the Islamic religion and on a “social structure based on distinct orders and estates.”⁴³

Mahmud wanted to change this concept. As a result, this was to become one of the most important debates during the *Tanzimat*: to allow all people within the Empire irrespective of race, religion, or language the same rights and freedoms.

In order to achieve this goal of creating an equal society, Mahmud realized that he had to abolish the *millet system*. The *millet system* was the way whereby the Ottoman Empire organized its Muslim and non-Muslim subjects into separate communities, all headed by a religious figure. These communities were quasi-autonomous in that they administered their own educational and judicial systems. In return for this status as quasi-autonomy, the millets collected taxes for the Ottoman government and helped to

⁴² As quoted in *Ibid.*, 1.

⁴³ Berkes, *The Development*, 10.

enforce social discipline.⁴⁴ Mahmud believed this system treated non-Muslims as subordinates rather than as equals.

Furthermore, Mahmud also wanted to establish a new system of governmental organization to run the Empire. In this attempt, Mahmud used European styles of organization as a model. One of the positions Mahmud attempted to reform was the office of the *seyhulislam*,⁴⁵ which controlled the *ulema*.⁴⁶ In addition to the *seyhulislam*, Mahmud also wanted to modify the position of the *sadrazam*, the head of the military establishment.⁴⁷ By doing away with the political role of the *seyhulislam*, both of the roles of Sultan and *Caliph*⁴⁸ were combined into one position.⁴⁹ In place of the position of the *sadrazam*, Mahmud "...appointed a *basvekil* (chief minister) and *vekils* (ministers) to departments of government that had set duties, functioning under his overall authority."⁵⁰ By doing this, Mahmud began the process of creating a new system of government and political authority based on Western models rather than traditional Islamic models. In addition to these changes he made in the Sultan's bureaucracy, Mahmud reduced the role of the *seyhulislam* in regard to governing affairs by reducing his functions to religious affairs only.⁵¹ In addition to the changes in the organization of the government, Mahmud also made reforms in regard to how the bureaucrats were paid.

⁴⁴ Lapidus, "Sultanates and Gunpowder," 386.

⁴⁵ Matthew S. Gordon, "Shaykh Al-Islam," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 54. This is an alternative way of writing *seyhulislam*. This title first appeared in the late tenth century, well before the Ottoman Empire was established. The *seyhulislam* was the "chief mufti" or "jurisconsult" and was the head of the *ulema*. Among his duties was to order *fatwas* or "written legal opinions based on Islamic legal tradition." In addition to his religious and legal duties, the *seyhulislam* was also an advisor to the Sultan, making the position very important religiously and politically.

⁴⁶ Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 8.

⁴⁷ Berkes, The Development, 97.

⁴⁸ John L. Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th ed. (Syracuse New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984), 30-31.

Caliph was a title given to a person who was the "Commander of the Faithful." The duty of the *Caliph* is to enforce the Shari'ah or holy law, and is considered to be the protector of Islam. Refer to glossary for a full definition.

⁴⁹ Berkes, The Development, 97.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Berkes, The Development, 98.

The system which had been in place for centuries was that officials were paid a fee by those who used their services. Mahmud eliminated this by instituting a system of direct salaries paid from the central treasury, which he hoped would involve less corruption than the previous system.⁵²

After the Janissaries were destroyed and no longer posed a threat to Mahmud's attempts to reform the Empire, he was able to continue with little resistance with other reform policies. There is much debate as to why and how these reforms by Mahmud would become incorporated into the Ottoman Empire. According to Niyazi Berkes in his book The Development of Secularism in Turkey:

Aside from the acceptance of the superiority of the material features of the modern civilization, there was also the recognition of the need to replace certain traditional habits and customs by others in greater harmony with the new conditions. The notable element in this insight, giving to it the colour of Westernization, was the belief that the modern West was worthy of being taken as a model in the efforts to establish new ways.⁵³

However, Bernard Lewis has his own interpretation pertaining to the reforms in the Ottoman Empire. Bernard Lewis wrote in his book The Emergence of Modern Turkey:

The contemporary evidence of the influence of new ideas in Turkey is largely negative; it could hardly be otherwise. The cultural traditions and political traditions of the Ottoman Empire were conducive neither to the formulation nor to the expression of new political theories or programmes. As so often happens, the first appearance of heterodox ideas in an authoritarian society is known only from refutations and condemnations; when positive responses appear, they are sporadic and furtive, and, in Islamic societies especially, assume traditional disguise of a return to the sanctified past.⁵⁴

⁵² Justin McCarthy, The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923 (London and New York: Addison Wesley Longman limited, 1997), 293.

⁵³ Berkes, The Development, 122.

⁵⁴ Lewis, The Emergence, 72-73.

Both interpretations on the surface appear to be accurate assessments of the reform policies of the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century. However, Bernard Lewis fails to take into full account the affect the French Revolution had on the Ottoman Empire and how many of the reform policies introduced into the Ottoman Empire were a byproduct of the French Revolution. The Ottomans did not wrap these newly discovered principles of governing affairs under a blanket of traditional fundamentalism, as Bernard Lewis claims would transpire. Rather, the ruling Ottomans and Mahmud in particular, stressed the importance of moving forward rather than reverting to their Islamic traditions as was the case proposed by Sari Mehmed Paşa in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In this regard, Niyazi Berkes appears to more accurately formulate the changes implemented in the Ottoman Empire during the nineteenth century.

The reforms established by Mahmud were the beginning of later reforms. In addition to the above reforms, Mahmud also reformed other institutions. Mahmud also reorganized the educational system, which helped implement reforms of the military establishment and established a definite curriculum for the educational system for training officers.⁵⁵ These reforms led to a public announcement of a new policy of reform. The announcement was in the form of an imperial decree which inaugurated the *Tanzimat Era*. This document was called the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane*.

The Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane

On November 3, 1839 the *Tanzimat Charter*, better known as The *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane*, was proclaimed, only several months after Mahmud II had died and his son Abdul-Mecid had taken over the Sultanate.⁵⁶ This document was one of the first to

⁵⁵ Berkes, *The Development*, 100.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 144.

represent a transformation in the political as well as the social spheres of the dissipating Ottoman Empire. This document signifies an attempt to modernize the Empire according to Western political and social ideologies. The *Hatt-i Sherif* decree was primarily authored by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, the Foreign Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of its conception in 1839.⁵⁷ The *Hatt-i Sherif* was the first of many edicts in the next thirty-seven years, which stressed the importance of modernizing the political, social, military, and educational systems of the Ottoman Empire. This document is the decree which ushered in a new period of reforms in the Empire. This period is known as the *Tanzimat Era*.

Mustafa Reşid Paşa, born in 1800 and died in 1859,⁵⁸ was one of the first Ottoman bureaucrats to receive some European education. He dominated the first fifteen years of the *Tanzimat*, 1839-1854.⁵⁹ In addition, between the years of 1835 and 1839 Mustafa Reşid Paşa traveled through much of Europe and learned a great deal about the west and their ideology.⁶⁰ While in Europe he was attracted by how liberal there he governments were in comparison to the Ottoman Empire. He was also Ottoman Ambassador to Paris and London during the early 1830s, and served as *Grand Vezir* six times and as Foreign Minister twice.⁶¹ It was during these appointments when he was able to make the Porte “into an instrument of reform as well as political power.”⁶² Mustafa Reşid Paşa’s purpose in writing the *Hatt-i Sherif* was only to introduce the idea

⁵⁷ Serif Mardin, “*Tanzimat*,” in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, 4: 184.

⁵⁸ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 105.

⁵⁹ William L. Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East, Third Edition* (Boulder Colorado: Westview Press, 2004), 82.

⁶⁰ Butrus Abu-Manneh, “The Islamic Roots of the Gulhane Rescript,” in *Die Welt des Islams*, New Ser., 34, no.2 (November 1994), 173.

⁶¹ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern*, 82.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 59.

of complete security for all people and to regulate internal and military expenditures.⁶³

However true this may be, there seems to be a debate among the scholars as to how much Mustafa Reşid was influenced by Western knowledge of political systems. Berkes writes in his book, The Development of Secularization in Turkey, that Mustafa Reşid was influenced by the West in writing the 1839 *Hatt*. In discussing the influences of the 1839 *Hatt*, Berkes states:

We do not have to look at the English or the French political impact in order to discover the origins of the ideas contained in the *Tanzimat* Charter and we shall not find them in the Muslim political thinking of the past.⁶⁴

However, not all people agree with Berkes's conclusion that Mustafa's writing was influenced by the West. Halil Inalcik, a Turkish Ottoman historian states, "...the traditional state philosophy was genuinely apparent in it...the basic principle of legislation, also, was...not in natural rights but in the practical necessity of resuscitating the Empire."⁶⁵ Regardless from where his influence was acquired, Mustafa Reşid is considered by some scholars to be the real designer of nineteenth-century Ottoman reforms and hence his title, the "Father of the *Tanzimat*."⁶⁶ Another goal of his was to prevent the collapse of a multiethnic and multi-religious Empire, which at the time controlled parts of southern Europe, the Near East of today, and parts of North Africa.

Even though the Ottoman Empire ruled a vast area of territory; at the time of the document's introduction into Ottoman politics, the Empire was militarily weak and

⁶³ Mardin, "*Tanzimat*," 4: 184.

⁶⁴ Berkes, The Development, 144.

⁶⁵ Abu-Manneh, "The Islamic Roots..." 174. For the full quote by Halil Inalcik refer to Halil Inalcik, "The Nature of Traditional Society: Turkey," in *Political Modernization in Japan and Turkey*, eds. R.E. Ward and D.A. Rustow (Princeton, 1964), 56-57.

⁶⁶ Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 58.

economically stagnate. Moreover, the Ottoman possessions in the Balkans were in jeopardy of becoming independent due to a rise of nationalism, which was encouraged by other nations, such as Russia.⁶⁷ Starting in the 1920s, a succession of revolts took place in Serbia, Greece, Romania, and Bulgaria due to which all acquired their sovereignty.⁶⁸ The Balkans, however, was not the only region in which resistance occurred. Egypt was also a mounting dilemma for the Ottoman Empire. After British and French troops left Egypt in 1800, Egypt was left leaderless and in chaos. A Turk from Macedonia named Muhammad Ali took advantage of the disorder in Egypt, and assumed power.⁶⁹ Muhammad Ali may have been the leader of Egypt, but Egypt was still under the control of the Ottoman Empire. Ali ruled Egypt more as a Governor than as a Sultan. Yet in 1831, Ali's army, led by his son Ibrahim, invaded Ottoman territories in Syria and the area now called Palestine and Israel and continued to move northward toward the Ottoman capital, Istanbul.⁷⁰ This worried the British because they feared that this invasion could cause the demise of the Ottoman Empire, therefore changing the balance of power in Europe. In response, the British joined forces with the Ottomans and "...forced the Egyptian forces out of Syria in 1840."⁷¹

This event demonstrates how feeble the Ottoman Empire had become by the early nineteenth century, in spite of the reforms that had been carried out by Selim and Mahmud. Clearly, the Ottoman Empire was no longer a Ghazi state, in which vast territory was gained through warfare. As a result, the rulers of the Ottoman Empire, and

⁶⁷ James Gelvin, The Modern Middle East: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 58.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books, 1991), 273.

⁷⁰ Jason, Goodwin, Lord of Horizons (New York: Picador, 1998), 300.

⁷¹ Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 59.

their ruling apparatus, the bureaucrats and the military, knew that the Empire needed to be altered, rather than being reformed, and thus the 1839 *Hatt*, was promulgated.⁷²

This document was not simply a call for changes in order to re-establish the Ottoman Empire as a major power of the world. The ruling elites suspected in some aspect that the Empire would never again have the capabilities militarily, economically, or culturally to mirror those of the European powers. As a result, the *Hatt* was to become one of the most important documents of nineteenth century history in the Muslim world as it explicitly lays out a framework for a program of Westernized-inspired reform. A discussion of this document is thus necessary at this point. The interpretation of this document will be my account, since I have read the document.

The *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane* describes explicit reasons for the decline of the Ottoman Empire from its opulent status in the previous centuries. One of the primary causes of the Empire's decline was due to a lack of adherence to the *şeriat*. The document stated, "...countries not governed by the laws of *Şeriat* cannot survive".⁷³ This document also stated that there was no effective administration of the Ottoman government and its provinces, and new legislation was required in order to reverse the decline brought about by such inadequacies.

There were many other reasons for the decline of the Empire that were implicitly acknowledged throughout this document, one of these being overexpansion. At its height, the Empire ruled an immense amount of territory, which expanded into three continents. Due to this fact, the Empire was always waging war on one of its borders, for example, against the Hapsburgs in Europe, the Safavid Empire, and later against

⁷² Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 60. The 1839 *Hatt* is usually known for its full name, the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane*, because it was read first in the rose garden of the palace where it was promulgated.

⁷³ Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East*, 149.

Muhammad Ali in Egypt. Military success had always gone hand in hand with the Ottomans, but by the eighteenth century this had changed and the Empire was on the defensive on all its borders.

This leads to the next reason why the Empire was declining and was perceived as being weak. Even as the Empire was declining, the nations of Europe were undergoing dynamic change as a result of the cumulative effects of the scientific revolution, the Enlightenment, the industrial and democratic revolutions, all fueled in part by the influx of specie from the Western Hemisphere, the growingly world-wide mercantile dominance of the Europeans, and the evolutions of Western thought.⁷⁴ The Ottoman Empire, in common with all the societies of Eurasia outside of Europe, never went through such a combination of changes. As a result, the Empire did not modernize technologically, militarily, politically, economically, or culturally. While the nations of Europe were developing into stronger and more formidable societies, the Ottomans were in a condition of stasis.

There were three radical remedies proposed by the *Hatt-i- Sherif*. The first of these remedies introduced by this document was that it guaranteed “security of life, honor, and property,” for all people. The key phrase is “for all people.” The *Hatt-i- Sherif* propounded that all people, no matter their religion, language, or culture, should enjoy these fundamental freedoms. The second solution was a “regular system of assessing taxes.” A regular system of taxes would alleviate some of the financial instabilities that existed in the Empire at this time. This new tax system stated that every

⁷⁴ This fact is well documented in numerous scholarly studies. It is used to good effect in highlighting the differences in society, culture and technology between Europe and the other major polities of Eurasia in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in a recently published global history text, Robert Tignor, et. al, Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World (New York: W.W. Norton, 2002). See *ibid.*, Chapters Five and Six.

person should pay taxes and these taxes would be assessed according to a person's wealth. A regular system of taxing would also decrease the likelihood of corruption, a long term goal incidentally shared for that matter by traditional reformers such as Sari Mehmed Paşa in book The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors.⁷⁵

The last policy prescribed by this document was directed at the military. The document guaranteed, "...an equally regular system for the conscription of requisite troops and the duration of their service." This document stated all people should participate in the military. Lastly, the document stated that each member of the military should serve between three and five years, as opposed to serving lifelong tenures with the military.⁷⁶

Even though these ideas were not from Islamic sources, they did have their advantages. These ideas on reform created a loyal population, which because they owned property, would fight and defend the Empire at all costs to preserve these principles. In addition, these ideas of a new system of taxation also created a stable financial base, which would create a better economy. The reforms to the military were also beneficial because they caused the army to become more modern, meaning a stronger military with more capabilities in tactics and technology.

The ideas and reforms established by the *Hatt-i Sherif* all marked a fundamental departure from Islamic/Ottoman political practices. From this point on, it appears that Islam was no longer the answer to all the problems of the Empire. Instead the answers to these problems were heavily dependant upon modernization and Westernization, and the Empire looked toward Europe as a model to follow. However, not all subjects were fond

⁷⁵ Mehmed, The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, 88-89.

⁷⁶ Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 150.

of these new policies. The *ulema* and the *seyhulislam* specifically would not want to accept these reforms since they were based on European principals, and not those of traditional Islamic sources. So then why did they? They had no choice due to the reforms regarding the office of the *seyhulislam* implemented earlier by Mahmud. They had been stripped of their power and control over the affairs of the government and were left without a platform from which to convey their dissent.

The *Hatt* was a decisive moment in the long standing objective of the Ottoman rulers to increase the wealth and power of the Empire. It inaugurated the *Tanzimat*, and committed the Empire to a program of westernized reform.

Chapter II

Official Reformers: Statesman and Official Reform of the Tanzimat Era

Introduction

Before engaging the topic of the central political thinkers of the *Tanzimat* it is important to define what the *Tanzimat* meant in regard to the Ottoman Empire. The word *Tanzimat* means “reorganization” or “reordering.” This period began in 1839 with the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane*, and ended in 1876 when a constitution was promulgated. The *Tanzimat* was an attempt for the Empire to reform its institutions in order to modernize or Westernize the Empire and its society, and thus preserving the Empire in a world which was becoming ever so dominated by Europe.⁷⁷ In other words this was an attempt to bring about a program of Westernization in order to preserve the Empire with Islamic reform and revival not being its primary objective.⁷⁸ According to Stanford and Ezel Shaw it was to:

...include the right and even the duty to regulate all aspects of life and changing the concept of Ottoman reform from the traditional one of attempting to preserve and restore the old institutions to a modern one of replacing them with new ones, some imported from the West.⁷⁹

Furthermore, *Tanzimat* is used commonly in modern Turkish and Western terms as a noun meaning “reforms.” Regarding Ottoman history, however, *Tanzimat* has been used in three senses: first to designate the 1839 *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane* and the 1856 *Hatt-i*

⁷⁷ Shaw, and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 55.

⁷⁸ John Obert Voll, “Foundations for Renewal and Reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” in *The Oxford History of Islam*, ed., John Esposito (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 523.

⁷⁹ As quoted in Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 55.

Humayun; second, to discuss the totality of reforms from 1839 to approximately 1876; and third, to describe Ottoman history in its entirety.⁸⁰

The *Tanzimat* was a period of time which saw a transformation of the Empire from a traditional Islamic framework to a more Westernized form of government. The reforms which were discussed earlier, by Selim and Mahmud, were also an attempt to reform the Empire; however those reforms established a more centralized government. This centralized government quickly became very powerful and the people of the Empire were not given any new rights or liberties. During the *Tanzimat* there was a dramatic shift in reforming the Empire, which emphasized improving the lives of the people by guaranteeing them new rights and reformulating the government so that it was a more responsive and effective government.

Official Reformers of the *Tanzimat*

In the two decades following the promulgation of the *Hatt-i Sherif* there were several significant figures, all of whom became *Grand Vezir*. They were Ali Paşa, Fuad Paşa⁸¹, Midhad Paşa⁸², and Khayr al-Din Paşa. Collectively, they dominated the government of the Empire during the *Tanzimat* and carried out reforms in the spirit of the *Hatt-i Sherif* that they deemed important or necessary. This chapter will consider these men's reforms. These figures can conveniently be divided into two groups: the early and the later official reformers.

⁸⁰ R.H. Davison, "*Tanzimat*," in *Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1 (The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2001), 10: 200a. 1876 is the date being used in this paper to designate the end of the *Tanzimat Era*. However, other historians used different dates. Some use 1871, the year the *Grand Vezir* died, considered by observers at that time as the last of the great reforming *Vezirs*. Other use 1877, which is the year Midhad Paşa was exiled and Abdulhamid II turned toward a policy of Islamism. Still, other historians use 1881, which is the year the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was established.

⁸¹ Fuad Paşa is also spelled as Fuat Paşa.

⁸² Midhad Paşa is also spelled as Midhat Paşa.

The early reformers were represented by Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa who were the dominant government officials as *Grand Vezir* of the Empire during the 1850s and 1860s. In 1856 the two, along with Sultan Abdulmecid, promulgated a new edict on February 18, 1856, the *Hatt-i Humayun*.⁸³ This document was an extension of the 1839 document the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane* in that it guaranteed the rights of the people established in the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane*.⁸⁴ Furthermore, this document abolished the tax farming system and bribery of government officials.⁸⁵ In addition, there was an attempt to create equality for all subjects. For example, the *Hatt-i Humayun* wanted to reform the court system in which the courts would be mixed ethnically in order to take care of a greater proportion of cases involving Muslims and non-Muslims. There were other statements regarding equality such as, equality of taxation, all subjects were allowed to enter military schools regardless of religion and race and they were to be equal in regard to military service and administration of justice.⁸⁶ Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa were instrumental in creating this document and showed their willingness, at least on the surface, to continue the reforms began by their mentor, Mustafa Reşid Paşa, in 1839.

Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa

Ali Paşa was born in 1815 and died in 1871.⁸⁷ He was involved in government service literally all his life. Ali was very conservative and less intruding in nature. He took as long as possible in making his decisions so that he could analyze all alternatives and the consequences, which could occur. He believed in gradual reform, while others wanted drastic changes in a relative short period of time. He also believed that the

⁸³ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 115-16.

⁸⁴ Albert, Hourani, *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), 47.

⁸⁵ Roderick, Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876* (New York: Gordian Press, 1973), 55.

⁸⁶ Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 47.

⁸⁷ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 117.

Empire should defend itself aggressively from European intervention in order to preserve its geographic integrity and its Islamic character. Ali Paşa believed Islam was the official tradition of the Empire although he pledged to keep the affairs of the state and the affairs of Islam separate.⁸⁸ He did not believe a constitution should be introduced into the Empire, but he did support better relations between Muslims and non-Muslims by giving all subjects the same freedom no matter what religion or race they were in regard to education, military service, and government positions.⁸⁹ Ali Paşa also wanted to improve the schools in the Empire, and he wanted these schools to be religiously and ethnically mixed. In addition, he also sought a new civil law code based on Western models. This should be drawn up with an attempt for more mixed tribunals and for mixed courts, composed of ten Muslims and ten non-Muslim Ottomans, which would help to improve upon Christian-Muslim relationships.⁹⁰

Ali Paşa's colleague and collaborator during this time period was Fuad Paşa. Fuad Paşa, also born in 1815, received his higher education at the military medical school. Once his education was completed, he transferred to the translation office. With this training he was nominated to the Ottoman embassy in London, and then in 1852 he was appointed to the position of Minister of Foreign Affairs, a position he would hold five times during his political career. Fuad Paşa was also highly Europeanized and he spoke French fluently.⁹¹

Fuad Paşa's views were different than Ali Paşa's views, though they had more similarities than differences. Similar to Ali Paşa, Fuad believed that reform was

⁸⁸ Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 64.

⁸⁹ Davison, Reforms in the Ottoman Empire, 87.

⁹⁰ Ibid.

⁹¹ Cleveland, A History of the Modern Middle East, 82.

necessary in the Empire, but they disagreed on the pace of reform. Fuad believed in a stronger and quicker reform policy. Similar to Ali Paşa, Fuad opposed European intervention in the affairs of the Empire, because he, like most Ottoman statesmen, was concerned with preserving Ottoman integrity and its ability to solve each problem as it occurred in accordance with a planned approach firmly under the control of the Ottoman government without interference from Europe.⁹² Both Ali and Fuad believed in further secularizing the government, and wanted a greater degree of popular participation in government.⁹³ Popular participation is a form of government whereby the representatives, elected by the people, control the government.⁹⁴ And they both wanted to keep the Council of Ministers free from interference from the Sultan and the palace. Furthermore, the two officials believed a new system for public administration was needed and that the infrastructure of the Empire needed to be improved, such as roads and railroads.⁹⁵ Unlike his counterpart, Ali Paşa, Fuad was less cautious, and more Western in implementing reforms. Lastly, Fuad wanted stronger provincial government, in order to fight off “nationalist separatism” encouraged by European powers.⁹⁶

The *Hatt-i Humayun* was promulgated by Ali and Fuad Paşas’ but was seen as a byproduct of British interference into Ottoman affairs. In fact the *Hatt-i Humayun*, was largely dictated to the Ottoman government by the British ambassador, Stratford Canning.⁹⁷ The purpose of the *Hatt-i Humayun* was to re-establish the rights and guarantees of the 1839 *Hatt*, including the guarantee of security of life, honor and

⁹² Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 83.

⁹³ *Ibid.*, 89.

⁹⁴ Berkes, The Development, 42.

⁹⁵ Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 91-92.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 92.

⁹⁷ Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 82.

property. In addition, the *Hatt-i Humayun* abolished tax farming and bribery. Furthermore, it went on to bring in many European practices into the Empire, such as the establishment of banks and codification of laws.⁹⁸ By far the most important attribute of this document was that there would be “no inequality on grounds of religion, language, or race, in regard to the holding of government offices, entry into government schools, the payment of taxes or the rendering of military service.”⁹⁹ Many political and social elites viewed this document as a threat. According to them, the document threatened Muslim dominance over other religious sects of the Empire and singled out Christian communities by giving them rights and political privileges denied to some Muslims. The Muslim elites saw this document as a conspiracy with Europe in order to elicit European help, especially that of Great Britain.¹⁰⁰

The above leads to a discussion pertaining to the Eastern Question and the position of the non-Muslim millets and their relationship with the reforms. For Russia, this meant that these millets would be more autonomous or even independent from Ottoman control. However, this view was drastically different than that of Great Britain, which had its own objectives. According to Stratford Canning the question of equality was not for all individuals regardless of their culture as the Ottoman government insisted it was. Rather Canning wanted equality of the millets as “corporate communities.”¹⁰¹ Canning was not concerned with the Ottoman Empire on a social or cultural basis. Instead, his only interest was to ensure that it maintained peace and that it stayed out of

⁹⁸ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 55.

⁹⁹ As quoted in Hourani, *Arabic Thought*, 47.

¹⁰⁰ Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East*, 82.

¹⁰¹ Refer to page 12 for a definition or see the glossary.

the hands of other European nations, especially France and Russia.¹⁰² This is why the Ottoman elites had reason to be wary of the *Hatt-i Humayun*. It was clearly created by Great Britain in its attempt to keep the Ottoman Empire in existence and to maintain the equilibrium of power to further British interests in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

As a result of the *Hatt-i Humayun*, the millet system underwent fundamental reforms. Essentially, the millets were given more autonomy in the sense that lay bodies were given more direct power over ecclesiastical affairs. Furthermore, these communities were allowed to elect representatives from their population in order to run such affairs as "...to legislate, execute and judge all the religious, administrative, financial, educational, and civil affairs of the community."¹⁰³ The outcome of this was that these millets transformed into largely autonomous societies running their own affairs under the overall protection of the Ottoman Empire. However, the *Hatt-i Humayun* had little effect on the Muslim population since there was no distinctive Muslim millet system, as the Empire was a Muslim Empire by definition and the Muslim community was, in effect, under the authority of the Ottoman bureaucracy.

Under the leadership of Ali and Fuad Paşa, the Empire continued to reform according to Western models. Another area, in which these two men initiated reform, was in the legal realm. Even though the 1839 *Hatt* announced loyalty to the *şeriat*, new secular laws were introduced into the Empire. One of the most important laws created was a land law which was promulgated in 1858, which coincidentally was the same year Muhammad Ali of Egypt implemented his own land law. The goal of this law was to rid

¹⁰² Berkes, *The Development*, 153.

¹⁰³ As quoted in *Ibid.*, 158.

the countryside of all its problems by implementing Western reforms and making the countryside of the Empire similar to that of the better-off Europeans. “The general trend of the reforms was to abrogate the earlier agrarian relationships and progressively to extend and confirm the rights of use, of possession, and of ownership.”¹⁰⁴ As mentioned earlier, Mahmud II was able to abolish the *timar* system, but was not able to abolish the tax-farming practices of the Empire. As a result, tax-farmers and leaseholders controlled a majority of the land and had all of the rights involved with the land including disposal and succession of the land. The people who actually worked the land were reduced to share-croppers or hired laborers and were under control of either the tax-farmer or the lease holder. As a result, a landlord class was created, which benefited the most from the reforms.¹⁰⁵ What this new law tried to do was to increase the power of the government by lessening the role of large landowners in the countryside.¹⁰⁶ In effect the land law formed a new class of wealthy landowners and centralized the power of the government, rather than allowing the people to own and control their own land. This was not what was intended when the *Hatt-i Humayun* was passed, which promised to protect people’s property.

Another legal reform implemented by Ali and Fuad Paşa was the process of codifying the laws. A basic contradiction was present in the 1839 *Hatt* in that it made a promise to remain loyal to the *şeriat*; however, it also stated that the Empire should implement new laws. And it further stated that misrule was a byproduct of laws not being written down or accessible to the people.¹⁰⁷ This was a problem for the two

¹⁰⁴ As quoted in Lewis, *The Emergence*, 119.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 99.

¹⁰⁷ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern Middle East*, 84.

statesmen because the *şeriat* was not a codified body of law. The *kanuns*¹⁰⁸ were written and promulgated, but they were not accessible to the people. Thus, none of the laws or legal codes which were already in existence satisfied the 1839 *Hatt*. When creating new legal codes and laws, Ali Paşa decided to use the French civil code as a model.¹⁰⁹ A consequence of this process was the creation of mixed courts. As mentioned earlier, the first mixed court was composed of ten Muslim and ten non-Muslim Ottomans. These were the first secular courts in the Empire which were outside the jurisdiction of the *seyhulislam*. This led to the promulgation of the first secular codes in 1850, which were commercial laws, followed in 1860 by an addition to the 1850 commercial law.¹¹⁰ These acts of codification had three major effects. The first was that secular courts began to expand their jurisdiction over the *şeriat* courts. Second, there was a movement to reorganize the judiciary system of the Empire so as to separate the functions of the secular and religious courts. Finally, there began a process of codifying areas of law which were covered by the *şeriat*.¹¹¹ This was important because this showed that both Ali and Fuad Paşa were attempting to follow the 1839 *Hatt*. This process of codifying and creating new laws gave people greater access to the laws and thus allowed more people to become aware of the activities of the government.

In the context of modernizing the *şeriat*, there was an attempt to create a penal code in order to ensure the promises of the 1839 *Hatt* to protect “life, property, and honour.” The first penal code was enacted back in 1840. This code confirmed the principle of equality and followed the principle that no one would be punished without a

¹⁰⁸ Lapidus, “Sultanates and Gunpowder...,” 383. Kanun(s) is/are legal codes.

¹⁰⁹ Cleveland, *A History of the Modern*, 84.

¹¹⁰ Berkes, *The Development*, 161-62.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, 162-63.

trial and would be given sentences by the court. The penal code of 1840 also ruled that trials would be public and that the impartiality of the judges was essential.¹¹² But this penal code fell short because it omitted several crucial components. It failed to define and classify criminal deeds. This led to another attempt to create a penal code in 1851. But this effort was also considered inadequate. After this failure, yet another effort to create a penal code occurred in 1858, called the Reform Edict. It was modeled after the French Penal Code of 1810 and was "...the first introduction of a Western legal formulation in the field of public law."¹¹³ This penal code lasted from 1858 until 1918. It was distinguished from the others in that it included disciplinary provisions to deal with the issue of equality for all. This penal code stated people should not be punished for an unspecified reason, and it established a principle of individual responsibility.¹¹⁴ These laws are important to analyze because they constituted the attempt of the ruling elite to try to put into effect the promises which were made in the 1839 *Hatt* and again in the *Hatt-i Humayun* in 1856.

The crucial component to examine is the degree of political, social, and cultural institutional separation between the former traditional Islamic Empire and the new Westernized Empire, which was coming under greater European political and intellectual influence every year. As pointed out above, in this phase of the *Tanzimat* the Empire was greatly influenced politically by Great Britain. Great Britain was able to pressure the ruling elites of the Empire to implement new ideas of freedom and equality, especially for the Christian millets. Great Britain was able to do this because it had assisted the Empire in defeating the military forces of Muhammad Ali and his son Ibrahim of Egypt

¹¹² Berkes, The Development, 163.

¹¹³ As quoted in *ibid.*, 164.

¹¹⁴ Berkes, The Development, 163-64.

in the 1830s and came to the defense and support of the Empire again in the 1850s. The Empire was also heavily influenced by France and especially by French law, used as the preferred model to implement new laws and legal codes. This acceptance of Westernize laws and a European style bureaucracy was a radical departure from traditional Islamic models of governing, in which faith and state, *din ve devlet*, functioned as one institution rather than as two separate ones.

The Ottoman Empire had a struggle ahead, not only in terms of reforming the Empire to restore its power, but also in becoming modern without losing Islamic traditions. How could the Empire reform itself and become a modern entity without losing its Islamic traditions? The assumption by many is that in order to be considered a modern state/nation one must be secular, and those that are not secular are not modern in the sense of this definition. But this does not take into account historical perspectives and experiences. For example, James Gelvin writes that secularism in the West developed as a result of its historical experience, especially its involvement in religious wars which took the lives of so many people during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. As a result of this experience in religious wars, Gelvin states that the West made a separation between faith and state in order to decrease the number of wars.¹¹⁵ By the seventeenth century, with the Treaty of Westphalia, European nations decided that the state was sovereign and rulers may regulate religion within their realm, but would not stipulate or force specific religious commitments. This led ultimately to the emergence of an increasingly secularized state and society, which in turn became the basis on which modern western nations developed. As a result of this ideology, the definition of secularism has been defined as seen through the eyes of the West as a paragon of

¹¹⁵ Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 132.

modernity. As defined by Berkes in his book The Development of Secularism in Turkey, secularization is, “a sociological process which takes place as a result of factors beyond the control of individuals. A doctrine of secularism involves individual ideas, attitudes, beliefs, or interest.”¹¹⁶ Even though this worked in the West, it is ethnocentric to assume this is the formula to modernity that all modern nations must adhere to.

The Ottoman Empire did not pursue this pathway when it was attempting to reform its institutions to become modern and reformed, especially in the sphere of political authority. One of the major differences between modernization in the West and in the Ottoman Empire was due to their historical experiences. Religion in the Ottoman Empire always had a dominating role in the political sphere and in political authority. Western European governments had come to see religion as a major cause of wars between nations and had decided to separate the two. The Ottoman Empire had a different perspective on faith and state. In their view they were not separated, as was the case in the West. Nevertheless, it is not accurate to assume that they are not modern, for the word modern is defined according to a Western ideology. The Empire simply went in a different direction in trying to achieve its goal of becoming modern and reformed. The Empire did attempt to follow the Western model of modernity in that reforms were implemented which limited the political role of the *seyhulislam* in an attempt to divorce faith and state. However, the Empire did not want to lose its traditional ideology, and the Empire was stuck in the stages of transformation.

The reforms implemented by Mustafa Reşid in the form of the *Hatt-i Sherif* and those of Ali and Fuad Paşa in the *Hatt-i Humayun* in 1856 were important steps in the process of Westernization and secularization, but they failed to bring about a complete

¹¹⁶ Berkes, The Development, 3-4.

transformation in the Empire's government and its political establishment. Never once during the *Tanzimat* was there an established framework which stated how the government should expound its political authority onto the people. The relations between the governing and the governed, the ruler and his administration, and the legislative and the ruler were never established. This led to a government that was unstable and lacked homogeneity, even though it was becoming more secular in appearance.¹¹⁷

The problem of the lack of homogeneity in the Empire led it to attempt to continue the process of reform in regard to establishing an even more Westernized form of political authority. The next series of reforms were made to the Supreme Council.¹¹⁸ In 1868 this council was separated into two councils. The first being the Board of Judicial Enactments, and the other was the Council of State. The former was placed in charge of the secular courts and became the most powerful judicial council. This council was headed by Cevdet Paşa. The latter of the two councils became the source of inspiration for the constitutional movement, and was headed by Midhad Paşa. (More on these two figures will follow.) The purpose of this new organization according to Sultan Abdulaziz was that, "The new organization is based upon the separation of the executive power from the judicial, religious, and civil powers."¹¹⁹ It would appear that this was an attempt to create a new political authority based upon secular ideas, with the ultimate goal being to establish a constitutional form of government. But was this really the case or was there an outside force applying pressure upon the Empire to continue reforming the Empire?

¹¹⁷ Berkes, *The Development*, 156.

¹¹⁸ Lewis gives this council another name, the *High Council for Judicial Ordinances* (Lewis, *The Emergence*, 99). This council was initially created by Mahmud and was created for the purpose of planning and carrying out reforms.

¹¹⁹ As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 157.

In 1867 a note was given to the Ottoman government by the French government. This note suggested that the Ottoman government should involve itself in a more active plan of reform.¹²⁰ The Sultan, Abdulaziz, upon hearing this became angry with this further European intrusion into Ottoman affairs. He had no choice, however, but to follow the suggestions on the note. The Sultan had no option because of the position of the Empire. The treasury of the Empire was empty, the army was unpaid, and the economy of the Empire was in disarray.¹²¹

Once again the Empire was pressured by Europe, through the 1867 note, to continue a policy of reform in accordance to Western ideas. But the reforms that the Empire implemented were those initiated by the West and not those on the Empire's own determination. This furthered the divergence between the traditional Islamic framework and the new Empire under Western reforms in that, the courts were further subjected to secularization and the role of the executive became separated from the other realms of government. Yet the most important aspect to keep in mind is the mention of the constitutional movement, which will be discussed below.

The constitutional movement was to have important and lasting effects on the subsequent history of the Empire, almost to the very end of its existence in 1924. Of those Ottomans who supported the idea of constitutional government and worked to bring it about, two individuals stand out, Midhad Paşa and Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, and it is to their examination that I will now turn.

Midhad Paşa, Khayr al-Din Tunisi and the Climax and End of Constitutional Reform

¹²⁰ Lewis, The Emergence, 121.

¹²¹ Ibid., 120-21.

The Empire was being rapidly brought to destruction... The only remedy that he could perceive, lay, first in securing a control over the Sovereign by making the Ministers... responsible to a national popular Assembly...¹²²

The passage quoted above was authored by Midhad Paşa, who was destined to be one of the most important official reformers of the *Tanzimat*. Midhad was born in 1822 in Istanbul. His parents gave him the name of Ahmed Shefik and provided him with a traditional Muslim education. This is proven from the fact that at the age of ten he memorized the *Qur'an*, and henceforth was given the designation of “Hafiz Shefik,” one who has memorized God’s word. His good work and talent then landed him with his current name, Midhad. In 1840 he was transferred to the *Grand Vezir’s* office to which he was to be attached on and off for the remainder of his government service¹²³

Between the years of 1842 and 1847, he held several positions in the government. One of the most important was involved with the Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances, where he stayed until 1859 and held the position of chief secretary. After taking several other governing positions throughout the Empire, Fuad Paşa invited Midhad back to Istanbul to work with him to draft a new vilayet law, or a new province law, which was modeled after French examples. This new law was created in order to reform the provincial administration.¹²⁴ The objective of this law was to combine central control with local authority in an attempt to keep the Empire together.¹²⁵ This vilayet law

¹²² As quoted in *Ibid.*, 164.

¹²³ R.H. Davison, “Midhat Paşa” in *Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001), 6: 1032a.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 151.

was to be tested in the newly created province of Tuna¹²⁶, and on October 13, 1864, Midhad was appointed its governor. While there he began a program of reform, including producing three thousand kilometers of roads and one thousand four hundred bridges.¹²⁷ Furthermore, Midhad also aggressively built public buildings and schools, and, as well, established state farms equipped with European machinery. Midhad also was able to promote the economy of the area by building several small factories and he also created “agricultural credit cooperatives,” which lent out money at low interest rates. On another front as governor, Midhad attempted to improve relations between the Ottomans and the Bulgarians through just rule and ethnically and religiously mixed schools. However, this was to no avail due to developing Bulgarian nationalism, which led to rebellions and which Midhad dealt with severely. Even though Midhad struggled with the rise of Bulgarian nationalism, the vilayet law was seen as a success and Midhad was summoned back to Istanbul in 1867.¹²⁸

Once back in Istanbul, Midhad’s political career continued successfully. After the Supreme Council was dismantled and a Council of State and the Judicial Council were created to replace it, Midhad was placed in charge of the former.¹²⁹ The role of the Judicial Council was to discuss and draft laws. However, due to tensions with Ali Paşa, the *Grand Vezir* at that time, Midhad did not maintain this position long. In fact, in 1869 he was sent to Baghdad as Governor.¹³⁰ The tension was a result of Midhad not enthusiastically supporting the policies of Ali Paşa, who believed his protégé should

¹²⁶ Ibid. Tuna is now the area of Danube in present day Bulgaria. Tuna was newly created by combining the provinces of Silistre, Vidin and Nish.

¹²⁷ Davison, “Midhat Paşa,” 6: 1032b. It is important to note here that these statistics were according to Midhad.

¹²⁸ Ibid.

¹²⁹ Davison, “Midhat Paşa,” 6: 1032b.

¹³⁰ Ibid.

accept everything that he said, which Midhad did not do.¹³¹ Even though this was clearly a demotion, Midhad made the most of the opportunity. While in Baghdad, Midhad effectively applied the “new tax systems, land distribution to peasants, dams for irrigation and navigation, and improvements in cultivation methods...”¹³² In addition, Midhad had some of the streets in Baghdad paved, built a bridge, built cotton and wool mills, established public schools and military schools, and started the first newspaper in Iraq, to name several of the reforms Midhad introduced while Governor of Baghdad.¹³³

While Midhad was in Iraq, Ali Paşa continued to hold the position of *Grand Vezir*. Ali’s reign as *Grand Vezir* would end when he died on September 7, 1871.¹³⁴ This left a vacancy, and, due to his dedication to reform, Midhad was named *Grand Vezir* in the summer of 1872. But from the beginning of his reign as *Grand Vezir*, Midhad encountered problems brought on in large measure by his personality. He was known for his brusque speech, as was seen earlier with his tension with Ali Paşa. This type of speech brought him many enemies, and he quickly grew out of favor with Sultan Abdulaziz. Abdulaziz thought Midhad was going to allow him to continue to rule under the traditional system of Sultanic absolutism. This, however, was not the case. Midhad’s goal was to bring about a constitutional style of government, which would end absolute rule of the Sultan.

After this short reign as *Grand Vezir*, Midhad knew that change was needed if the constitution was to be promulgated. In hindsight, Abdulaziz had to be removed from his position due to his determination to exercise an absolutist style of control. Midhad

¹³¹ As quoted in Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 68.

¹³² Ibid.

¹³³ Davison, “Midhat Paşa,” 6: 1032b. For these reasons Midhad is considered to be the founder of modern Iraq.

¹³⁴ Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 62.

attempted to persuade Abdulaziz to support the promulgation of the constitution in an attempt to avoid a movement which would lead to his deposition. However, Abdulaziz did not want to renounce his absolute authority, which he would have been forced to do so if the constitution were to be promulgated. Midhad, along with other followers, led the movement against the Sultan.¹³⁵ On May 30, 1876 after having secured the support of the important government officials, including the *seyhulislam*, Midhad Paşa forced the abdication of Abdulaziz from the Sultanate and placed Murad V onto the throne.¹³⁶ After the deposition, Midhad was once again selected to the position of President of the Council of State, in effect, the most powerful minister, where he could continue to reform in accordance with his ideas on constitutionalism.¹³⁷

A week after the succession of Murad V, Midhad called a meeting to discuss the proposals for creating and passing the constitution. While this meeting was occurring, three distinct groups were formed. The first group included those in favor of promulgating a constitution immediately. The second group was those who were opposed to the creation of a constitution. The last group incorporated those who shared the opinion of the second group, but were not vocal in their opinions.¹³⁸

One of the opponents of the idea of the constitution was the *Grand Vezir*, Rustu Paşa.¹³⁹ He claimed the Empire was not suited for a constitutional style of government. He argued the people were not smart enough to enjoy the liberties, which would be afforded to them by a constitution. Rustu Paşa concluded people would misuse their

¹³⁵ Ibid., 163. Along with Midhad were two other key figures who also wanted to depose Abdulaziz. The first was Huseyin Avni, who was head of the army. The other was Suleyman Paşa, who was head of the *Harbiye Military Academy*.

¹³⁶ Carter V. Findley, *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1980), 222.

¹³⁷ Davison, "Midhat Pasha," 6: 1033b.

¹³⁸ Berkes, *The Development*, 226.

¹³⁹ Ibid.

liberties and that the end result would be anarchy. In addition to the arguments made by Rustu Paşa, another popular argument against establishing a constitutional government revolved around the role of minorities. Some anti-constitutionalists believed if minorities were elected into a representative body, they could pass laws favoring their cause, such as limiting the role of the *şeriat*. These anti-constitutionalists concluded a constitutional government was not allowable on religious grounds. Overall, the meeting showed the *Grand Vezir* and the *ulema* were not going to favor a constitution. Even the new Sultan, Murad V, was not helpful in promoting the creation of a constitution, even though he was placed onto the throne because he was considered a pro-constitutionalist.¹⁴⁰

After this, it appeared as though there was a need for change in the Sultanate for the pro-constitutionalists, since the purpose of placing Murad on the throne was to support the promulgation of a constitution. Fortunately for the pro-constitutionalists, Murad grew mentally ill shortly afterwards. Some believed he became mentally ill due to the death of Abdulaziz, who was found with his wrists slit a few days after his deposition. Murad was examined by several doctors, and it was deemed that his illness was incurable. The next heir to the throne was Murad's younger brother, Abdulhamid II. Before he was officially placed onto the throne, Midhad spoke with him to assure that he would be sympathetic to his and the *Young Ottomans* liberal cause. The *Young Ottomans* were a group of intellectuals who wanted to reform the Empire by promulgating a constitution and ending absolutism.

Midhad showed Abdulhamid a draft of the constitution, which he and the other pro-constitutionalists were going to introduce. Upon viewing the document, Abdulhamid

¹⁴⁰ Berkes, The Development, 227-28.

gave his support to constitutionalism, and he was placed on the throne once Murad had been officially deposed on August 31.¹⁴¹

Once Abdulhamid became Sultan the argument over the constitution changed dramatically. The argument was no longer between pro-constitutionalists and anti-constitutionalists, rather the new arguments were among separate groups within the pro-constitutionalists. Though all individuals involved in this argument desired for a constitution to be promulgated, each group had its own perspective of what should be and should not be in the constitution. For the purpose of this paper, the argument to be analyzed here will be the different views of Abdulhamid and Midhad Paşa, who during their argument was *Grand Vezir*, 1876-1877.

Though both Abdulhamid and Midhad Paşa wanted a constitution to be promulgated, they had different perspectives regarding the document. The arguments between the two individuals were “the respective prerogatives of the ruler, the government, and the parliament on executive, legislative, and religious affairs; and the particular issue of centralized versus decentralized government”.¹⁴² The first issue was based on what would the specific roles of the ruler, other executive organs, and legislative branches be with respect to religious affairs, as this document attempted to separate state and faith. The second disagreement was in regard to whether or not government would be more centralized or would become decentralized. Midhad wanted a more decentralized central government than did Abdulhamid. This issue had divided the reformists since the reign of Mahmud II. Contrary to Midhad’s views of a decentralized government, Abdulhamid believed a centralized government was

¹⁴¹ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 162-63.

¹⁴² As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 230.

necessary. One of the reasons Abdulhamid gave for maintaining a more centralized government was to have more control over limiting Russian expansion into Ottoman territory. But as events were to prove, Abdulhamid also wanted to maintain the apparatus of despotism and he wanted as well to base his authority squarely on the traditional principles of the Sultan as an Islamic ruler of a Muslim Empire.¹⁴³

Furthermore, in Midhad's proposal for a constitution, the parliament would be made up with a composition of all nationalities, religious affiliations, and ethnicities. The government, through the parliament, would be responsible for providing the same rights and treating all people as equals. In addition, Midhad's proposal gave provinces, which were not of a Muslim/Turkish majority, a semi-autonomous administration, more so than many other pro-constitutionalists wanted. In respect to these decentralizing views, Abdulhamid's was not so much against the composition of the parliament, rather he was not fully on board with Midhad's proposal dealing with provinces which did not have a Muslim/Turkish majority. Abdulhamid had a pro-Arab policy. Throughout the reign of Abdulhamid, non-Muslim representation was not a priority. Ottoman reformers never outlined in the constitution that there had to be a proportional representative assembly of non-Muslims, which means there were not many non-Muslims elected to the representative assembly during the reign of Abdulhamid.¹⁴⁴

The issue dealing with the creation and promulgation of a constitution was threefold. The first was in regard to faith and state and how the two would be separated. The second issue was the relationship between Muslims and non-Muslims. The third issue was the relationship between Turks and non-Turks. The first issue was not a major

¹⁴³ Carter V. Findley, Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 27.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, 110.

concern for Abdulhamid. It was the second and third issues which Abdulhamid had a problem in resolving. Abdulhamid and other pro-constitutionalists saw these proposals as creating an environment for nationalist separatist movements, which it wanted to avoid. According to Midhad, the purpose of the constitution was to create a stable government, in which all people could participate. Abdulhamid feared Midhad because he had successfully deposed two former Sultans, Abdulaziz and Murad.¹⁴⁵

The dilemma above was a major issue for all pro-constitutionalists. In this sense, Midhad's proposal for a constitution would influence the Empire to become a secular nation. However, many within and outside of the government disagreed with this belief, such as Abdulhamid and, the growingly famous literary figure, Namik Kemal, who will be discussed below. Both Abdulhamid and Namik Kemal viewed constitutionalism as a dangerous process leading to weakening the Islamic character of the Empire. This attitude came from recognition that these liberal ideas on which constitutionalism was based had their origins in Europe. Most Muslim Ottomans at this time were still not entirely sure of the motives of the West, regarding why the West had such an interest in promulgating a constitution in the Empire. Therefore, many people believed there were anti-Muslim/anti-Turkish ideas embedded within the context of the liberalism which was being transferred into the Empire.¹⁴⁶

As a result of these feelings, many people were not supportive of Midhad's proposal for a constitution. Riding with this wave of resentment toward Midhad, Abdulhamid was successful in promulgating a constitution, which aligned itself with his belief. The constitution, which was passed on December 23, 1876 did not focus on

¹⁴⁵ Davison, "Midhat Pasha," 6: 1033b.

¹⁴⁶ Berkes, The Development, 231.

protecting the rights of people.¹⁴⁷ Instead it focused on protecting the rights of the sovereign, meaning the government was much more centralized than initially intended by the pro-constitutionalist and the *Young Ottomans*. Even the manner in which the constitution was passed was against the ideology of the *Young Ottomans*. The constitution was created and passed by the Sultan, Abdulhamid, rather than being created by an elected representative assembly. The constitution can be viewed with this perspective, “The ruler was not bound by the constitution; the constitution was bound by his will.”¹⁴⁸

As mentioned above, the constitution did not fully succeed in achieving all of the goals of the *Young Ottomans* and pro-constitutionalists, especially Midhad Paşa. Many believed the constitution was promulgated in order to appease Europe and to keep Europe out of the affairs of the Empire, rather than with an original intent of giving rights to the people.¹⁴⁹ In an attempt to appease Europe, Sultan Abdulhamid sent Midhad Paşa to a meeting of ambassadors in Istanbul to elicit support for the constitution from Europe. However, upon his return to the palace, Midhad was abruptly dismissed from his position as *Grand Vezir*. Abdulhamid forced Midhad out of his position and out of the Empire on the basis of Article 113 of the constitution, which gave the Sultan the power to exile individuals whom he saw as a threat to the Empire.¹⁵⁰

Midhad’s reign as *Grand Vezir* was short lived but his political career had been outstanding; in fact, he is considered to be one of the most important bureaucrats during the nineteenth century. However, his views on the constitution were different than those

¹⁴⁷ Davison, “Midhat Pasha,” 6: 1033b.

¹⁴⁸ As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 246.

¹⁴⁹ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 165.

¹⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 167.

proposed by other pro-constitutionalists and *Young Ottomans*. Even though his ideas may have been different, they were not totally out of context with the time period, which saw an influx of liberal ideologies, derived from Western thought. His ideas however, were not the same as those of Abdulhamid, and as a result he was exiled and dismissed from his position. Once he was exiled, Abdulhamid choose a new *Grand Vezir*, one who was more in line with his ideas and concepts of constitutionalism. This new *Grand Vezir* in 1878 would be Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi.

Before Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi came into office, the constitution was in effect. Throughout the year 1877, the constitution would help the Sultan to rule the Empire. The parliament was split into two houses, a Chamber of Notables and a Chamber of Deputies. The Chamber of Notables was appointed by the Sultan and would be considered a senate. The Chamber of Deputies was considered to be the lower house of the parliament and was to be elected.¹⁵¹

Once the Parliament was established it immediately began to strip powers from the Sultan. For example, this parliament began the process of eliminating ministers from office who were, in their opinion, corrupt. This in turn upset Abdulhamid and his ministers. Abdulhamid insisted the act of appointing and dismissing ministers was his prerogative. As a result, this first parliament was dissolved on June 28, 1877. The Empire then underwent new elections and the second parliament met on December 13, 1877. Even this newly elected parliament did not fully support the Sultan's wishes, and he dissolved this parliament as well on February 14, 1878.¹⁵² After this, there would be

¹⁵¹ Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 176.

¹⁵² Lewis, The Emergence, 168-69.

no more attempts made to create a parliament under his rule. From this perspective, constitutionalism and creating a representative government both failed.

The creation of the constitution and a representative parliament was an attempt to create a government based upon European constitutionalism. Though some of the Empire's applications can be seen as being successful, in the long run the representative assembly was dissolved. However, before the representative assembly was discontinued in 1879, Abdulhamid appointed a leading advocate of constitutional government as *Grand Vezir*, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi.

As the quote that follows indicates, Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, in common with the other official reformers of the Empire, was highly educated and conscious of his role in the great transformation that was taking place throughout the *Tanzimat*.

I also assert openly the truth that any functionary who does not believe he should be held accountable in his public office lacks trustworthiness and sincerity to his state and country.¹⁵³

Along with Midhad Paşa, Khayr al-Din was one of the more important official figures of the *Tanzimat*. During his political career, he did serve a short tenure as *Grand Vezir* in the Empire, and he was also a dominant official in the government of Tunisia which was considered to be within the Empire, an autonomous province. He was born between 1820 and 1825, and died in 1889.¹⁵⁴ In 1840 Khayr al-Din arrived in Tunis.¹⁵⁵ It was here in Tunis where he became an important figure in state and politics.

¹⁵³ As quoted in Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries, A translation and an introduction to by Carl Leon Brown, The Surest Path The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-Century Muslim Statesman (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1967), 178.

¹⁵⁴ Carl Leon Brown, "The Khayr al-Din Round of Reform" in The Surest Path, 29.

¹⁵⁵ John P. Entelis, "Tunisia," in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 235-36. Throughout its history Tunisia had been ruled by several Islamic dynasties dating back to the eighth century. Of these Islamic dynasties one of the most important dynasties was the Fatimid Dynasty, which existed between 905 and 909, and overthrew the Aghlabid state. When Khayr al-Din wrote The Surest Path in 1867, Tunisia had been part of the

While in Tunis, Khayr al-Din began his career as a statesman. In 1856 Khayr al-Din had two great accomplishments, while serving in the Porte, as a faithful statesman of state and religion. In 1856 he was appointed Minister of Marine, and shortly thereafter he ascended to President of the Grand Council, established by Ahmed Bey. He held both offices until 1862.¹⁵⁶ In 1862 Khayr al-Din retired from both offices because of a growing conflict with Mustafa Khazandar, the most powerful and long serving minister of Ahmed Bey's government.¹⁵⁷ Between 1862 and 1868, Khayr al-Din lived abroad, and wrote The Surest Path.¹⁵⁸ In 1869 he briefly returned to a career in government and became the president of an international commission in Tunisia. In 1873, Mustafa Khazandar was finally forced from office and Khayr al-Din, who had become a favorite of the Bey was appointed to the office of Prime Minister. As Prime Minister he initiated reform programs along the lines set out in his book The Surest Path.¹⁵⁹ He held this position for four years, when he was once again dismissed from office in 1877 due to palace intrigue, and left Tunisia again. This time he left for Istanbul and became the *Grand Vezir* under Abdulhamid II.¹⁶⁰ In 1878 he was selected by Abdulhamid II to become *Grand Vezir*. His reign would not last long, though, for in 1879 he was

Ottoman Empire for three hundred years and it began to develop an Arab cultural character as opposed to a Turkish one. At first the Ottoman Empire ruled Tunisia through direct rule; however, in the eighteenth century, Tunisia was given semi-autonomous status, ruled by a bey, and had to pay tribute to the Ottoman Empire in recognition of the latter's governing attributes.

¹⁵⁶ Brown, "The Khayr al-Din Round of Reform" in The Surest Path, 30.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid., 31. Mustafa Khazandar was also Khayr al-Din's father-in-law.

¹⁵⁸ Brown, "The Khayr al-Din Round of Reform" in The Surest Path 31. Khayr al-Din's book The Surest Path was written in 1867. Throughout this book Khayr al-Din wrote about reforming the Ottoman Empire using Western ideas of government as models for reform. However, Leon Carl Brown in the introduction, (Brown, "The Khayr al-Din Round of Reform," (32) writes about Khayr al-Din's memoirs, which he personally dictated to a French secretary in 1888 and which were recorded in French. One of the major themes in the memoirs was, "an idea of government which remained traditional throughout his life" (ibid., 32). For the purpose of this paper these memoirs were not consulted for two reasons. First, I must admit, I can not read French. Second, his book describes his ideas on reform when he participated in government. His opinions on state and religion in his book are much more pertinent to the objective of this paper.

¹⁵⁹ Ibid.

¹⁶⁰ Hourani, Arabic Thought, 86.

dismissed and retired from service and political life, and lived out the rest of his life in retirement in Istanbul, until his death in 1889.¹⁶¹

Before discussing Khayr al-Din's ideas on reforms it is important to discuss his book, The Surest Path. This book was written in 1867 and he expressed his ideas on reforming the Ottoman Empire using Western ideas of government as models for reform. This translation of his book is used here in analyzing his thoughts on reform. This book provides great insight into how educated Ottoman Muslims understood and tried to control the power of Europe in politics and culture.

Khayr al-Din's ideas on reform were based upon the concept of westernization rather than reforming the Empire according to traditional models of government, which meant that the Sultan would rule the Empire according to God's will. For example, he was opposed to arbitrary rule and believed the Empire needed to reform its political structure because this led to corruption. One of the major resources for these ideas was the French Revolution, which began in 1789. Several of his ideas had their origins from the French Revolution such as the role of government to guarantee justice, freedom, and security. In order to validate his point of view in regard to reform, Khayr al-Din made reference to Ibn Khaldun and his book The Muqaddima. He believed Ibn Khaldun was correct in his assessment that oppression foreshadows the downfall of civilization.¹⁶² This is why Khayr al-Din was not a proponent of the concept of one person being in control of the entire government. Rather, he thought the Sultan should have statesmen and religious men to counsel him in his responsibilities as a just ruler.¹⁶³ According to

¹⁶¹ Ibid., 85-86.

¹⁶² Khayr al-Din, The Surest Path, 93-94.

¹⁶³ Ibid.

Khayr al-Din, arbitrary rule was not a type of rule which could work, and he cited the example of Napoleon I. In regard to the rule of Napoleon I he writes,

In sum, we should heed his mistakes and avoid them. Then we, the present sons of the homeland, may profit by a final lesson not to be forgotten: It is never permissible that the affairs of the kingdom should be given over to a single person.¹⁶⁴

Throughout his book, Khayr al-Din makes several references denouncing the idea of a single individual being in charge of the entire government.¹⁶⁵

Furthermore, on the subject of consultation, Khayr al-Din had many ideas of reform which he uses to validate that consultation be used rather than a single person being in full control over governing affairs. Khayr al-Din's views on this subject were validated by other great Muslim thinkers. For example, he quotes Ibn al-'Arabi, who stated, "Consultation is one of the foundations of the religion and God's rule for the two worlds."¹⁶⁶ He even quotes the fourth rightly guided *Caliph* Ali who stated this about the importance of consultation, "There can be no right behavior when consultation has been omitted."¹⁶⁷ By using these quotes in his book, Khayr al-Din emphasized the importance of consultation in political authority and policy making decisions. In addition, Khayr al-Din also made sure to illustrate the importance in the concept of majority rule in political authority. In order to illustrate his thoughts on this subject, he quotes 'Umar ibn al-Khattab who made succession to be the next *Caliph* a decision among six men, "If you divide two against four, then decide in favor of the four".¹⁶⁸ All of these quotes used by Khayr al-Din illustrate his believe in the importance of consultation and majority rule in

¹⁶⁴ As quoted in Khayr al-Din, The Surest Path, 93-95.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, 82-83.

¹⁶⁶ As quoted in Khayr al-Din, The Surest Path, 82.

¹⁶⁷ As quoted in *ibid.*, 83.

¹⁶⁸ As quoted in Khayr al-Din, The Surest Path, 89.

the realm of political authority and in policy-making decisions. Consultation was to be used as a way in which the power of the Sultan could be checked if the law was not able to do so. It was a way in which a balance of power could be checked by those people who were involved in governmental affairs and to end corruption.¹⁶⁹

One of the most pertinent arguments during the *Tanzimat* was whether or not the *Tanzimat* conflicted with the Holy Law? Khayr al-Din did not believe the *Tanzimat* transgressed the Holy Law. He believed the *Tanzimat* should continue in its attempt to improve the administration of the Empire along with preserving the rights of the people, such as the rights of life, honor, and wealth. He also wrote that reforming the administration of the Empire was another way in which the power of oppressive governors could be checked by the people.¹⁷⁰ He also believed that the ideas expressed by the *Young Ottomans* (more later) were important issues, which needed to be discussed. One of the more important issues was that the *Young Ottomans*, “continued to demand of the state the most far-reaching liberty by means of law to be established and protected by an assembly whose members should be elected by the people.”¹⁷¹ Khayr al-Din believed the people who supported this idea on a representative assembly had the goal of safeguarding and improving the Empire. He goes on to write that proponents of an assembly were trying to improve not only the Empire but also the lives of the people living within its borders.

However, Khayr al-Din had his doubts as to if this could really work in the Empire. He thought the real aim of many of the members of the *Young Ottomans* was to do away with the authoritarian style of government which existed in the Empire. He

¹⁶⁹ Ibid., 90.

¹⁷⁰ Khayr al-Din, *The Surest Path*, 115.

¹⁷¹ As quoted in *ibid.*, 116.

believed the people had lost faith in this style of government and were ready for a change in the organization of political authority.¹⁷² Describing the ambitions of the *Young Ottomans*, of which was the cause of many of his doubts as to whether or not a liberal government and a representative assembly could be implemented in the course of establishing a constitution, Khayr al-Din wrote,

Instead, they often showed a desire to draw closer to those of their own race by complaining about the state's official conduct and by stirring up confusion. This is due to their being constantly subject to corruption by foreigners who plant in their chests the seed of protection for purposes which cannot be hidden. It is possible that the establishment of liberty, in the way demanded above, before giving consideration to those obstacles would merely facilitate these ulterior aims. Among the requisites of liberty is the equality of subjects in all political rights, and this includes access to the highest state positions. However, among the important preconditions for granting this freedom is the greatest among all of the subjects concerning the interest of the kingdom and the strengthening of the state's authority.¹⁷³

Khayr al-Din goes on to write about his doubts in regard to the realization of an assembly and of granting people new liberties. He writes implementing both of these would be difficult because the Empire is divided into several ethnicities, all of which have their own languages, religions, and customs. Most of these various groups did not even know Turkish, which at the time was the state language. Due to these cultural differences, dialogue between the several groups would be difficult if a representative assembly were convened. Also Khayr al-Din wrote it would not be easy to award liberty to certain groups and exclude other groups of these liberties because that would cause anarchy.¹⁷⁴

In conclusion, Khayr al-Din wrote the biggest obstacle to the objective of the *Tanzimat*

¹⁷² Khayr al-Din, *The Surest Path*, 117.

¹⁷³ As quoted in *ibid.* Leon Carl Brown writes in a footnote the term "race" was used to translate the word *jins*.

¹⁷⁴ Khayr al-Din, *The Surest Path*, 118.

were the people of the Empire. However, he wrote that he hoped statesmen and the *ulema* would work together in an attempt to implement these new liberties.¹⁷⁵

He believed in a reformist policy based on Western models of government. He knew that it was necessary to gain the support of the *ulema* if such a program was to be successful. His book was thus in part designed as an appeal to the *ulema* to accept his position on reform, which was to adopt European models and implement them in the Empire. There were some components of European life which Khayr al-Din held to high esteem and other parts which he dismissed. He admired European advances in such fields as education, libraries, inventions, roads, and railroads. The one aspect of Europe which he had no appeal for was representative government. He saw this type of government as a means of controlling the central authority or ruler. Another one of his objections to representative government was that he was certain "...Turkey was not as yet ripe for the establishment of a national assembly on a nationwide basis."¹⁷⁶ This does not necessarily signify he was against representative government; rather, he believed and wrote that he did not believe the Empire was ready for such a radical change in government.

¹⁷⁵ Ibid.

¹⁷⁶ As quoted in Serif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1962), 392.

Chapter III

Unofficial Reformers: The Intellectuals of the Tanzimat Era

Introduction

While the official reformers, because of their control of government, were able to implement or even force changes in the policies and the organization of the Empire, there were also several key figures outside of the government, during the *Tanzimat*, who deserve special recognition for their ground-breaking ideas which were to be influential. This group of intellectuals had several names given to them. For example, Berkes refers to this group as the *Young Ottomans*. Serif Mardin and Albert Hourani also commonly refer to this group as the *Young Ottomans* or *New Ottomans*. Roderic Davison gives the title of the *Patriot Alliance* or *Ittifak-i Hamiyet* to this group. The *Young Ottomans'* goal was to form a secret society with the aspiration of ridding the Empire of absolutism and promoting constitutionalism.¹⁷⁷

The first meeting of this group occurred in the Summer of 1865 at a picnic in the Forest of Belgrade, which several intellectuals attended. These men wanted to take action against the Ottoman government in order to facilitate reform in the Empire. All of these men had several commonalities such as their knowledge of European civilization and a concern for the Empire, which they saw as falling behind Europe more so each year. Another similarity between these men was most of them had worked in the Translation Bureau of the *Porte*, and as a result of their work here became educated on European civilization including its culture, political structure, and its languages. This group of scholars wanted to reform the Empire according to Western ideas of government

¹⁷⁷ Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 187-88.

and society. However there were to be many obstacles during the subsequent years, especially from Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa. Among the original members of the *Young Ottomans* were Mehmed Bey, who received an education in Paris and had return to the Empire with the goal of trying to establish constitutionalism and popular representation. Another member and maybe the most important unofficial reformer to come out of the *Tanzimat* was Namik Kemal Bey, who early in his life gained fame for his abilities as a poet.

On the day of their Forest of Belgrade meeting, the *Young Ottomans* decided their objective would be to change the government of the Empire into a constitutional form of government. They were opposed to absolutism, which they later made clear to Sultan Abdulaziz and their intention to see constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁷⁸ Embodied in a document, this proposal to Abdulaziz was called *Ittihak-i Hamiyet*. Not only did this document discuss the possibility of constitutionalism in the Empire, but it also instructed Abdulaziz to take control of the government out of the hands of Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa. The ultimate goal of the group was to allow for popular sovereignty and representative government, which would control the legislative branch of government and would check the power of the executive branch and to form some variation of a constitutional monarchy.¹⁷⁹ Furthermore, the *Young Ottomans* supported a program of reform which attacked the policies and the centralization of political authority, which was supported by some of the official reformers of the *Tanzimat*.¹⁸⁰ A discussion of the ideas

¹⁷⁸ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 10-13.

¹⁷⁹ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 192.

¹⁸⁰ Carter Vaughn Findley, "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part II), *Studia Islamica* 56 (1982): 152.

of the most important members of this society— Mustafa Fazil Paşa, Ibrahim Şinasi, Ali Suavi, Namik Kemal and Ahmed Cevdet Paşa—follows.

Mustafa Fazil Paşa

If religion does not remain in the position of eternal truths, in other words, if it transcends into interference with worldly affairs, it becomes a destroyer of all as well as of its own self¹⁸¹

Mustafa Fazil was born in 1829.¹⁸² As was the case with almost all of the intellectual elite of the Empire, Mustafa Fazil had a privileged upbringing as part of the ruling family of Egypt. This placed him in an interesting predicament in that his father, Muhammad Ali, ruler of Egypt, and his brother, Ibrahim, were both enemies of the Empire. Mustafa was in line to be the next ruler of Egypt however; on May 27, 1866 Egypt changed its succession laws and he was left out of the line of succession.¹⁸³ Contrary to the history of his family, Mustafa Fazil Paşa was a supporter as well as a participant of the *Young Ottoman* movement. In fact most of the early funding for the group to publish and edit newspapers came from Mustafa Fazil.¹⁸⁴

This is not what he is most known for, though. In 1867 Mustafa Fazil wrote a letter to Sultan Abdulaziz, which was considered the foundation for public political commentary in the Ottoman Empire.¹⁸⁵ This letter was the first manifesto from the liberal *Young Ottomans*, which stated explicitly their admiration for transformation in the Empire. The letter was written in order to make aware the current situation of the Empire

¹⁸¹ As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 208-09.

¹⁸² Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 500.

¹⁸³ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 198.

¹⁸⁴ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 156-57.

¹⁸⁵ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 276.

according to the *Young Ottomans*. They believed the decadence of the Empire and European interference into Ottoman affairs was occurring due to unjust rule. This unjust rule was a result of the lack of liberty in the Empire. Accordingly, it was not efficient only to reform the Empire, rather a new liberal political regime needed to establish itself in order to bring about a new liberal government.¹⁸⁶ In addition to this problem, Mustafa Fazil believed there were many other problems within the Empire which had some effect in the current status of the Empire. He believed “depopulation, decline in Turkish virility moral degeneration, loss of moral, intellectual stagnation, injustices and exactions of subordinate officials, treasury crisis, and lack of industrial, agricultural, and commercial development” were all problems which had to be dealt with in the Empire.¹⁸⁷

The problem the Empire faced was how to deal with all of these issues in the Empire, which was the purpose of Mustafa Fazil’s letter to Abdulaziz. The letter was an attempt on the part of Mustafa Fazil to influence the Sultan to take action to bring about a liberal regime, one which Mustafa Fazil and the *Young Ottomans* believed would be necessary to secure the liberty of all people and to continue strengthening the Empire. Mustafa also stated, unlike what some people believed that reforming the education of the Empire was not a way in which all the shortcomings of the Empire could be cured.¹⁸⁸ The only way to mend the Empire, according to the letter, was for a constitution to be promulgated which expressed equal rights for all people. This in turn would change the structure of political authority within the Empire, one which had been traditionally engulfed with Islamic principles of rule.

¹⁸⁶ Berkes, *The Development*, 208.

¹⁸⁷ As quoted in Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 203.

¹⁸⁸ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 279.

Mustafa Fazil set out in his letter a detailed plan as to how to change the basis of political authority of the Empire. For example, Mustafa believed the provincial assemblies should be freely elected by the people. Furthermore, he believed these freely elected members should then form a national assembly, which would be used in some degree like a parliament. This in turn, he believed, would guarantee equality for all people of the Empire. As a result of this proposed equality and liberty, the loyalty, moral basis of the society, economy, culture, and military would all be rejuvenated.¹⁸⁹ The objective of these reforms would be to bind the government and the people.¹⁹⁰

This was indeed a radical departure from the traditional framework of Islamic rule. Mustafa Fazil also believed the reforms implemented by Mahmud II, which established a centralized political authority with an increase of control, was not the correct steps of reform to implement. As a result of the centralization of authority by Mahmud II before 1839, Mustafa Fazil believed the Empire was in effect ruled not only by tyranny, but also by the Sultan's ministers who were mostly dependent of the Sultan. In other words, the Sultan no longer ruled the Empire. Also since public opinion was not present in the Empire, these powerful ministers could work independently of the people, whom they ruled. An interesting aspect of Mustafa's writing was the terms he used such as, "tyranny" and also the term "*tyrans subalterns*" which he appropriated from European political discourse.¹⁹¹ He used these terms in order to appeal to the intellectual class within the Empire which had already expressed its aversion to these powerful

¹⁸⁹ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 204.

¹⁹⁰ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 279-80.

¹⁹¹ Mustafa Fazil learned of these terms from Western political writers such as Vincenzo Gioberti. *Prolegomeni del Primato Moral e Civile degli Italiani* (Brussels: Caus & Co., 1846). See Mardin, *The Genesis*, 281.

ministers.¹⁹² In Mustafa's opinion the real purpose of creating a constitutional government was to dismantle the amount of power these ministers had in governmental affairs and to check their power by creating a responsible government, representing the people. In other words, Mustafa Fazil had become convinced that the only remedy for the political weakness of the Empire was to adopt European constitutional government.

In this context, it is important to describe the role in which Mustafa Fazil's representative assembly would engage in the formulation of political authority. According to Mustafa the representative assembly would act in order to control the abuses of the political establishment. For instance, he states the only role the Sultan would lose would be the right to make wrong decisions, because the assembly would be there to correct any mistake which could occur. This assembly would be strictly consultative to protect the rights and liberty of the people it represented.¹⁹³ In other words, Mustafa Fazil's understanding of how representative government worked was either naïve or flawed.

The one aspect to take notice of is how revolutionary these ideas were in regard to the traditional Islamic concept of political authority. Mustafa believed in a complete severance of faith and state and made no reference to Islam being involved in representative assembly. This view distinguishes him from other *Young Ottomans* in that most of the members wanted to maintain some Islamic structure in the government. In a sense the other members of the *Young Ottomans* wanted to Islamize Westernization, while Mustafa wanted simply to Westernize the political authority. Lastly, Mustafa

¹⁹² Ibid., 280.

¹⁹³ Mardin, The Genesis, 280-81.

wanted the control of reform in the hands of the people and to create a government of the people and for the people, no matter ethnicity, or religion.¹⁹⁴

Mustafa Fazil led an active political life, beginning in Egypt and ending in the Ottoman Empire. In 1875, a year before the promulgation of the constitution, Mustafa Fazil died.¹⁹⁵ Even though he died before a constitution could be promulgated, he was an influential figure during the *Tanzimat*. As indicated above, he patronized other members of the *Young Ottomans*, and helped finance their operations and their journals, when these men were in Europe in exile. One of the *Young Ottomans* Mustafa helped was Şinasi, who will be discussed below.

Şinasi

My nation is mankind, my country is the face of the earth.¹⁹⁶

Şinasi was born in 1826 in Istanbul and was raised in a well-to-do family.¹⁹⁷ He received his early education in a neighborhood school, and then he became an apprentice at the Bureau of the Tophane Imperial Arsenal, where he was trained in Arabic, Persian, and French. In 1849 he went to Paris where he studied literature and public finance.¹⁹⁸ Upon his return, Şinasi brought back new ideas which he learned from the West, and they included Western-style patriotism and most importantly, new ideas on literacy and writing styles.¹⁹⁹

¹⁹⁴ Ibid., 281.

¹⁹⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 500.

¹⁹⁶ As quoted in Mardin, *The Genesis*, 268. According to Mardin, this is one of the most interesting couplets written by Şinasi.

¹⁹⁷ Ibid., 252.

¹⁹⁸ Quoted in Talat Sait Halman, "Şinasi," in *Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001), 9: 443a.

¹⁹⁹ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 183.

Şinasi is best known for his efforts to promote literacy and reform writing styles and is credited as being instrumental in the “birth of public opinion,”²⁰⁰ Şinasi is accredited with introducing playwriting into Turkish literature when he wrote his first play, *Sair evlen-mesi*.²⁰¹ In addition, he also helped to bring into the Empire Western examples of poetry. In 1859, he published *Terdjame yi-manzume*, which was a selection of poems written by Fenelon, Gilbert, Racine, Lamartine, and La Fountain--all translated into Turkish. According to E.J.W. Gibb, who translated numerous Ottoman Turkish poets, his poetry “mark the turning-point in the history of Ottoman poetry”.²⁰² However, this is not what Şinasi is most known for in history. He is known more so for simplifying the Turkish language and creating a new system of writing prose. For example, he advocated and also used short concise sentences rather than elaborate and confusing sentences, which were used by many of the elite class.²⁰³

However, Şinasi knew in order to reform the literacy and writing systems, he would have to write more in order to promote his Western ideas. In light of this, he gave his full attention to literature and journalism. His ultimate objective was to create a new profession and a new style of writing and expressing ideas.²⁰⁴ In order to reach a wider constituency, Şinasi created the first privately owned weekly newspaper, which was independently administered and outside governmental control. The newspaper was named *Terdjaman-i Ahwal*.²⁰⁵ According to one of his biographers, his association with

²⁰⁰ As quoted in Mardin, *The Genesis*, 252.

²⁰¹ Davison, *Reform in the Ottoman Empire*, 184. The name of this play translated is “The Wedding of a Poet”.

²⁰² Halman, “Şinasi,” 9: 443b. The title *Terdjame yi-manzume* is translated as “Translation of Verses.”

²⁰³ Berkes, *The Development*, 197.

²⁰⁴ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 137.

²⁰⁵ Halman, “Şinasi,” 9: 443b. The translation of the title of the newspaper is “Interpreter of Events.”

Terdjaman was not to last long as he constantly disagreed with his colleagues and he gave up his association with *Terdjaman* in 1861.²⁰⁶

Even though he left the *Terdjaman-i Ahwal*, he did not stop publishing newspapers. In June 1862 he created his own journal called *Taswir-i afkar*, “which became a platform for innovative ideas based on European-type rationalism and technological reform for the salvation of the Ottoman state.”²⁰⁷ Among the issues that he wrote articles on were,

urban problems, agriculture, industry, and governmental corruption, and advocated the rule of law based on the rights of the people, political rationalism secularization, and a system of governance sustained by national sovereignty, freedom, and citizenship rights.²⁰⁸

These journal articles were where Şinasi developed his reputation as the man who gave birth to public opinion. In these articles Şinasi developed new ideas and new ways in which to articulate these ideas. Şinasi expressed ideas such as citizen’s rights and natural rights of the people, such as their rights to life, honor, and property as expressed in the *Hatti-i Sherif of Gulhane*. This would then allow all Ottomans freedom of expression and gave birth to public opinion without their fearing repercussions from the government. In addition, he began to articulate ideas of a constitutional government with representative government. Also, Şinasi was the first to use the term “millet” to represent “nation.”²⁰⁹

These ideas were new to the Empire and much criticism was directed toward Şinasi especially from Ali Paşa and Fuad Paşa, who were two of the most powerful

²⁰⁶ Ibid. Talat Halman does not go into details as to the exact reason why Şinasi left the *Terdjaman-i Ahwal*, other than to say that it was a disagreement.

²⁰⁷ As quoted in Halman, “Şinasi,” 9: 443b. The translation for *Taswir-i afkar* means “Chronicle of Opinions.”

²⁰⁸ As quoted in *ibid*.

²⁰⁹ Berkes, The Development, 197-98.

statesmen of the Empire during the *Tanzimat Era*.²¹⁰ In Şinasi's attempt to reform the literature and governing affairs of the Empire, he was joined by Namik Kemal in writing articles for *Taswir-i afkar*.

No matter how many articles Şinasi wrote, he still had a problem to overcome, that being the lack of literacy in the Empire. In order to overcome this dilemma, Şinasi had to create a new system for writing prose that a majority of the people could read and comprehend. Part of this change in writing style was to write short and concise sentences. Not only were there structural differences, but there was also vocabulary changes which also had to be implemented. For instance, he attempted to revise the vocabulary, not according to Arabic or Persian traditions, but on the basis of the current vocabulary of the people.²¹¹ By doing this, Şinasi anticipated that the Ottoman people would be able to grasp this new vocabulary more easily because it was modeled according to the people's speech.

Şinasi in common with the other unofficial reformers combined literary pursuits with what can be described today as political activism. Among the many accomplishments of Şinasi were his ideas on constitutional government, his ideas on people's natural rights, his ideas on public opinion and his ideas on creating journals and newspapers to express new ideas based on Western traditions. According to Serif Mardin, one of Şinasi's most important contributions to the development of political thought in the Empire was his idea on people's natural rights such as life, honor, and property. Initially, Şinasi believed protecting people's rights was important in order to save the Empire from its current declining status. However, his perspective changed

²¹⁰ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 137.

²¹¹ Berkes, *The Development*, 198.

from an attempt to save the Empire from disintegration into protecting the people's rights.²¹²

In addition to protecting the rights of the people, Şinasi also discussed the possibility of creating a representative assembly in the Empire. According to Serif Mardin, his views were very difficult to synthesize because he tended to disguise his ideas of reform so not to be labeled as a person who sought to Westernize the Empire. This in effect caused his ideas on representative government to be ambiguous in nature and "...which weakened the foundations on which the Young Ottomans attempted to build their intellectual constructions."²¹³ By analyzing his work, it can be perceived that he looked toward the West for motivation, especially in the sphere of political authority for he saw "...European intellectual advances and political conceptions as superior ones which did not try to conciliate with Islam."²¹⁴ He felt the Empire should create a representative assembly and separate the affairs of the state and religion because he did not believe it would cause a problem within the Empire. However, Şinasi can be seen as naïve in that he believed separating the two could be done simply, which could not be further from the truth.²¹⁵ According to Berkes, Şinasi was the leader of the early constitutional movement. However, Berkes goes on to write that Şinasi realized the unofficial reformers were to fail in their movement because they could not convey their ideas to the "uneducated" and "unenlightened" people.²¹⁶

However, Şinasi did not push these ideas further in a radical direction and he also did not harshly critique the existing order. The one objective he did push strongly for

²¹² Mardin, The Genesis, 266.

²¹³ *Ibid.*, 275.

²¹⁴ Mardin, The Genesis, 275.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.*

²¹⁶ Berkes, The Development, 198.

though was the use of the Turkish language, rather than using Arabic or Persian. Şinasi ended his career in a rented home in Istanbul where he established a printing press to continue to republish his books. He died on September 13, 1871,²¹⁷ largely a forgotten figure, but his ideas heavily influenced the next figure to be discussed, Namik Kemal.

Namik Kemal

Man is free. He always requires freedom. To deprive humanity of it is as if one were to deprive it of food.²¹⁸

Namik Kemal was born on December 21, 1840 in the town of Tekirdag. Kemal's early life was influenced at a young age by his family's tradition of participating in government service.²¹⁹ Kemal spent his early childhood with his grandfather, who had a lasting impression upon Namik, especially in regard to poetry. Not much is known about his early life and his early education, but it appears that he was schooled by tutors and went to a private school, *Dar al-Ma'arif*²²⁰ in Istanbul for about a year when he was either twelve or thirteen.²²¹

There is not much known about the early political life of Kemal, but Lewis states that by the age of seventeen he was involved in government service, holding a position in the Translation Office of the Customs Bureau²²² Then at the age of nineteen he was Secretary to the head of the *Bab-i Ali*.²²³ By the age of twenty, he was appointed to be the assistant of the Chief Secretary of the Customs, Leskofcali Ghalib. Then, when the

²¹⁷ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 256.

²¹⁸ As quoted in *ibid.*, 297.

²¹⁹ Serif, Mardin, "Namik Mehmet Kemal," in *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*, 2: 409.

²²⁰ In Arabic this means "House of Knowledge" (personal communication, David Thomas, April 17, 2006).

²²¹ F.A. Tansel, "Namik Mehmed Kemal" in *Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1, (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001), 4: 874b.

²²² Lewis, *The Emergence*, 141.

²²³ The *Bab-i Ali* was the Arabic term for the Sublime Porte, which was the location of the offices of the *Grand Vezir*. See Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 511.

Chief Secretary was appointed to the Director of Customs in Tripoli the following year, Kemal became a member of the Chamber of Translation Office of the Porte.

It is evident that Kemal was capable and was valued for his knowledge of French. These attributes set him on the road to even higher office and in 1867, at the age of 27, he was appointed to the position of Assistant Governor of Erzurum, in Eastern Anatolia.²²⁴ While holding these positions, Kemal was at the forefront of the reforms of the *Tanzimat*, and he became influenced by the writing of Şinasi, so much so that Kemal learned French in order to be able to inform himself more on the reforms of the *Tanzimat*. Like the other intellectuals, Namik Kemal thus had wide experience in government service.

In the early 1860s Kemal joined forces with Şinasi and began to collaborate with Şinasi in his journal *Tasvir-i afkar*. Kemal took over editing this journal in 1865, when Şinasi left for France.²²⁵ When Kemal took over this position, he wrote about translations, but then he began to write more about the Empire and its political situation. His views soon angered the “authorities” and in 1867 he left for Europe, where he joined other *Young Ottomans* in exile. In Europe, Kemal and the others spent their time in exile in Vienna, London, and mostly Paris. While in Europe, Kemal would continue to write in several journals which were circulated in the Empire, expressing his ideas of reform for the Empire.²²⁶

One of the most important of these ideas was his idea on freedom or *hurriyya*.²²⁷

This term was used extensively during the 1860s by many of the *Young Ottomans* and

²²⁴ Tansel, “Namik Mehmed Kemal,” 4: 875b.

²²⁵ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 141.

²²⁶ Tansel, “Namik Mehmed Kemal,” 4: 875b.

²²⁷ F. Rosenthal, “Hurriyya”, in *Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1, (Leiden:Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001), 3: 589a. *Hurriyya* is derived from *hurr* meaning “free.” In pre-Islamic times “free” meant the opposite of “unfree” or “slave.” Furthermore, the word also had a connotation meaning “noble” of character and behavior.

Ottoman bureaucrats. For example Şinasi stressed the importance of freedom of expression. Khayr al-Din believed in a government which established justice and freedom. Namik Kemal on the other hand had a much more in-depth analysis of *hurriyya*. He believed that freedom resonated most clearly around the idea of the sovereignty of the people. This freedom for the people would be protected by the creation of a constitution and by the creation of an elected representative assembly. According to Kemal, "...justice means not only care for the welfare of the subject, but respect for his political rights. These rights must be safeguarded by appropriate institutions."²²⁸ Another of the differences between Kemal and other *Young Ottomans* was the way in which he tried to legitimize his idea of *hurriyya*. Namik Kemal expressed the meaning of *hurriyya* as "natural developments from traditional Islamic notions, in this way justice grows into freedom and consultation into representation."²²⁹ However, Kemal was naïve in his belief that *hurriyya* could be implemented in the Empire, thus creating an Empire based upon principles of just rule and freedom, even if he legitimized it through Islamic notions and sources. According to Kemal, the sole purpose of creating a representative assembly was so it would guarantee *hurriyya* but at this point, late 1860s, a true representative assembly did not exist in the Empire.²³⁰

In conjunction with his thoughts on personal freedom, Namik Kemal emphasized ideas pertaining to the role of government and its power. He was able to express these ideas because in September 1876 Kemal was elected to hold a position on the Council of State, and then later on in November of the same year he held a position on a special

²²⁸ As quoted in *ibid.*

²²⁹ As quoted in Rosenthal, "Hurriyya," 3: 589a.

²³⁰ *Ibid.*

committee. The objective of this committee was to create a constitution.²³¹ Up to this point, the government of the Empire remained centralized, and the Sultan or the *Grand Vezir*, depending upon who was Sultan and who was *Grand Vezir*, controlled the bulk the power and were able to use their power with relatively few checks upon it.

Kemal preferred to have a system of government which saw a separation of power. With this in mind, Kemal used a French model to describe his system of government. His government included three branches of government, which all had their own responsibilities and duties. According to Serif Mardin's analysis, the first branch would be the Council of State. The duties of this branch were to prepare laws and also to resolve any administrative issues which may arise. The second branch of government, according to Kemal's model, was the Senate. The purpose of the Senate was to approve or reject laws which were prepared by the Council of State. The third branch of government was to be the Lower Chamber. The main purpose of this branch was to control the budget, which was also an issue throughout the Empire's history due to corruption and economic stresses.²³²

However, Berkes interpreted Kemal's proposal for government differently than Mardin. According to Berkes, Kemal believed there should be three branches of government. The first branch of government was the Council of State. This branch was composed of forty to fifty members, and its purpose was to draft bills and to "decide upon the execution of administrative laws." The second branch, which differs from Mardin's interpretation, was the National Assembly. The purpose of this branch was to legislate bills which were passed by the Council of State, and this branch was also to

²³¹ Tansel, "Namik Mehmed Kemal," 4: 876b.

²³² Mardin, The Genesis, 311.

control the budget. The third branch of government was the Senate. The purpose of the Senate was,

...to act as a moderating power between the legislative body and the executive power by keeping alive the maintenance of the basic laws and the liberties of the people, and to ratify for promulgation all laws in these terms.²³³

Though it is evident that there is some confusion as to what Kemal actually intended governmental structure to be, it is clear that he believed that the objective of the government was to ensure that the laws were enforced and also to make sure the Empire continued to move forward. The role of the Sultan was to appoint members to governmental positions and to support the government, for according to Kemal, the Sultan's powers would be limited by the laws created by the Council of State and then ratified by the Senate.²³⁴

Clearly, Namik Kemal's model of government was greatly influenced by European, especially French models, and in accordance with this model he believed that the government would only be able to function properly if the people gave the government its consent. In order for the people to provide the government with its consent, Kemal understood that the people needed rights and freedoms, as have been described earlier. However, Kemal's ideas on individual rights go far beyond his ideas on freedom, *hurriyya*. Kemal has been described as one of the first Muslims to understand the true meaning of liberalism, and the importance of the sovereignty of the people, which was essential for there to be a legitimate constitutional political sovereignty. Included with sovereignty of the people was the idea that government was

²³³ As quoted in Berkes, The Development, 213.

²³⁴ Mardin, The Genesis, 312-13.

responsible for providing rights and justice for its people.²³⁵ In order to be permissible, “political sovereignty,” had to satisfy two obligations. First, it must be based upon the people’s consent, as was mentioned earlier. Second, the government had to act in accordance to the law.²³⁶ By implementing both of these attributes, Kemal believed that the government would be a just government, where people could participate in and also have a legitimate voice within its framework.

If one was to simply look at Kemal’s views on the creation of a new government, then one must also look at his views on law, because these views were not as secular as one might infer by looking only at his views on the role of government. According to Kemal, the binding thread in the Empire was the *şeriat*, and the role of good government was to fulfill and follow the *şeriat*. In other words, Kemal wanted Islamic law to remain as a basic fundamental element in regard to law within the Empire.²³⁷ He also believed the *şeriat* allowed for a constitution in regard to the foundation of government and the rights of the people. In this sense he was against the process of secularizing law which was underway throughout the *Tanzimat*. He was also against the establishment of the secular courts in that he truly did not understand the purpose of these courts within the framework of providing people with more rights and creating a just government.²³⁸

In other words, Kemal believed the establishment of secular courts did more damage to the Empire than good. He argued that the secular courts damaged the legal principles on which the Empire was created.

²³⁵ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 143.

²³⁶ Berkes, *The Development*, 212.

²³⁷ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 314.

²³⁸ *Ibid.*, 315.

The second reason why Kemal believed secular courts should not have been created was because he saw the process of secularizing the legal institutions as providing the West with the opportunity to challenge the historical significance and existence of the Empire.²³⁹ He regarded Islamic law as the principle foundation on which a parliament could function. He thought Islamic law permitted reforms to occur and this was the easiest way in which to help reform the Empire.²⁴⁰ Kemal's views on reform can best be described as being half influenced by the West and liberalism, as witnessed by his views on government, and half influenced by traditional Islamic society, as seen by his thoughts and ideas on law.

Another important idea proposed by Kemal were his ideas on patriotism. Kemal's views on patriotism were wrapped around the idea of a fatherland.²⁴¹ Kemal viewed a fatherland as not being a geographical area *per se*, but rather a bond which existed between individuals in which people share, "memories of ancestors, recollections of one's own youth and earliest experiences all had a place."²⁴² Kemal wrote:

The fatherland is not composed of the vague lines traced by the sword of a conqueror or the pen of a scribe. It is a sacred idea resulting from the conglomeration of various noble feelings such as the people, liberty, brotherhood, interest, sovereignty, respect for one's ancestors, love of the family, and childhood memories.²⁴³

A fatherland gave an emotional significance to one's own history, whereby one could be proud of whom one was with respect to religion and ethnicity. This is an important concept because it gave people a sense of pride; it encouraged people to be proud of

²³⁹ Berkes, The Development, 216.

²⁴⁰ Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 225.

²⁴¹ Mardin, The Genesis, 326. Kemal used the word *vatan* to express his ideas on fatherland. The word itself is the Turkish equivalent to the French word *patrie*.

²⁴² As quoted in *ibid.*, 327.

²⁴³ As quoted in Mardin, The Genesis, 327.

whom they are and where they came from, in an attempt to bring the Empire together under a specific rubric or cause. This rubric or cause was for one to be proud of being an Ottoman. This was one of the first movements of pan-Ottomanism with Islamic undertones embedded within its framework.²⁴⁴ This movement was an attempt to fuse together all people who lived within the borders of the Empire regardless of gender or ethnicity. The purpose of pan-Ottomanism was to create a feeling within the Empire of solidarity, in which the government and a constitution would provide all people the same rights as everybody else.

Kemal thus wanted to reform the Empire in several essential respects. One goal was to instill a sense of patriotism in all Ottomans; he also wanted the Empire to continue to progress in all areas. He wrote articles stressing the importance of simpler and more concise writing which was closer to spoken language in terms of grammar and syntax.²⁴⁵ The purpose of this was to allow more people to read and understand the writings of the elite members of the Empire. This is especially the case for laws. If laws were written in a simpler form, then everyone in the Empire would have access to them and would understand them.

Kemal took many of his ideas from the West, such as his ideas of a constitution and a representative parliament, which he witnessed firsthand while in exile in Europe. Kemal understood the Empire could not simply implement these European ideas the Empire. Kemal believed the best way to reform was to stress the importance of Islam not only culturally but also legally. This is one reason why he stressed that the secular courts were not a positive reform. In the legal sense, Kemal believed the *şeriat* needed to

²⁴⁴ Berkes, The Development, 221.

²⁴⁵ Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 194.

remain the principle foundation for law within the Empire. By combining Western and Islamic traditions within the Empire, Kemal figured he could reform the government while still maintaining its Islamic tradition and practices.

Even after the parliament was dissolved, thus ending the *Tanzimat Era*, Kemal continued working for the government. He held several government positions throughout the Empire, though he no longer publicly advocated a program of political reform. Rather he concentrated on his literary career. On December 2, 1888 Kemal died. Namik Kemal was an important intellectual figure during the *Tanzimat*. Some scholars, such as Mardin, consider him to be the most influential of the unofficial reformers of the *Tanzimat*.²⁴⁶ He was considered the leader of the *Young Ottomans*, and wrote in several journals expressing his ideas of reform. His ideas had reform at his heart, but also included Islamic traditional underpinnings embedded within it. He truly believed the Empire should not lose its Islamic character, because Islam was important historically and culturally to the people of the Empire. This leads us to the next figure, Ali Suavi, whose ideas in some respect were both similar and dissimilar to those of Namik Kemal.

Ali Suavi

To provide justice is the greatest, the first duty of government, for it is the very reason of its establishment and a pledge of its continuation.²⁴⁷

Ali Suavi was born in Istanbul in 1839, the same year the *Hatti-i Sherif of Gulhane* was promulgated. He received his early education at a *rusdiyye* and later studied Islamic sciences at a *madrasa*.²⁴⁸ One of his first jobs was as a teacher in Plovdiv, located in present day Bulgaria. However, he was dismissed for inciting civil

²⁴⁶ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 283-84.

²⁴⁷ As quoted in *Ibid.*, 366.

²⁴⁸ A *rusdiyye* is a high school while a *madrasa* is a college.

disturbances during his sermons. After this incident, Suavi left Plovdiv and headed back to Istanbul in 1866.²⁴⁹ In 1867, he began to write articles in *Muhbir*.²⁵⁰ These articles were considered highly controversial, especially by the *Grand Vezir*, who in 1867 exiled Suavi to Anatolia and also forced *Muhbir* to shut down.²⁵¹ The government used the Press Law of 1865, which established strict regulations for the press, and created a Press Commission, which would enforce the new laws, to shut down *Muhbir*. On March 12, 1867 a notification was passed by the Ottoman government against *Muhbir* explicitly stating:

A part of the local press, not recognizing the spirit by which journalism should be inspired in the East, has made itself the passionate organ of all the extreme parties and of tendencies essentially hostile to the general interests of the country... the Sublime Porte therefore reserves the right, whenever the general interest of the country may require it, to act through administrative channels and independently of the law of the press, against those newspapers which do not recognize the above-stated principles, whose observance is an essential condition of a national press...²⁵²

After fleeing the Empire, Suavi found himself in London. It was in London where he joined the *Young Ottoman* alliance, and met Namik Kemal and other members of the Young Ottomans in exile in England.²⁵³ In London he continued to write articles for *Muhbir* in which he expressed his ideas on political reform.²⁵⁴

As was the case with many Ottoman intellectuals during this time period, Suavi “...oscillated between his loyalty to Islam (as faith and culture) and modernization (as a

²⁴⁹ Talat Sait Halman, “Ali Su’awi,” in CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1 (Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001), 9: 737b.

²⁵⁰ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 361. The term means “The Reporter.”

²⁵¹ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 149. Lewis does not state who the *Grand Vezir* was at that time. In 1867 Ali Paşa was the *Grand Vezir*. See Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: See chart on p. 62.

²⁵² As quoted in Lewis, *The Emergence*, 149-50.

²⁵³ Halman, “Ali Su’awi,” 9: 737b.

²⁵⁴ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 149.

civilising and secular process).”²⁵⁵ He realized the Empire was in dire need for reform; however, he was not entirely sure if that meant Islam had to be removed from state affairs. Due to his commitment to maintaining an Islamic character for the Empire, he challenged the value of European political ideas such as, popular sovereignty and separation of power.²⁵⁶ Suavi had a particularly difficult time understanding the later of the two because he believed a separation of power between *din ve devlet*, faith and state, already existed in the Empire. He identified this as a separation of function, which was permissible in Islam. Suavi then pointed to the separation of function that existed between the *muftu*, the interpreter of the *şeriat*, the *kadi*, the judge, and the *vali*, the governor.²⁵⁷ The role of the *muftu* was to act as the Legislative branch, the *kadi* was to act as the Judiciary branch, and the *vali* was to act as the Executive branch. Each would cooperate with the other but each operated independently of the other. Thereby, the close relationship between faith and state, *din ve devlet*, would be maintained through the three separate governmental offices cooperating with one another.²⁵⁸

On this basis Suavi advocated the establishment of three branches of government. Each would be responsible for particular components of government. At the head of the political authority, as the overall legitimizing force, was God. The *şeriat* was the law that transferred God’s will to the people. The *ulema* were to interpret the *şeriat*. Lastly, the rulers of the Empire, either the Sultan or *Grand Vezir* acting for the Sultan, were to be the executors of the interpretive decisions of the *ulema*.²⁵⁹ This foundation for political authority can be seen as inspired by early Islamic political thought as opposed to the

²⁵⁵ As quoted in Halman, “Ali Su’awi,” 9: 737b.

²⁵⁶ Ibid.

²⁵⁷ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 367-68.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 368.

²⁵⁹ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 373-74.

implications of the *Tanzimat* and the views of many of the *Young Ottomans*. For example, Şinasi advocated the replacement of Islamic political ideas and practices with European political practices such as constitutional and representative government²⁶⁰

Furthermore, on the topic of political authority, Suavi also believed a representative assembly was permitted by Islam. Unlike many of his *Young Ottoman* counterparts, Suavi looked to early Islam to validate that such an assembly was indeed allowed by Islam. Suavi defended his thoughts on this subject by providing three examples from early Islam. The first was from the institution of *hilf al-Fuzul*, the second was based on the principle of *nazar fi-l mazalim*, and the last was based on the ideology of the *shura*.²⁶¹ According to Mardin, the *hilf al-Fuzul*, "...was the name given to an assembly which had gathered before the prophet Mohammed's mission had become manifest."²⁶² The purpose of the assembly was to protect the people of the different clans in their commercial transactions with one another. In other words this was an assembly created in order to protect the rights of individuals. In addition to the institution of *hilf al-Fuzul* was the principle of *nazar fi-l mazalim*. This principle was, "...a widespread Islamic practice establishing means for a recourse to justice whenever recourse to the *Şeriat*, in itself, did not result in the redress of a wrong."²⁶³ This was a way to check the power of the executive and the Sultan in order to avoid tyranny. Lastly, there is the principle of the *shura*. The *shura*, Suavi maintained, was an assembly which was used by *Caliph Omar* (R. 634-644, C.E.) In this situation the *Caliph* would consult with

²⁶⁰ Ibid., 374.

²⁶¹ Mardin, The Genesis, 375.

²⁶² Ibid.

²⁶³ Mardin, The Genesis, 375.

prominent members of the community before making a decision.²⁶⁴ Using this historical example, Suavi legitimated a representative assembly in terms of early Islamic practice.

His perspectives on political authority and organization, which he believed must be primarily based on Islamic forms, went against the ideas of other *Young Ottomans*, such as Namik Kemal. Due to their divergent views, the two of them separated. Kemal went so far as to state that what Suavi was advocating went against the objective of the *Young Ottomans*. However, this dispute did not prevent Suavi from continuing to express his ideas on reform. In order to fully comprehend the difference of opinion on political authority between Suavi and Kemal, it is crucial to compare their ideas further.

One major difference was that Namik Kemal emphasized the idea of popular sovereignty and its implementation within the Empire, which Suavi did not agree with as he insisted that Allah was sovereign. In addition, Kemal believed in nonviolence and civil disobedience in attempting to reform. On the other hand, Suavi was willing to go much further, not that he specifically endorsed using violence, he simply was not opposed to it. Suavi saw two justifications for the right to rebel. First, he stated the tradition of rebellion against the Umayyad caliphs and the early Abbasid caliphs. Second, Suavi, pointed to the Qur'anic verse that Muslims have a responsibility to conform to God and steer clear of evil.²⁶⁵

Suavi's ideas on reform were focused on three critical points. First, like the other *Young Ottomans*, he wanted to bring about a movement of "new energy" to the Empire in order to make drastic reforms that would facilitate the recovery process of the Empire.

Unlike other *Young Ottomans*, however, he refused to conform to constituted authority

²⁶⁴ Ibid.

²⁶⁵ Hanna, E., Kassis, *A Concordance to The Qur'an* (Berkeley: University of California Press 1983), 1111. One example is from 40:58 (60) "not equal are...those who believe and do deeds of righteousness, and the wrongdoer."

and even advocated rebellion.²⁶⁶ Suavi believed individual Ottomans should take responsibility for their own actions. In common with Namik Kemal, he recognized that it would be difficult to put these ideas into practice in a largely traditional Ottoman society without education. For Suavi, education was crucial. In order to improve education in the Empire, Suavi proposed all efforts should be made to improve the educational system of the Empire until it was equal to European standards.²⁶⁷ Serif Mardin writes that Suavi was absolutely against the traditional set-up of the educational system in the Empire as well as the curricula of the schools, specifically the religious schools, and he wanted to have a system of education which was as advanced as Europe.²⁶⁸

The one attribute which distinguishes Suavi from other unofficial reformers, was his idea of nationalism and his patriotic belief in a “fatherland.” While Namik Kemal also emphasized the importance of the fatherland, *vatan*, Suavi’s idea of the nation was not one of being an Ottoman nation, rather of being a “Turkish” nation.²⁶⁹ He played a pioneer role in spreading the idea of a Turkic identity and Turkish nationalism.²⁷⁰ His ideas were not specifically for Ottomans alone. He intended them for all Turkic speakers, especially those like the Tatars in Kazan’ (Russia), Astrakhan’ (Russia), and in the Crimea Peninsula, as Suavi considered these people to be primarily “Turks” from an ethnic and linguistic perspective rather than simply Muslims from a religious

²⁶⁶ Mardin., The Genesis, 369.

²⁶⁷ Ibid. Mardin does not go into more details as to how Suavi wanted to match the European education advancements. Mardin does provide an article to read, in which the prologue deals with this issue. It is entitled “Mukaddime”, in *Muhbir*, 25, Saban, 1283/ January 2, 1867.

²⁶⁸ Mardin, The Genesis, 369.

²⁶⁹ Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 193.

²⁷⁰ The idea was taken up much later in 1905 by Yusuf Akçura who was a later pioneer figure in the development of Turkish nationalism. Akçura proposed that the Turkic nation include all the Turkic speaking peoples of Asia and that a Turkic identity had existed since the time of Genghiz Khan who first united the Turkish and Mongolian peoples of Asia. David Thomas, “Yusuf Akçura’s Uç Tarz-i Siyaset” (Three Types of Policies) in Central Asian Monuments, ed. Hasan B. Paksoy (Istanbul Turkey: The Isis Press, 1991), 163.

perspective.²⁷¹ In his attempt to redefine the Empire as one based on the existence of a Turkic nation, Suavi laid the basis for later developments of Turkish nationalism especially in terms of identifying language and ethnicity as the basis of association, rather than religion.

Another of Suavi's objectives was to reform the education system. He proposed schools should minimize instruction in Arabic and adopt Turkish as the basic language of instruction at all levels and for all subjects.²⁷² Furthermore, he also not only wanted to codify the *şeriat* into Turkish, but he also sought for a translation of *şeriat* into Turkish. However, his intentions for this Turkic movement were not clearly stated. He may have wanted these reforms in order to bring about a "Turkish" nationalism; however, Serif Mardin states, "...but this was more a function of his attempt to make knowledge available to a large audience and simplify *madrassa* teachings than part of his Turkism".²⁷³ So this aspect of Suavi's ideas had implicit, not explicit political ramifications.

Similar to the rest of the *Young Ottomans*, Suavi lashed out against the ministers of the Porte. One of his strongest criticisms for the ministers was the way in which they treated the people. For example, the ministers expected people to address them as "statesmen." In regard to this Suavi stated, "The individual who comes to seek justice is, like the vizier, a man. He is not the slave of the vizier. He does not come to beg for

²⁷¹ Bernard, Lewis, *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East* (New York: Schocken Books, 1998), 13. Bernard Lewis states that the terms "Turk" and "Tatar" are problematic for their own specific reasons. The problem with the word "Turk" is that it did not come into full recognition until after 1923, when Mustafa Kemal Atatürk proclaimed the Republic of Turkey, and the word was often affiliated with religion not with an ethnicity. "Tatar" is just as troublesome because this word also had a religious connotation as well as an ethnic one.

²⁷² Mardin, *The Genesis*, 371.

²⁷³ *Ibid.*

pity.”²⁷⁴ Suavi believed the *şeriat* treated people equally no matter their status in society, and should be treated with the same respect as statesmen.

Thus while Suavi was an important political thinker, his ideas tended to be more visionary or futuristic than those of the other thinkers. For example, his idea of a Turkic nation was not to be raised and discussed seriously until the beginning of the twentieth century with Yusuf Akçura. Yusuf Akçura identified it as the only basis upon which a reformed and Westernized Ottoman Empire could sustain itself in the face of European power and hostility.²⁷⁵ Nevertheless, he was dedicated not only to the religion of Islam but its history and traditions as well. Although other *Young Ottomans* expressed Islamic themes in their arguments, Suavi went far beyond the others. He wrapped his ideas under a blanket of Islamic tradition, precedents, and Qur’anic verses so that some of his arguments were perceived to be weak, especially when compared to those of Namik Kemal. Suavi was a reformist but not in the same sense as the rest of the *Young Ottomans*. His views are closer to those encased in traditional reform arguments, such as not separating faith and state, *din ve devlet*. Furthermore, his political ideology is far less liberal than those of Namik Kemal particularly in the sense of forming a parliament, the basis of representative government, and popular sovereignty all of which were basic to Kemal’s reforming ideology. However, he was a modernist in the sense that he wanted to reform the education system of the Empire and simplify the language. His ideas of a “fatherland” surrounding a new sense of nationalistic Turkish pride can also be viewed as a modernist perspective.

²⁷⁴ Mardin, *The Genesis*, 373.

²⁷⁵ Thomas David, “Yusuf Akçura’s Uç Tarz-i Siyaset,” 164-65.

In conclusion, Suavi had a difficult time separating his ideas of reform and his religious beliefs. This leads to a discussion of another important figure during the *Tanzimat*, one who, like Suavi, also tried to blend Islamic and Western ideas, the historian and *alim*, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa.

Ahmed Cevdet Paşa

The basis of laws and by-laws in every state is the civil code. As our state was based upon the *Şeriat*, it should, therefore, be the basis for our laws and by-laws and this idea was not very popular²⁷⁶

The last figure among the intellectuals to be discussed is Ahmed Cevdet Paşa. Ahmed Cevdet is, in fact, a representative of both the official and unofficial reformers, and could have been placed in Chapter II discussing the official reformers. However, I have included him here because of the importance of his ideas on reform, which were articulated publicly within the framework of the intellectual debates carried on during the *Tanzimat*. Cevdet was born in 1822 in the small town of Lofca, in northern Bulgaria. His family had a long history of serving the Empire as military, religious, or administrative officials. Cevdet's education was put into the hands of his grandfather, Haci Ali Efendi, who wanted Cevdet to become a *muftu*. His early education was dedicated to the study of Islamic sciences and the study of Arabic. This education was acquired by means of studying with local *ulema*.²⁷⁷ This meant his early education was one primarily based upon religious learning, not a secular education. However, at around the age of sixteen, Cevdet became weary of the learning environment in the town. He had a tough decision to make. Should he stay in Lofca and continue his education by the *ulema* or should he move to Istanbul and continue his education? If he decided to move

²⁷⁶ As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 168.

²⁷⁷ Richard, Chambers, "The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Alim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa," *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 4, no. 4 (October 1973): 440-41.

to Istanbul where would he continue his education, would he go to the newly established military school, or continue his traditional Islamic education at the *madrasa*?²⁷⁸ Cevdet decided to leave Lofca for Istanbul and continued his education at the *madrasa*. By 1845, at the relatively young age of twenty-three, Cevdet completed his schooling and received his diploma, which made him a member of the *ulema* class.²⁷⁹

Soon after Cevdet finished his schooling, he was approached by Mustafa Reşid Paşa, at that time the *Grand Vezir* 1846-1848,²⁸⁰ in 1846 for assistance to help him become better educated on Islamic religious law.²⁸¹ He wanted to learn more about religious law so that he could avoid conflict while trying to implement legal reform in the Empire. Mustafa had learned of Cevdet's academic excellence, and hand selected Cevdet to tutor him. Cevdet accepted this offer, lived in Mustafa's house, and tutored him until Mustafa Reşid's death in 1858.²⁸²

While living in Mustafa's house, Cevdet learned first hand from his mentor about state administration and politics. Cevdet during this time also received increasingly important positions in the educational affairs of the Empire. Due to his obvious intelligence and ability, along with his relationship to Mustafa Reşid, Cevdet was appointed as a member of the *Council of the Tanzimat*, in 1857.²⁸³ In this position, Cevdet was instrumental in creating the *Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances*, which replaced the *Council of the Tanzimat*, and he became a member of this newly created

²⁷⁸ Ibid., 441-43. The military school Cevdet was considering was called *Mekteb-i Harbiye*.

²⁷⁹ Chambers, Richard, "The Education..." 443.

²⁸⁰ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 62.

²⁸¹ H. Bowen, "Ahmad Djewdet Paşa", in *Encyclopedia of Islam* CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1 (Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001), 1: 284b. Mustafa Reşid Paşa was *Grand Vezir* from 1846 to 1848.

²⁸² Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 64.

²⁸³ Ibid., 64-65.

council.²⁸⁴ This position was one of the most important positions in the government bureaucracy involved with developing reform policies. He was to work in it until the mid 1860s, when he was faced with a decision as to whether to maintain this position or to leave government and return to the ranks of the *ulema* full time. Cevdet's career up to this point was not what one would expect from a member of the *ulema*, that is. to be involved in government in a capacity to propose and implement Westernizing reforms. Most *ulema* were against the creation of new Western modeled institutions which would replace the traditional Islamic ones.. Hence Cevdet's choice was either he could return to a career as a member of the *ulema*, or continue to work in the office of the *Grand Vezir* as a member of the civil bureaucracy. In 1866 Cevdet decided to abandon his career as an *alim* and devote himself to government affairs. This decision was made easier when Cevdet was passed over to become the next *seyhulislam*, the head of the religious establishment, because he was considered too liberal, that is Western, in his ideas.²⁸⁵

Henceforth, in his capacity as a full-time employee in the civil bureaucracy of the Empire, Cevdet was able to express his ideas on reform and modernization without fearing retaliation from his fellow *ulema*. In 1868, Cevdet was appointed to President of the *Divan of Judicial Ordinances*, which in effect also made him Minister of Justice.²⁸⁶ During his reign as Minister of Justice, Cevdet was able to implement many of his ideas on reform. While holding this position, he instituted law courses at the Ministry of Justice for better instruction of judges and also for judicial procedure.²⁸⁷ Cevdet was also involved in the creation of a new civil law code, which would be modern in application

²⁸⁴ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 65.

²⁸⁵ Ibid.

²⁸⁶ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 122-23.

²⁸⁷ Bowen, "Ahmad Djewdet Pasha," 1: 285a.

and appearance but would remain, at least in part, based upon the *şeriat*.²⁸⁸ However, this view came under intense scrutiny from other officials. Some officials, such as Ali Paşa, wanted there to be a newly created body of law, which would primarily use the French Civil Code as its basis. Ali Paşa had gone so far as to create a committee whose purpose was to translate into Turkish some sixteen hundred articles of the French Civil Code.²⁸⁹ Others objected to the adoption of the French Civil Code, including Cevdet, and wanted to remain true to the *şeriat* and wanted to codify Islamic law. After a long heated debate, Cevdet's views on reforming the law were accepted. He was then given the responsibility of heading a committee, whose responsibility it was to compile a book of law called the *Mecelle*.²⁹⁰ This collection of law included sixteen books, which Cevdet worked on from 1869 until 1876. Cevdet remained as the Ministry of Justice until April 1870. By this time four volumes of the *Mecelle* had already been published.²⁹¹

However, it is important to note that neither the Europeans, especially the French, nor the *ulema* were happy with this decision. The Europeans were not content because they believed the Empire was not attempting to reform, according to Western models, but were rather simply using French law to supplement the *şeriat*. The *ulema* and specifically the *seyhulislam*, were upset with this development because they believed the office of the *seyhulislam* should have the responsibility of codifying the *şeriat* rather than Cevdet and the office of the Minister of Justice.²⁹²

²⁸⁸ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 123.

²⁸⁹ Berkes, *The Development*, 167-68.

²⁹⁰ *Ibid.*, 168. In Arabic it was called *Majalla*. For an analysis of the *Mecelle* refer to Siddik Sami Onar, "Majalla," in *Law in the Middle East*, ed. Majid Khadduri and H.J. Liebesny (Washington, D.C.: Brill Academic Publishers, 1955), 1: 292-308.

²⁹¹ Bowen, "Ahmad Djewdet Paşa," 1: 285a.

²⁹² Berkes, *The Development*, 168-69. At this time the *seyhulislam* was Hasan Fehmi.

While holding several positions within the governmental bureaucracy, Cevdet was able publicly to discuss his ideas on a constitution. While the debate over the promulgation of a constitution was occurring, Cevdet came into conflict with Midhad Paşa, who at the time was selected Prime Minister by Abdulhamid II.²⁹³ At this time a constitution had not yet been promulgated and the debate over passing it was at a deadlock. On one side of the debate was Cevdet. Cevdet believed a constitution should be passed in order to check the power of the tyrants and power hungry rulers. Referring to the recent accession to the throne of Abdulhamid II, Cevdet stated, “Now that a wise and sane ruler has come to the throne there is no need for a constitution in the terms of the *Şeriat*.”²⁹⁴ Therefore, Cevdet did not feel as though a constitution was needed in the Empire because Abdulhamid would rule the Empire justly, according to the *şeriat*, and would strengthen the Empire and help return it back to its opulence. On the other hand, Midhad believed there needed to be a constitution in the Empire, regardless of whom held the position of Sultan, and was furious with Cevdet’s comments. According to Midhad, a constitution was imperative and the establishment of a parliamentary government were both needed in order for the Empire to return to greatness. Midhad argued that if both of these measures were undertaken, then the European powers would not intervene in the affairs of the Empire, if they saw the Empire enforcing governmental reforms.²⁹⁵ Midhad’s ideas on a constitution were vastly different than those of Cevdet. As was mentioned earlier, a constitution and a representative assembly were both created and promulgated.

²⁹³ Ibid., 245.

²⁹⁴ As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 246.

²⁹⁵ Shaw and Shaw, *History of the Ottoman Empire*, 2: 174.

Much of Cevdet's public writings advocating reform tended, not surprisingly, to be focused on the role of law in the Empire. When considering law, Cevdet wanted to maintain an Islamic foundation, but his views on the newly created secular courts were based upon Western models rather than traditional principles. In fact, the creation of the secular courts was partly his idea, which is surprising considering his religious upbringing. He thought the secular courts were in fact compatible with Islam. In fact he went so far as to say that secular courts were necessary in order to best implement the religious provisions of the *Mecelle*.²⁹⁶ These new secular courts had their own Judiciary and procedure. Included with this was a level of courts which would be used as an Appeals Court.²⁹⁷

In addition to reforming the law and the court system, Cevdet also publicly advocated reforming education. Most of these reforms undertaken by Cevdet occurred while he was Minister of Education, a position he held from 1873-74, and most of the reforms he implemented were directed to the secular component of the education system, rather than to the traditional schools. One of the reforms implemented under Cevdet, which was to have lasting impact was the introduction of new text books, one of which he himself wrote which exemplified his ideas on educational reform. In it he attempted to blend Islamic and Western knowledge which "...simplified geography and science that were beginning to appear in the West; and yet it contained stories of the prophet and exemplary Muslims and information about different religions."²⁹⁸ In addition to new textbooks, Cevdet also felt there was a need for trained teachers, who could teach

²⁹⁶ Berkes, *The Development*, 165.

²⁹⁷ Lewis, *The Emergence*, 123.

²⁹⁸ As quoted in Berkes, *The Development*, 174. The title of Cevdet's book was *Malumat-i Nafia* or Useful Knowledge.

students about secular sciences. In order to solve this problem, Cevdet wanted to expand teacher-training schools.²⁹⁹ Cevdet felt teachers who had received an education from the *madrasa* were qualified to teach in the secular schools. Teachers who had learned in Europe and abroad were sought after to teach in the secular schools.³⁰⁰ However, Cevdet failed to realize that these teachers with experience in learning from the West, were also receiving jobs in the West to teach, rather than returning to the Empire to teach. In order to combat this dilemma, Cevdet felt there was a need to create and expand not only teacher-training schools, but also *rusdiyye* schools.³⁰¹ This led, "...to the creation of a teaching profession at the secondary rather than primary level, and contributed to the points of differentiation which can be observed still."³⁰² However, the problem with this was that the training of teachers was still being performed at the *madrasa* schools, rather than at the *rusdiyye* schools and teacher-training schools.³⁰³

Throughout his life Cevdet always promoted a curious blend of progressive and conservative ideas on reform. One of his objectives was to advocate for greater learning among all people of the Empire. He also always condemned any demonstration of ignorance or "self seeking" in the elite class.³⁰⁴ However, the tone in his writing changed as he got older and wiser. At the beginning of his career, he criticized his contemporaries and their shortcomings in an optimistic tone. However, as he aged, his tone for his contemporaries became unsympathetic. This change can be seen as a byproduct with his quarrel with Midhad Paşa, who provoked Cevdet by mocking Cevdet's inadequate

²⁹⁹ Shaw and Shaw, The History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 66.

³⁰⁰ Berkes, The Development, 174.

³⁰¹ See glossary for definition of term.

³⁰² As quoted in Berkes, The Development, 175.

³⁰³ Ibid.

³⁰⁴ Bowen, H. "Ahmad Djewdet Paşa," 1: 286a.

command of the French language, thus impugning Cevdet's understanding of European thought.³⁰⁵

Regardless of the origin of his disparaging attitude, Cevdet was a more than capable writer. Among his works were many historical monographs. Among his work was a twelve-volume compilation entitled *Kisas-i Enbiya ve-Tawarikh-i Khulefa*. This book was a history stemming from Adam and Eve and ending with the reign of Mahmud II. He also wrote another history which deserves special recognition, called *Ta'rikh-i Djewdet* or *Cevdet's History*, which was a comprehensive work covering the period 1774-1826. In addition to his histories, Cevdet also wrote poetry, textbooks, and books on Turkish grammar.³⁰⁶

Cevdet's ideas on reform, especially in the realm of legal reform, were important aspects of the intellectual discussions that took place during the *Tanzimat*. His ideas continued to exercise influence, especially after the deposition of Abdulhamid in the *Young Turk* period following the Revolution of 1908. His influence can also be seen during the secular revolution led by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk in the 1920s and the 1930s. He is an especially interesting figure because of his religious education and background and because, though he was an *alim*, he was a proponent of reforming the Empire according to Western models.

³⁰⁵ Ibid.

³⁰⁶ Bowen, "Ahmad Djewdet Pasha," 1: 286a-286b.

Conclusion

When Abdulhamid II first ascended to the Sultanate, he appeared to support continuation of the *Tanzimat* program of reform as well as the ideas of the *Young Ottomans*. While Sultan he rehabilitated many of the important historic public buildings of the Empire including Islamic monuments such as the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem and the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus.

However, in true *Tanzimat* fashion he continued aggressively to develop the technological infrastructure of the Empire, building, for example an empire-wide telegraph system and continuing to build railways. Among the most important and dramatic railroad he built was the Hijaz Railroad. The ostensible purpose of this railroad was to connect Istanbul with Mecca and Medina, so as to facilitate the annual Pilgrimage, the *Hajj*, to Mecca.³⁰⁷ The latter was more truly indicative of his sentiments and his intentions.

Though he was committed to developing the wealth and power of the Empire by Westernizing its material and economic attributes, he also was committed to assuring that it would be primarily an Islamic state and society, and he quickly abandoned his support for the *Tanzimat* program of Westernization of society and culture, and so he soon denounced the reformist ideas of the *Young Ottomans*. More concretely, in 1878 he dismissed the representative assembly and suspended the constitution. This temporarily ended the constitutional movement until the *Young Turk* revolt of 1908 ended his authority and with it his program to emphasize the Islamic character of the nation.³⁰⁸

³⁰⁷ Gelvin, *The Modern Middle East*, 135-36.

³⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, 136.

Analyzing the *Tanzimat Era* and the period of initial reform which preceded it is important in order to understand the modern history of Turkey after the Ottoman Empire ceased to exist. Many of the reforms implemented during this period gave the future leaders of Turkey the intellectual and practical foundation to transform Turkey into a secular state and ultimately the democracy it is today. This paper analyzed the reforms of the Empire beginning with Selim III and Mahmud II, who both attempted to reform by centralizing authority within the Empire. Though their attempts of reform were not the final answer to solve the problem of decline of power within the Empire, they were steps in the correct direction, in that they and their supporters finally realized the Empire needed to be reformed in order to bring it back to greatness.

After the reign of these two Sultans, the Empire was led into another direction of reform beginning in 1839, when the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane* was promulgated. This document ensured the Empire would treat all people equally, and would protect the rights of all its diverse populations. This document marked a watershed in the attempts at reform, and ushered in the period which comes to be known as the *Tanzimat*. After the promulgation of the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane*, the official reformers, the rulers of the Empire began wholesale reform of the traditional institutions of the Empire, hoping to modify or even replace them with European models. These institutions included the most important institution of an Islamic society, the law, the *şeriat*, the judiciary system and especially the traditional system of political authority.

The main objective throughout this paper was to examine the reforms of political authority within the Empire. Before the *Tanzimat*, political authority was in the hands of either the Sultan, the *Grand Vezir*, or elements of the military such as the janissaries.

One of the main objectives of the *Tanzimat* was to change the organization and understanding of political authority. Rather than authority being centralized in the hands of a few members of the elite bureaucracy, the official reformers tried to move toward a system of constitutional government so as to elicit the support of the diverse populations of the Empire. And the unofficial reformers, the *Young Ottomans*, attempted to introduce new ideas, for the most part derived from partially digested Western liberal ideas. In general the overriding purpose of the unofficial reformers was to change the traditional system so as to allow all of the diverse peoples of the Empire to become active in politics.

Many members of the *Young Ottomans* wanted all citizens of the Empire to have the freedom to participate in government. This would best be accomplished, they believed, by creating a representative assembly or a parliament, where the elected representatives of the Empire would vote on laws and policies to govern the Empire. This representative assembly finally materialized in 1876 when a constitution was passed. However, it was only to last for approximately eighteen months because it was dissolved by Sultan Abdulhamid. After this, the sultan ruled as a traditional Muslim autocrat until the revolt against the Sultan in 1908, which led to the restoration of the constitution.

The *Tanzimat Era* was important for several reasons in addition to reforming political authority. Included in the attempts to reform the Empire were cultural and linguistic reforms. Culturally, the unofficial reformers wished to allow all people the same freedoms and to establish a society in which all people regardless of ethnicity or religion were treated as equals. Linguistically, many of the *Young Ottomans* discussed in their articles that the difficult Ottoman language should be simplified so that more people could read Ottoman Turkish, other than the elite bureaucracy. For example, some of the

Young Ottomans wanted the laws of the Empire to be written in such a way that all people could read and understand them. This meant the orthography and grammar had to be reformed

Though Ataturk set Turkey firmly on the road to secularization and Westernization, the central issues of the *Tanzimat* remain alive in Turkey to this day: Is Turkey, the successor to the Ottoman Empire, to be both Western and Muslim at one and the same time, and how much of each? Even though geographically Turkey is in the Near East, and its current government is dominated by a political party with extreme Islamic underpinnings, there is little question that the country wishes to join the European Union. If accession to the European Union is granted, this would have a dramatic effect on the country in that its political identity as a member of the European Union would seem to transform it from a Muslim Near Eastern nation to a Western Muslim nation. This possibility has led to another inevitable debate over reform. How can the nation remain true to its Islamic traditions, and how much can the country reform according to Western models? The *Tanzimat* continues to influence modern Turkey.

Glossary

Auspicious Incident. The destruction of the *Janisaries* by Mahmud II in 1826. See Lewis, The Emergence, 79.

Basvekil. Chief Minister. See Berkes, The Development, 97.

Caliph. Title given to a person who was the “Commander of the Faithful.” The *Caliph* is elected or nominated, and can also be nominated by the incumbent *Caliph*. After this is done the chosen *Caliph* is accepted by the community. According to John Esposito, the Caliph must have many qualifications including: “justice, knowledge to interpret and apply the law; virtuous character, courage to wage war, good physical health, and, finally, descent from the Quraysh-the Prophet’s tribe.” The duty of the *Caliph* is to enforce the Shari’ah or holy law, and is considered to be the protector of Islam. See Esposito, Islam and Politics, 4th Edition, 31.

Chief Mufti. Leading Muslim judicial official who interpreted Islamic law. See Shaw and Shaw History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 74.

Dar al-Ma’arif. “House of knowledge” (personal communication, David Thomas, April 17, 2006).

Dawlah. Traditionally “refers to the concept of state and is a central concept in the discourse of the contemporary Islamists.” In Turkish the term is *devlet*. This term refers only to state and not government. See Shahrough, “Dawlah” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 1: 353.

Din ve devlet. Faith and State. The formulaic term used to describe the traditional relationship between religion and government. See Shahrough, Akhavi, “Dawlah” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 1: 353.

Grand Vezir. The head deputy to the Sultan was called “Grand Vizier.” The duty of this position was to be the leading advisor to the Sultan, and in due time, he came to rule over the imperial divan, “which was comprised of the ordinary viziers as well as other officers of state.” “Although the *Grand Vizier* was often the effective ruler, it was only in the mid-seventeenth century that a permanent residence, separate from the Sultan’s palace, was established to house him and the numerous departments under him. As the new center of government, the “sublime Porte” (Bab-i Ali), as the residence was called, quickly became synonymous with the state itself.” See Zilfi, “Vizier” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 306.

Fatwa. Written legal opinions based on Islamic legal tradition. See Gordon, “Shaykh Al-Islam”

in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, Volume, 4: 54, or Muhammad Khalid Masud, “Fatwa” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 8.

Hatt-i Sherif. A *Hatt-i Serif*, that is a “Noble Rescript” is a decree written or signed by the *Sultan* or “executive order” in contemporary American usage. See Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire Volume, 2: 490.

Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane. Document written in 1839 which promised equality and rights to all Ottoman citizens, and is considered the document which ushered in the *Tanzimat*. Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 333.

Hurriya. *Hurriya* is derived from *hurr* meaning “free” corresponding to Hebrew *hur*, Aram, *her*, and widely used in many other languages other than Arabic. In pre-Islamic times “free” meant the opposite of “unfree” or “slave.” Furthermore, the word also had a connotation meaning “noble” of character and behavior. See Rosenthal “Hurriyya” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 3: 589a.

Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun was born in 1332 and died in 1406. Ibn Khaldun gained much admiration with his political thoughts about Arab social structures and their processes. Khaldun was born in Tunis. This area of North Africa was under the control of the Muslim Empire. At the time that Khaldun lived, he saw the Muslim empire in decline. The politics of the Muslim empire were feeble and unstable at best. Throughout his life he held many prestigious positions such as secretary of state, ambassador, and was at one time a judge. It was these positions that gave Khaldun a podium to voice his opinions on Arab society. It was through these opinions that facilitated Khaldun’s ideas of a new science, the science of social organization (*ilm al-umran*). Within this context, Ibn Khaldun refers to many social groups, but he considers the nomadic tribes or primitive cultures to have the greatest potential to acquire large-scale political power. According to Khaldun, nomadic people have more *asabiyyah*, or nationalism, than other social groups of that time. He asserts that nomadic people will follow their ruler and their religion to death if called upon to do so. Nomadic people are also, according to Ibn Khaldun, more willing to go to the extreme in order to achieve social solidarity or sovereignty. See Baali, “Ibn Khaldun, ‘Abd Al-Rahman” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 164.

Janissaries. The *Janissaries*, or *Yeniceri* in Turkish, were created in the late fourteenth century. Before the creation of the Janissaries, the military of the Ottoman Empire were free Muslim Ghazi warriors; however, the Janissaries were an elite slave infantry. Some of the *Janissaries* were recruited through the *devsirme*. *Devsirme* was when the officials of the Empire went into the conquered territories, especially in the Balkans, and recruited the smart young Christian boys in the region and brought them back to the capital. Once in the capital, they were converted to Islam, and then they were schooled. Some of the boys after their education was completed went into the bureaucracy, while others went into the military system. In return for their military services, the members of the Janissaries were given special privileges, such as tax-exempt status. In addition to fighting wars, another purpose of the *Janissaries* was to keep the peace between Muslims and non-Muslims within the

borders of the Empire. After centuries of existence, the *Janissaries* became extremely powerful. They became active in the politics, they joined guilds, they became active with locale *Ulema*, and they entered businesses. After 1640, the recruitment of Christian boys ended, and the *Janissaries* were replenished by free Muslims and sons of current *Janissary* members. As a result, their numbers grew exponentially and their demands grew at the same rate. They demanded pay increases, and this led to revolt against the Sultans. Also, the *Janissaries* became extremely corrupt, and this is one reason why Selim III decided it was necessary to rid the Ottoman Empire of the *Janissaries*. See Griswold, “*Janissaries*” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 367-68.

Kanuns. The legal codes promulgated by the Sultan. See Lapidus “Sultanates and Gunpowder Empires The Middle East”, in The Oxford History of Islam, 383.

Law. The idea of law is usually described by two key terms. The first of these is *fiqh*, which is any attempt to “elaborate details of the law, to state specific norms, to justify them by reference to revelation, to debate them, or to write books or treatises on the law are examples of *fiqh*. The word connotes human and specifically scholarly activity.” Followers of *fiqh* try to delineate and give expression to the *Shari’ah*, which is the second key term in regards to defining law. The *Shari’ah*, which “refers to God’s law in its quality as divine. “It also refers to God’s law as it is with him or with his Prophet, or as it is contained within the corpus of revelation.” The *Shari’ah* displays loyalty and a focus of faith for all Muslims. See Calder, “Law” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 2: 450.

Madrasa. An establishment of learning where the Islamic sciences are taught, also known as a college for higher studies. For more see Mona Abaza “Madrakah”, in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 3: 13-16.

Malumat-i Nafia. Translated as Useful Knowledge. See Berkes, The Development, 174.

Mecelle. In Arabic it was called *Majalla*. This was the law book created in part by Cevdet Pasha. See Berkes, The Development, 167-68.

Millet system. The way in which the Ottoman Empire allowed religious minorities control over their own affairs, including education and judicial affairs and was headed by a religious figure. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 335.

Muhbir. “The Reporter.” See Mardin, The Genesis, 361.

Nizam-i Jedid. In Ottoman Turkish means the new organization, that is the new (military) formation. See Stanford J. Shaw, Between Old and New, 127.

Rusdiyye. High schools established in 1838 for men and 1858 for women. See Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire, 2: 507.

Sair evlen-mesi. “The Wedding of a Poet.” See Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire, 184.

Şeriat. The Turkish spelling of *Shari'ah*. See Berkes, The Development, 9.

Seyhulislam. This is the Turkish form of writing *seyhulislam*. This title first appeared in the late tenth century, well before the Ottoman Empire was established. Contrary to this, however, the title did not gain much acceptance or popularity until after the Ottoman Empire began to use it. Within the Ottoman government, the *seyhulislam* was the “chief mufti” or “jurisconsult” and was the head of the *ulema*. Among his duties was to order *fatwas* or “written legal opinions based on Islamic legal tradition.” These *fatwas* were not only related to legal or religious questions but also government policy. In addition to the religious and legal duties, the *seyhulislam* was also an advisor to the Sultan, making the position very important religiously and politically. See Gordon, “Shaykh Al-Islam” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 54.

Shari'ah. Islamic law. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 336.

Sultan. Ruler. Title adopted first by the Seljuks in the eleventh century and then increasingly by rulers thereafter, hence, the title Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 337.

Tanzimat. Means “reorganization” or “reordering.” Period of time in Ottoman history from 1839-1876 in which the government attempted to reform or modernize. See Mardin, “*Tanzimat*” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 184.

Taswir-i afkar. “Chronicle of opinions”. See Halman, “Shinasi,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 9: 443b.

Terdjaman-i Ahwal. “Translation of verses”. See Halman, “Shinasi,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 9: 443b.

Terdjame yi-manzume. “Interpreter of events”. See Halman, “Shinasi,” in Encyclopedia of Islam, 9: 443b.

Timar. In exchange for military service, the Janissaries were given land grants as the form of income; this land grant was called a “timar”. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 337.

Ulama (singular ‘alim). Arabic term which means “man of knowledge” and is the plural form of the word *alim*. *Ulama* refers to a class of men with knowledge of the *Qur'an*, *Hadith*, and *fiqh*. They retained this knowledge by either tutelage with other scholars, or by attending a *madrasah*, or school. While attending a *madrasah*, students learned about Islamic sciences. See Zaman, “Ulama” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 258-59.

Vatan. “Fatherland.” See Mardin, The Genesis, 326.

Vekils. Ministers. See Berkes, The Development, 97.

Veizir. This term is derived from the Arabic and Persian “wazir,” “vazir,” and Turkish “vezir.” The term means “bearer of burdens” or “minister”. The role of a “vizier” was to advise the Sultan in military and civil matters. Zilfi, “Vizier” in The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World, 4: 306.

Young Ottomans. Group of nineteenth century intellectuals who advocated on some level Islamic modernization and constitutional rule in the Ottoman Empire. See Gelvin, The Modern Middle East, 338.

Notes on Sources

The sources used in this paper consist mostly of secondary sources as I do not have the linguistic capacity at present to read Turkish-language primary sources. I have, however, used English-language primary sources whenever possible. These include The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors, written by Sari Mehmed Paşa and translated by Walter Livingston Wright Jr. This book was significant for the writing of this paper because it provided an example of an individual who lived and wrote during the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries and who had detailed knowledge of the government of the Ottoman Empire as a result of his long service in the upper levels of the Ottoman bureaucracy. His book illustrated vividly the traditional perspective on what caused the weakness of the Empire and what was needed to reform the Empire. This book allowed me to understand why reforming the Empire according to traditional foundations was a pathway to restoring the Empire to greatness. Sari Mehmed's ideas on reforming the Empire were used in this paper to show the traditional, pre-Tanzimat perspective on reforming the Empire, rather than using Europe as a model.

Another primary source which was used was The Surest Path written by Khayr al-Din and translated by Carl Leon Brown. This source was very important because it allowed me to understand the reformist ideology of an important Muslim statesman of wide experience during the *Tanzimat*. This book was used to provide insight into how the Empire should reform using Western ideas on reform and government. Khayr al-Din's and Sari Mehmed's books provided a comparison between the two different ideologies behind reforming the Empire, and made it easier for me to understand the importance of the *Tanzimat*.

In addition to these, I also utilized a variety of other, briefer primary sources. These included the texts of the two reforming decrees of 1839 and 1856 and extracts of the writings of the unofficial reformers, as I have chosen to identify them.

In addition to the primary sources, which were instrumental, there were five significant secondary sources that I used extensively and that deserve special attention. The first was The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World. This four-volume encyclopedia set was important to consult, not so much so for article content but for the

bibliographies at the end of each article. The bibliographies provided me with other sources which could be examined. I must admit that I used this encyclopedia in order to describe many of the technical terms fielded throughout this paper. This is especially true for the terms in the glossary. The second source consulted was the CD-ROM version of the Encyclopedia of Islam, available in CD-ROM form in Adams. The Encyclopedia of Islam is considered to be the most authoritative scholarly reference source for all aspects of Islamic studies. The articles I used included “Namik Mehmed Kemal,” “Midhat Pasha,” “Shinasi,” “Ali Su’awi,” “Ahmad Djewdet Pasha,” and “Hurriyya,” Both The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World and the Encyclopedia of Islam were essential for researching and writing of this paper, especially in terms of the biographical articles on the figures of the *Tanzimat*.

The next most important group of sources used during the research and writing of this paper were a series of monographs, all published during the 1960s. These include The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought by Serif Mardin. This book was an excellent source for two reasons. First, this book was useful when researching the ideas of reform by many of the figures in this paper. Mardin’s book, for example, provided detailed information on Namik Kemal, Şinasi, Mustafa Fazil Paşa, Ali Suavi and Khayr al-Din. Furthermore, the organization of the book was also crucial for the purpose of this paper. Even though this paper is organized differently than Mardin’s book, his book was organized in such a way that not only did it help to synthesize the information but it also influenced how I choose to organize my paper. A second monograph that was heavily consulted is The Emergence of Modern Turkey by Bernard Lewis. This book specifically was crucial in understanding the context for policies and ideas of reform during the *Tanzimat*. A third extensively used monograph is The Development of Secularization of Turkey by Niyazi Berkes. This book, similar to Lewis’s, was crucial not only for information pertaining to the figures of the *Tanzimat* but also for the background information for why these reforms were crucial to the Empire. However, Berkes discusses more extensively--and often with reference to the primary sources themselves--the policies and ideas of the *Tanzimat*. Another important monograph is Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1789-1939 by Albert Hourani. This book was used to obtain information on several of the figures of the *Tanzimat* and also for figures--though not

specifically mentioned in this paper--significant during the time period, such as Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, Muhammad Abduh, and Tahtawi. This book was valuable because it also discussed reform in other areas of the Muslim world, including Egypt and Tunisia. This showed that the reform movement was not exclusive to the Ottoman Empire, but was a movement which involved all areas of the Middle East. The last monograph to be discussed is History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey. Volume II by Stanford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw. Though many scholars have criticized this book for its lack of content analysis, this book was useful for its abundant background information. This monograph provided me with useful information on all aspects of the *Tanzimat* especially in regard to the technical information about the legal and other *Tanzimat*-era reforms.

In the research for this paper, I also used several scholarly articles, some of which did not make it into the paper. There were two articles written by Carter Findley that were consulted. These two articles were “The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East. Part I and Part II.” Even though part I of this article was not included in this paper, both were consulted in order to provide essential background information ranging from the eighteenth century to the twenty-first century. Another important article that was consulted was “The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Alim, Ahmed Cevdet Paşa” written by Richard Chambers. This article was very useful in providing information about the educational background for Cevdet Pasha. A third article that was very useful for background information was “The Islamic Roots of the Gulhane Rescript,” written by Abu-Manneh, Butrus. This article was most useful in providing information on the *Hatt-i Sherif of Gulhane* and providing information about the author of the document Mustafa Reşid. This article also provided a perspective on what might have influenced Mustafa Reşid while he was creating this document.

Annotated Bibliography

Primary Sources

al-Tunisi, Khayr al-Din. *The Surest Path to Knowledge Concerning the Conditions of Countries*. Translated by Carl Leon Borwn. *The Surest Path: The Political Treatise of a Nineteenth-Century Muslim Statesman*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967.

See section: “Notes on Sources.”

Mehmed, Sari Pasha. *The Book of Consul for Viziers and Governors*. Translated by Walter Livingston Wright Jr. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, Publishers, 1935.

See section: “Notes on Sources.”

Mubadele-An Ottoman-Russian Exchange of Ambassadors. Edited and translated by Norman Itzkowitz and Max Mote. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970.

This source describes how the Treaty of *Kuchuk Kainardji* affected the relationship between Russia and the Ottoman Empire and provides the treaty stipulations including the Ottomans losing control over the Crimea.

Secondary Sources

Abu-Manneh, Butrus. “The Islamic Roots of the Gulhane Rescript.” *Die Welt des Islam*, New Series 34, no. 2, (November 1994): 173-203.

This source was used for background information on the writing of the *Hatt-I Sherif of Gulhane*, the document that inaugurates the *Tanzimat*.

Akhavi, Shahrough. “Dawlah.” In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 1: 353-56. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This source was used in order to get a clear definition of *dawlah*. This definition was used to describe the meaning of state and faith, *din wa dawlah* in Arabic or *din ve devlet* in Turkish.

Baali, Fuad. "Ibn Khaldun, 'Abd Al-Rahman." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 2: 164. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This source was used to provide a brief description of Ibn Khaldun. Ibn Khaldun was a very important Muslim figure, and influenced many *Tanzimat* figures.

Berkes, Niyazi. *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. First published by McGill University Press, 1964, published in a facsimile edition London: C. Hurst & Company, 1998.

See section: "Notes on Sources."

Bowen, H. "Ahmad Djewdet Pasha." In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1*, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001, 1:284b-286b.

This article was important to consult on the section on Cevdet Pasha. This article provided biographical information and also information on his ideas on reforming the Empire.

Calder, Norman. "Law" In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 2: 450-56. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This source was used in order to find a definition for law and the components composing it.

Chambers, Richard L. "The Education of a Nineteenth-Century Ottoman Alim, Ahmed Cevdet Pasa." *International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies*, 4, no. 4 (October 1973): 440-64.

See section: "Note on Sources."

Cleveland, William L. *A History of the Modern Middle East*. 3^d ed., Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2004.

This source was pertinent for background information on the *Tanzimat* and on Mustafa Reshid Pasha.

Davison, Roderic. *Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876*. New York: Gordian Press, 1973.

This source was one of the most useful sources that I used during the research and the writing of this paper. The content of this monograph was useful because it was written in a clear and concise way allowing the information to be easily accessible. I used this source to describe many of the reforms from 1856-1876.

_____. "Midhat Pasha", In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1*, Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001. 6: 1031b-34b.

This article was useful in describing the life of Midhat Pasha. Also this source was used to find information about the political career and the reforms that Midhat Pasha tried to implement.

_____. "Tanzimat." In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001, 10: 200a-209a.

This article was consulted in order to obtain general knowledge of the *Tanzimat*, such as the dates, 1839-1876, and the meaning of the word.

Entelis, John P. "Tunisia." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 4: 235-40. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This source provided a brief description of Tunisia and its semi-autonomous stature within the Ottoman Empire.

Esposito, John L. *Islam and Politics*. 4th edition. Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press, 1984.

This source provided a definition of *Caliph*, describing the role of the *Caliph* in society.

Findley, Carter V. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte. 1789-1922*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980.

This source provided background information on the *Tanzimat Era* and was particularly valuable on reform reform within the bureaucracy of the Ottoman Empire.

_____. *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989.

This source gave a social historical backdrop of the Ottoman Empire.

_____. "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part I)." In *Studia Islamica*, 55 (1982): 143-69.

This article was consulted in order to read about the Ottoman Empire's political system and initial ideas on reforming it.

_____. "The Advent of Ideology in the Islamic Middle East (Part II)." In *Studia Islamica*, 56 (1982): 147-80.

This article portrayed political reform movements from the *Young Ottomans* through the *Young Turks* movement.

Gelvin, James. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

This source rendered useful information about the *Tanzimat* period and pertinent general information on modern Near East history.

Goodwin, Jason. *Lords of the Horizons: A History of the Ottoman Empire*. New York: Picador, 1998.

Lords of the Horizons provided specific information about the campaigns of Muhammad Ali's army (nominally in his name though in actuality operated by his son Ibrahim) from Egypt into Syria.

Gordon, Matthew S. "Shaykh Al-Islam." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 4: 54. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

I consulted this article to obtain information about the "Shaykh Al-Islam," spelled as *seyhulislam* throughout this paper.

Griswold, William J. "Janissaries." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*.

4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 2: 367-68. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This article was utilized in order to provide information about the “Janissaries.” This article provided me with information not only about their purpose in defending the Empire but also their role in the bureaucracy.

Halman, Sait, Talat. “Shinasi.” In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v.*

1.1. Leiden, The Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001 9: 443a-44a.

This article was useful because it not only provided me with background information on this figure, but also provided information pertaining to his thoughts on reform.

_____. “Ali Su’awi.” In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1*, Leiden:

Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001, 9: 737b-38a.

This article was important because it provided a bibliographical sketch of Suavi and also discussed his ideas on reform.

Heyd, Uriel. “The Ottoman Ulema and Westernization in the Time of Selim III and

Mahmud II.” In *The Modern Middle East*. Edited by Albert H. Hourani, Mary Wilson, and Phillip Khoury, 29-61. New York: I.B. Tauris and Company, Limited, 2004.

This article was consulted to understand the role the *ulema* played within the Ottoman bureaucracy. Also, this source was valuable because it discussed Islam and how it assimilated Persian and Byzantine customs.

Hourani, Albert. *A History of the Arab Peoples*. New York: Warner Books, 1991.

This monograph was useful for acquiring comprehensive knowledge of the Ottoman Empire throughout its existence and for data used in the section on Muhammad Ali of Egypt.

_____. *Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939*. New York: Oxford

University Press, 1962.

See section: “Notes on Sources.”

Itzkowitz, Norman. *Ottoman Empire and Islamic Traditions*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1972.

This book was important for this paper as it provided critical information about Ottoman history, political authority, and the Ottoman religious establishment.

Kassis, Hanna E. *A Concordance to The Qur'an*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

This source was used to find a Qur'anic phrase which would provide an example of steering clear of evil and acting in accordance to the Qur'an. Though not used extensively in this paper it is a valuable source to consult.

Kinross Lord. *The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire*. New York: Perennial, 2002.

This book was used in order to read about the importance of the *Treaty of Kuchuk Kainardji*. This treaty was a critical one in Ottoman history because it ultimately brought about a period of reform within the Empire.

Lapidus, Ira M. "Sultanates and Gunpowder Empires: The Middle East." In *The Oxford History of Islam*. Edited by John Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999, 347-93.

This was another important article that I read during the research and writing of this paper. This article provided me with a definition of the word *kanun*. This article also provided information about the Janissaries.

Lewis Bernard. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. 3^d edition. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

See section: "Notes on Sources."

_____. *The Multiple Identities of the Middle East*, New York: Schocken Books, 1998.

This monograph, though not used extensively in this paper, was important in describing ethnicity of the Empire, more specifically on the Tatars and the Turks and in conveying how describing these ethnicities is problematic in Ottoman history.

Mardin, Serif. "Tanzimat." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 4: 183-86. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This article was used in order to provide general information about the *Tanzimat*, and its bibliography was a useful tool for finding monographs for this paper.

_____. “Namik Mehmet Kemal.” In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 vols. Edited by John Esposito, 2: 409-10. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This article gave me information about Namik Kemal’s life and ideas on reform.

_____. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962.

See section: “Notes on Sources.”

McCarthy, Justin. *The Ottoman Turks: An Introductory History to 1923*. London and New York: Addison Wesley Longman, Ltd., 1997.

This book examines some of Mahmud II’s attempted reforms, specifically bureaucratic compensation.

Rosenthal, F. “Hurriya.” In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001, 3: 589a-89b.

This article was crucial for many of the sources that I read mentioned but never fully explained “Hurriya.” This article explained the significance of “Hurriya” or freedom.

Shaw, Stanford J. *Between Old and New: The Ottoman Empire under Selim III, 1789-1807*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971.

This book was one of the most important sources that I used in portraying Selim III’s attempted reforms. It provided necessary contextual background information about the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century.

_____. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey: 1: Empire of the Gazis, The Rise and Decline of the Ottoman Empire 1280-1808*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1976.

This monograph was another important source in describing the period of reform and its context during the reign of Selim III.

Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel Kural Shaw. *History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey Volume 2: Reform, Revolution, and Republic*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977.

See section: “Notes on Sources.”

Tansel, F.A. “Namik Mehmed Kemal.” In *Encyclopedia of Islam CD-ROM Edition v. 1.1*. Leiden: Koninklijke Brill NV, 2001, 4: 874b-79a.

This article included bibliographical information on Namik Kemal, his early life, early jobs within the bureaucracy, and his ideas on reform.

Tignor, Robert, et. al. *Worlds Together, Worlds Apart: A History of the Modern World*. New York: W.W. Norton, 2002.

I cited this book to enable the reader to read more about Europeans dominating the mercantile world.

Thomas, David. “Yusuf Akçura’s Uc Tarz-i Siyaset.” In *Central Asian Monuments*. Edited by Hasan B. Paksoy. Istanbul: The Isis Press, 1991, 157-73.

This article was consulted in this paper in order to gain a better perspective of the Pan-Turkism movement. This was an important concept to identify and define since some of the *Young Ottomans* were proponents of this movement.

Voll, John. “Foundations for Renewal and Reform: Islamic Movements in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries.” In *The Oxford History of Islam*. Edited by John Esposito, 509-47. Oxford and New York: 1999.

This article was examined in order to find information about reform movements in the Ottoman Empire during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Though not cited much in this paper, this was a necessary article to consult.

Zaman Iftikhar. “Ulama.” In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 volumes. Edited by John Esposito, 4: 258-61. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This article described the “Ulama,” which is spelled as *ulema* throughout this paper. This article also informed me on how people became members of the *ulema*.

Zilfi, Madeline C. "Vizier." In *The Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. 4 volumes. Edited by John Esposito, 4: 305-06. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

This article described who the *vezir* was and his role in the bureaucracy of the Empire. This article also included spelling variations of *vezir* as well as the role of the *Grand Vezir*.