

2017

Amidst the Varieties of Populism: The Case of the Recurrent Pattern of Nativism and Authoritarian Populism in the Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy

Michelle C. Arias Santabay
Rhode Island College, marias_3250@email.ric.edu

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.ric.edu/honors_projects



Part of the [American Politics Commons](#)

Recommended Citation

Arias Santabay, Michelle C., "Amidst the Varieties of Populism: The Case of the Recurrent Pattern of Nativism and Authoritarian Populism in the Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy" (2017). *Honors Projects Overview*. 130.
http://digitalcommons.ric.edu/honors_projects/130

This Honors is brought to you for free and open access by the Honors Projects at Digital Commons @ RIC. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Projects Overview by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ RIC. For more information, please contact kayton@ric.edu.

AMIDST THE VARIETIES OF POPULISM: THE CASE OF THE RECURRENT PATTERN
OF NATIVISM AND AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM IN THE POLITICS OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY

By
Michelle C. Arias Santabay

An Honors Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
Honors

In
The Department of Political Science

Faculty of Arts and Sciences

Rhode Island College

2017

AMIDST THE VARIETIES OF POPULISM: THE CASE OF THE RECURRENT PATTERN
OF NATIVISM AND AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM IN THE POLITICS OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY

An Undergraduate Honors Project Presented

By

Michelle C. Arias Santabay

To

The Department of Political Science

Approved:

Project Advisor

Date

Honors Committee Member

Date

Honors Committee Member

Date

Honors Committee Member

Date

Department Chair

Date

AMIDST THE VARIETIES OF POPULISM: THE CASE OF THE RECURRENT PATTERN
OF NATIVISM AND AUTHORITARIAN POPULISM IN THE POLITICS OF U.S.
IMMIGRATION POLICY

By

Michelle C. Arias Santabay

To

The Department of Political Science

ABSTRACT

This project started as a comparison of varieties of populism emergent in the past two decades, which grew into discerning how authoritarian populism is rooted in nativism as a recurrent concept throughout immigration policy in the U.S. This is demonstrated historically by reviewing the different types of nativist movements in different epochs of controversial immigration policy. The project's methodology derives from the usage of political sociology conceptualizing populism as a discursive register or rhetorical style as argued by Ernesto Laclau (2005; 2011) or as a structure of feeling (as argued by Raymond Williams 1977). Therefore, populism is seen as a *recurrent pattern* transcending historical particularities. According to Laclau's theory of "the empty signifier," populism can be driven by left or right politics. I then looked into Seymour M. Lipset's research where he uses the *authoritarian personality syndrome*, detailed in the social-psychology survey analysis of Theodor Adorno and Ellen Frenkel-Brunswick (1950), which he conceptualizes as *working-class authoritarianism*, showing how "the people" act in reactionary rather than in revolutionary ways. By the 1980s, Stuart Hall presents a cultural studies approach, widening Lipset's hypothesis beyond the proletarian collective subject where he conceptualizes an *authoritarian populism* that supports yet transcends both neoliberalism and neo-conservatism.

Table of Contents

I. Introduction.....	1-4
II. Our Method: Historical Sociology of Discursive Framing in Varieties of Populism.....	4-5
III. Methodological Excursus: Historical Sociology as an Understanding Infused with the Sociology of Knowledge.....	6-11
IV. How to Understand Varieties of Populist Reasoning.....	11-13
V. Ernesto Laclau’s Revisionist Left Populism.....	14-17
VI. Development of Left Populism within the Pink Tides in Latin America and Spain.....	17-24
VII. Authoritarian Populism Contra Working-Class Authoritarianism.....	24
VIII. S.M. Lipset’s Concept of Working-Class Authoritarianism	24-27
IX. The Critique of Working-Class Authoritarianism Arguments.....	27
X. Stuart Hall’s Concept of Authoritarian Populism.....	28-30
XI. Critique of Authoritarian Populism Approach.....	30-31
XII. Nativism as a Form of Authoritarian Populism.....	31-40
XIII. Nativism in Post-1920s U.S. Politics of Immigration Policy.....	40-42
XIV. A Typology of Immigration Policy Politics in Liberal Democratic States.....	42-45
XV. Understanding Developments in the Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy as a Recurrent Pattern in the U.S.....	46-54
XVI. Conclusion.....	54-55
References.....	56-60

I. Introduction

As a Latin American, it has become evident to me that populism is not simply a movement of a repressed common people, which is what many South American authors claim it to be. Populism cannot be simply understood by generalizing it as concept of the struggle of the common people. Rather, it must be understood as a concept of discursive register or rhetorical style that overarches across the spectrum of left and right social movements.

The Argentinian social theorist, Ernesto Laclau in his 2005 book *On Populist Reason* argued how populism is not specific to any right or left politics: it is rather a movement of the masses that confronts governing power. Laclau goes on to argue that populism is rooted in a sense of assuring that institutions will accommodate and implement social demands. Sometimes such can be accomplished rapidly, while at other times, if not acted upon promptly, it will be joined by other demands. By doing so, Laclau argues that such demands must not be differentiated from each other according to the dead hand of older 19th century-based ideologies. Rather, more current demands become *equivalent* in significance, and therefore ideologically empty in their articulation. Laclau labels this pattern as *the Empty Signifier*. This results in the emergence of a more flexible and mobile collective movement making elites accountable for the completion of their demands.

The development of progressive demands is evident in Left Populisms in Bolivia, Venezuela, and Spain. This shift towards the Left is known as the *Pink Tide*, where social movements in these countries want to focus on finding alternatives to neoliberal policies that have brought great hardships to the common people in those lands. Within Bolivia and Venezuela, populist rhetoric is definitely the common factor; however, the effects from it are not common at all. In Bolivia, the indigenous were always neglected in the neoliberal elitist politics

and policies of their nation as well as by the elites preceding them. However, ever since Evo Morales was elected as President, when many things have changed in their favor. Many see the example of Bolivia as a disgrace, mainly because the government is led and ran by indigenous people.

On the other hand, Hugo Chavez's Venezuela is quite a different example of a country where populist discourse mobilizes groups of people. Chavez's populist politics is not a Movement Left style politics like Morales' Bolivian project -- where the indigenous movement keeps the party leadership ever accountable (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 1-28).

At the surface, populism seems to describe the poor and neglected people; but populism is not meant to be simply for this specific group of people. Ironically, in Venezuela, the self-professed "neglected" are the Middle Class and young students who feel repressed from the ongoing government of Chavez's handpicked successor, Nicolas Maduro. Here we are not talking about a group of poor indigenous people, but a group of young middle class students who feel outcast. The present regime has chosen to follow the charismatic leadership democracy politics known as *Bolivarian Politics* imposed by the former President Hugo Chavez. Since Chavez's death, the country itself is crumbling apart to the point where there is scarcely enough food or basic goods to be purchased.

Not only are Left Populisms manifested in Latin America, but also it is also manifested in Spain, the "Motherland." Here the rate of unemployment is at its highest, especially with the youth --over 50 percent among those between ages 19 -35. Unemployment and prospective precarious job possibilities have been the main cause of the emergence of the populist movements such as the 15-M Indignados manifested in (1) anti-austerity occupations since the 2008 financial crisis; (2) the anti-evictions Platform against Mortgage-Repo Enforcers led by

Ada Colau (now mayor of Barcelona); and (3) a new political party, Podemos (Yes We Can !) first formed in 2014. Podemos has gained 23 percent of the seats in the national parliament in both the December 2015 and June 2016 national elections. The demands in Spain are coming from the youth under critical economic conditions. Programmatic solutions in Spain thus far have come on the municipal and regional level as opposed to Bolivia, which has successfully utilized national State and parliamentary power to enact new programs.

Political sociologists, such as Seymour Martin Lipset (1959), understood the issues surrounding populisms as that of a socio-economic stratification problem, characterized by what he labels “Working Class Authoritarianism.” Here Lipset argues how the lower classes tend to be socialized in a way where their views can be quite extremist and intolerant, which makes them prone to support authoritarian movements in the manner noted in the Theodor Adorno and Ellen Frenkel-Brunswick, et. al. *Authoritarian Personality* study in 1950.

This appeal to authoritarian movements is further developed by Stuart Hall (1979; 1983), who explains a current of populism through the lens of what he re-conceptualizes as *Authoritarian Populism*. Hall’s concept is rooted in the governing politics of the Margaret Thatcher regime of 1979-1990 in Britain. Hall claims that such populism makes the State supremely powerful in “policing the crisis” even when they are emphasizing the strengthening of the market mechanism. The Discipline and Punish State is supported by the will of the common people who fume and rant about their sense of being squeezed out of the middle class by immigrants and taxes. Such a right populism accommodates authoritarian figures, who promise to implement their demands rapidly and to solve their current crisis.

This particular form of right populism ties into the American concept of *nativism*. Nativism is a concept used to exemplify a state of mind that is shared by a population that is

racist and xenophobic; and that particularly does not want to share citizenship rights with any other minority groups in the U.S. For the most part, such population is characterized as being particularly White, Protestant and Northern European. Nativism is manifested through different organized movements throughout different periods in American history, starting with the Know Nothing Party Movement in the first half of the 1800s. Nativist sentiments are connected to what Hall (1983) calls *Authoritarian Populism*, in the rhetoric used in their demands – demands in order to solve their current crisis of resentment and sense of being squeezed out of the middle class. This, they believe, is caused principally by a wave of new immigrants from different lands. These nativist sentiments emerge from time to time in this country, but we have recently experienced this rhetoric with the presidential campaign of Donald J. Trump.

This recurring pattern in American society of Nativism joined with Authoritarian Populism can be understood by utilizing a methodology of historical sociology. The thrust of this project is to unveil -- through the continuous study of varieties of populism -- how such populist patterns are a recurring pattern in the historical sociology of the politics of immigration policy in this country.

II. Our Method: Historical Sociology of Discursive Framing in Varieties of Populism

The methodological orientation of this paper is a mode of political sociology informed by history. In learning from the historical sociology methods of Max Weber's ideal type-guided normative analysis, my project studies how populism serves as a syndrome (Ionescu and Gellner 1969) or a thin ideology (Stanley 2008) or what Laclau sees as merely a discursive register or rhetorical style commingled with deeper ideologies. Such a historical sociological approach is simultaneously a sociology of meaning in understanding how actors frame the context with

which they interact. Ideal typical frames help us to accentuate how political actors frame what they seek to normatively control.

The paper begins with a genealogical review not just of the literature on populism, but with a sense of affiliated variation in the way populist framing occurs – in the recent post-structuralist concept of empty signifier of Ernesto Laclau. This is tied to the working class authoritarianism and nativism as described by Seymour Martin Lipset's functionalist analysis of the 1950s and 1960s; and the authoritarian populism approach of Stuart Hall's cultural studies approach to Thatcherism at the start of the 1980s.

The focus is on genealogy and interpretation in a Sociology of Knowledge. The knowledge cluster being studied here is the populist framing employed in politics. Such populist reasoning can be understood as ideological frames in understanding how both the world is seen and how the politics of policy-making – here immigration policy – can be understood. (Abrams, 1980; Somers 1996).

In the process of such an understanding, we can see how nativist ways of framing politics continue to have influence in events that happen. History and political sociology often overlap and enrich each other in understanding how political actors understand the world. Historical sociology often involves what Karl Mannheim (1936) and Robert K. Merton (1973) referred to as the Sociology of Knowledge to study patterns of collective reasoning and practices of the past in order to explain patterned sequences that may recurrently appear in the unfolding of time – as within American politics.

III. Methodological Excursus: Historical Sociology as an Understanding Utilizing Historically Infused Sociology of Knowledge

Human beings are not creatures who live in isolation; rather they are – as Aristotle teaches us -- social animals who interact with the people and the occurrences surrounding them, whether they are natural or man-made. However, in terms of the reality constructed by humans, it is their own *assemblage* of the world that endures over time -- creating and establishing institutions or practices that carry meaning to we humans. Institutions as human practices-- as well as the ideas and language involved -- are the foci of Historical Sociology and the Sociology of Knowledge. Sociology of Knowledge is the study of the relationship of human thought and practice with its social environment in which human thought and practice emerges. Sociology of Knowledge focuses on the prevailing ideas that emerge from such contexts and how they can influence societies.

As Philip Abrams (1980, 4) argued: Historical Sociology stresses the connection between history and sociology. Abrams notes that historians and sociologists have turned to one another and see the benefits of the convergence between both disciplines as a resource to aide what one discipline might be lacking in comparison to another, and vice versa. Sociology must be concerned with eventuation because that is how structuring happens. History must be theoretical because that is how structuring consequence of an event is to be apprehended. History has no privileged access to the empirical evidence relevant to the common explanatory project. In addition, sociology has no privileged theoretical access (Abrams 1980, 5).

In a historical light, Abrams argues that “the notion of class entails the notion of historical relationship,” for such relationship cannot be dissected or fragmented, rather it must be viewed as a whole occurrence (in the manner of cultural Marxian historian E. P. Thompson as

quoted in Abrams 1980, 5). Abrams argues further that if a social relationship is viewed as a whole, it is mainly due to the realization that it cannot be analyzed piece by piece; rather it must be appreciated organismically, with real people and in an actual context of meanings and legitimations. Abrams points to *The Social Construction of Reality* by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1966) for Sociology of Knowledge arguments. The significance of Berger and Luckmann are explained further below.

Over a decade after Abrams, Margaret Somers (1996, 53) argues that the turn to Historical Sociology enables us “to see that causal propositions must vary with time.” And in appreciating the evolving and destructiveness of time contexts, historical sociology emphasizes and links historical variations and meaning to the different areas such as “class, gender, revolutions, state formation, religion, and cultural identity” (Somers 1996, 53).

Somers believes that the field of historical sociology traces three conundrums such as that of *knowing, being, and asking*; or in other words, respectively: epistemology, ontology and the context of discovery (Somers 1996, 54-56). An epistemological problem is concerned with the context of knowledge and justifications of beliefs. An ontological problem is how to know the character of society. Finally, there is the context of discovery, which emphasizes the question being asked and the rationale behind it. All these conundrums have been plaguing sociologists and historians, and that is due primarily to the lack of epistemologically exploring the significance of justified beliefs in terms of the dimension of time; and secondly, the lack of focus with some “science as foundation knowledge based on the certainties of nature” (Somers 1996, 54).

Somers builds methodologically towards the understanding of what she deems a Historical Epistemology, understanding that knowledge and practices are defined by the

“signature of the time” (Somers 1996, 54). Such understanding can be done through a *Knowledge Culture*, which is a “range of thinking, reasoning, and institutional practices possible in a given historical time and space” (Somers 1996, 55).

This project’s trajectory magnifies ideas that emerge from society, as well as how these ideas can influence societies throughout different times in history. This magnification in ideas is refined through the practice of the Sociology of Knowledge. One of the most prominent sociologists to explain Sociology of Knowledge methodologically was Robert K. Merton (1973), who argued that “it is primarily concerned with the relations between knowledge and other existential factors in the society” (Merton 1973, 7).

Merton asserts that the Sociology of Knowledge is concerned with understanding both sociologically and historically ideas within a society and how they have been repeated through different times in history – in what we will refer to as a historically recurrent pattern. As well, Merton (1973, 8) noted that the Sociology of Knowledge still faces hardships in terms of the perspectives and interpretations that can emerge from one society. This occurs mainly due to differences in values, attitudes, and modes of thought from different interpreters, who in their variety of values, debate what a legitimate understanding is or not.

Somers argues that the conflict over interpretations of legitimacy can be disciplined if a *knowledge culture* is applied -- looking at the ideas, practices, and language in a given historical time and place; therefore, opening Sociology of Knowledge into Historical Sociology. Beyond Somers’ approach, Merton – like Jürgen Habermas – leaves open as well a more critical dimension of evaluating the extent to which ideas, arguments and practices are valid epistemologically as well as the extent to which they immediately fulfill the premises of their argumentation and the extent to which these premises are rational and moral.

Karl Mannheim (1936, 69) explained the Sociology of Knowledge as what was boiled off from the earlier Marxian approach to false consciousness as ideology: “What was once the intellectual armament of a party is transformed into a method of research in social and intellectual history.” This also amounts to Historical Sociology. This once again binds the connection between the convergence of ideas with the significance and impact it has on history.

Mannheim (*op. cit.* 1936, 69) claims that the Sociology of Knowledge is utilized “to analyze without regard for party biases all the factors in the actually existing social situation which may influence thought.” It does so in order to better guarantee an accurate view of the whole historical process. This accentuates the concept of a historically infused Sociology of Knowledge as being a non-partisan discipline, for it looks at all ideology, practices, and languages utilized in specific periods as a way to study the society as a historical and sociological phenomena where patterns and trends become apparent. This fits with the concerns and approach of this paper.

Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann dissent from Merton and Mannheim in the sense that they believe that the Sociology of Knowledge must concern itself with the experience of constructionism as well as functional analysis; specifically, “how we construct the frames with which we see reality” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 29). This means that they focus on what is common sense everyday-life to people in a specific era as the reality that carries meaning and structure to a society’s existence, not just dominant ideas that are formulated by educated individuals. Berger and Luckmann argue (1966, 27) that “everyone in society participates in the ‘knowledge’ in one way or another.”

Combining both historical sociology and the sociology of knowledge enables one to focus on how ideas, language and practices are institutionalized throughout time, and become

recurring patterns in history. When it comes to the interpretations of how the sociology of knowledge must be used, one comes to an understanding that the ideas of differentiating theorists and the common-sense knowledge from ordinary individuals are both valid in the scope of understanding a society. This is even more significant when looking at different times in history in order to distinguish patterns of ideas, practices and language used by all participants in such societies.

Furthermore, interpreting in a historically infused sociology of knowledge is constituted in different forms of populist movements. Social theorist Ben Stanley argues how the “ideology of populism offers a distinct interpretation of the political. However, it is clearly a thin one” (Stanley 2008, 106). Even a “thin-shelled ideology” tends to clearly show a comprehensible set of core frames of reference that “elaborate distinct traditions of political thought that can transcend the proximate context in which they emerge.”

However, Ernesto Laclau sees populism less as a “thin ideology” and more as a discursive register, a rhetorical style that can connect to either fuller left or right ideologies. In the case of populism, we are confronted with a concept that is widely contested, and not traditionally agreed upon in terms of its definition. One of the main reasons this occurs is due to the complexity and inability of being able to define the concept of “the people.” In addition, Stanley (2008, 107) points out the difficulty in such is due to the inconsistency in what “the people” want and what they should receive, and lack of identifying who the actors are.

Populism on its own is a thin concept, connecting with a complementary and fuller ideology. Populism can be loosely defined. For its dependent nature with other ideologies is not “sufficiently ‘thick’ to translate into a coherent and comprehensive policy” (Stanley 2008, 107). Even though populism can have several inconsistent definitions, it is clear that one of the main

characteristics of such a thin ideology is the fact that it possesses an anti-elite connotation and a generalizable framework capable of being manifested (Stanley 2008, 107-108).

In a way, populism can be seen as a syndrome due to how “virtue resides (and is expressed) in the simple people, who are the overwhelming majority, and in their collective traditions” (Wiles 1969, 166). This reflects Berger and Luckman's argument that the way we construct knowledge can be as significant, if not more crucial than the theories and comments developed by an elite.

IV. How to Understand Varieties of Populist Reasoning

In this paper, Populism will be defined below through the work of political philosopher Ernesto Laclau, who does not view populism as an ideology. Now, it is evident that this concept is currently being used in the U.S, by the media, to vaguely interpret populism as a right radical ideology. Such trend was certainly used to describe Trump's political movement this past year. However, despite the popularity, populism has gained as a rightist ideology, it is important to remark that populism itself is not meant to be identified with one certain set of substantive beliefs; rather it is meant to be flexible enough to rhetorically resonate to any specific ideology. Thus, populism should be recognized as a discursive register/style that explains a movement, wherever it may be on a left to right spectrum.

On one hand, a clear example of left populisms can be encountered in the political parties in nations like Venezuela, Bolivia and Spain, where there is more of a left and socialist ideological core. On the other hand, an example of right populisms is evident in several European countries like in the United Kingdom, France, and Austria, where there are right authoritarian populist political parties on the spectrum. As well, it is critical to establish that some left populist political parties have been able to institutionalize and become part of their

country's government or parliament as in Bolivia and Spain, while others have not been able to achieve that due to their lack of organization.

Below is a chart created by Pippa Norris and Ronald F. Inglehart, who demonstrate a clear rise in populist political parties in European countries, whether their values are centered in left or right ideologies (Inglehart and Norris 2016). The relevance of this chart is to demonstrate the current vigor and strength political populist parties have been obtaining and how such is transcending and restructuring the existing government parties throughout the world.

Technical appendix A: Classification of Populist parties

Country	Party abbreviation	Name in English	Economic Left-Right party scale	Populism party scale	Classification
Austria	FPO	Freedom Party of Austria	53.6	89.7	Populist-Right
Belgium	VB	Flemish Block	54.8	87.1	Populist-Right
Bulgaria	ATAKA	Attack	14.0	96.7	Populist-Left
Bulgaria	VMRO-BND	Bulgarian National Movement	32.6	90.5	Populist-Left
Bulgaria	NFSB	National Front for the Salvation of Bulgaria	36.5	87.2	Populist-Left
Bulgaria	BBT		37.2	81.2	Populist-Left
Croatia	HSS	Croatian Peasants Party	44.4	90.0	Populist-Left
Croatia	HDSSB	Croatian Democratic Alliance of Slavonia and Baranja	46.7	88.4	Populist-Left
Croatia	HSP	Croatian Party of Rights	49.6	95.3	Populist-Left
Croatia	HSP-AS	Croatian Party of Rights – Dr. Ante Starcevic	53.8	93.7	Populist-Right
Croatia	HDZ	Croatian Democratic Union	62.7	81.2	Populist-Right
Czech Rep	USVIT	Freedom Union	47.2	85.7	Populist-Left
Denmark	DF	Danish People's Party	44.0	84.3	Populist-Left
Finland	Sp-P	Finnish Party-True Finns	40.2	90.6	Populist-Left
France	FN	National Front	47.2	89.1	Populist-Left
France	MPF	Popular Republican Movement	67.3	93.0	Populist-Right
Germany	NPD	National Democratic Party	44.5	95.4	Populist-Left
Germany	AfD	Alternative for Germany	81.3	87.6	Populist-Right
Greece	XA	Golden Dawn	18.4	100.1	Populist-Left
Greece	ANEL	Independent Greeks	44.1	94.8	Populist-Left
Greece	LAOS	Popular Orthodox Rally	52.0	93.5	Populist-Right
Greece	ND	New Democracy	64.1	81.6	Populist-Right
Greece	Syriza	Syriza			Populist-Left
Hungary	JOBBIK	Jobbik Movement for a Better Hungary	31.0	98.9	Populist-Left
Hungary	Fidesz	Fidesz Hungarian Civic Union	45.9	87.7	Populist-Left
Italy	Fdl	Brothers of Italy	49.8	93.0	Populist-Left
Italy	LN	Northern League	64.7	89.1	Populist-Right
Italy	M5S	Five Star Movement			
Latvia	NA	National Alliance	60.5	81.4	Populist-Right
Lithuania	DK	The Way of Courage	37.0	81.5	Populist-Left
Luxembourg	ADR	Alternative Democratic Reform	63.1	91.6	Populist-Right
Netherlands	PVV	Party for Freedom	51.1	81.8	Populist-Right
Netherlands	SGP	Political Reform Party	64.1	92.1	Populist-Right
Norway	FrP	Progress Party	67.5	80.7	Populist-Right
Poland	PiS	Law and Justice	33.0	83.4	Populist-Left
Poland	SP	United Poland	35.1	87.9	Populist-Left
Poland	KNP	Congress of the New Right	101.0	84.3	Populist-Right
Romania	PP-DD	People's Party – Dan Diaconescu	33.1	84.6	Populist-Left
Slovenia	SDS	Slovenian Democratic Party	82.3	84.2	Populist-Right
Slovenia	NSI	New Slovenia – Christian People's Party	82.4	83.5	Populist-Right
Slovakia	SNS	Slovak National Party	49.1	97.3	Populist-Left
Slovakia	KDH	Christian Democratic Movement	55.2	85.7	Populist-Right
Spain		Podemos			Populist-Left
Sweden	SD	Sweden Democrats	48.1	93.8	Populist-Left
Switzerland	EDU/UDF	Federal Democratic Union of Switzerland	55.2	88.8	Populist-Right
Switzerland	SVP/UDC	Swiss People's Party	76.9	89.5	Populist-Right
Turkey	MHP	National Action Party	52.5	85.5	Populist-Right
United Kingdom	UKIP	UK Independence Party	87.2	91.8	Populist-Right
United Kingdom	NF	National Front			Populist-Right
United Kingdom	BNP	British National Party			Populist-Right

Source: Calculated from the 2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES)

V. Ernesto Laclau's Revisionist Left Populism

During the 1980s and 1990s in Latin America, it was clear that Friedrich Hayek/ Milton Friedman-style Neoliberal economic discourse was predominant, brought southward by the Economics Department at the University of Chicago with the support of new monetarist/supply-side Reaganomics elites who thought Neoliberalism would be a great fit to the development of these countries (Harvey 2005). However, Argentinian philosopher Ernesto Laclau believed that such countries could not meet such economic liberal criteria, due to the lack of transition and exposure to any democratic or liberal environments.

More recently, Laclau argued that what has been currently occurring, even with the demise of Neoliberalism in the new millennium, is a transition to populist discourses. The common people in South America had become upset about globalized private corporations dominating their respective country. Consequently, they are disposed to follow any leader who is able to recognize their issues as challenges to defeat. Moreover, this collective feeling and discourse are not necessarily dominated by either a left or right wing specific course.

To begin, for an understanding of what populism is, it is best to follow the definition of Ernesto Laclau "one way of constructing the very unity of the group ... where 'the people' is not something of the nature of an ideological expression, but a real relation between social agents." Laclau means here that the people cannot be personified under an abstractly defined label. Rather it is defined by the experience of their socialization (Laclau 2005, 73). As well, Laclau believes that

populism is not really an ideology, (but) a way to construct the political, which divides society in two fields, and incorporates those who are in power and those confronting it. This can be done with the most diverse ideologies (Laclau 2011).

In other words, populism is what constructs the political environment, yet it is not necessarily pertinent to any specific ideology, rather it is the movement of the masses to confront those who are in power in order to get their voices heard and implemented. Moreover, Laclau (2011) claims that populism “must not be a means to achieve democracy, rather a type of government that would allow an expansion of democratic bases in society.” The sole purpose of populism is to be a movement that allows those who are governed by a superior power to be part of the political process that they have been excluded from. For this reason, Laclau argues how populism is not necessarily a substantive movement in itself, for the logic of it can be seen in two strands, one liberal and the other “ultra-libertarian” (Laclau 2011).

On one hand, the Liberal Logic encompasses how “all strategies of power have to stay through the mediation of the appliances of the state,” which Laclau believes that it must have a democratic basis that must expand enough in order to reach all social spaces (Laclau 2011). On the other hand, The Ultra Liberal Logic occurs when “the only thing that matters is a democratic basis where the problem of mediation through the apparatus of the state become deciduous.” The term State Apparata is an Althusserian structuralist Marxist twist (Althusser 1974).

This means that one strand is either strictly tied to institutions and the other views institutions as obsolete and stresses that purely democratic practices will suffice. Laclau points out that you need both the intervention of “the apparatus of the state and (the) democratic basis.” Even though there is a continuous battle between both, it is necessary for both in order to have a government that is very democratic, but institutionalized enough in order for all social demands to be implemented (op cit. Laclau 2011).

The main impetus in Populism is the assurance of social demands being implemented. Some demands are resolved immediately, but when the demands are not satisfied at a rapid

manner, they are put in conjunction with other social demands. For this reason, the system at an institutional level cannot fulfill the demands in a “differential way (each in isolation from the others), and an equivalence relation is established,” where all the demands, whether they are of high priority or not, will become equal to each other (Laclau 2011, 73). This sense of equivalence of demands is known as the Empty Signifier, which is the flexible and transcendent affective current that generates the surging of populism. Laclau deliberately constructs his argument: due to social demands not being satisfied by the apparatuses of the State, institutions alone are not democratic enough to fulfill and distinguish the individuality of these requests, and for this reason, once all demands become equivalent in importance, they therefore become empty in significance.

Moreover, the Empty Signifier is more closely defined as a “frustrated demand in conjunction with other frustrated social demands, which is what constructs *the chain of equivalences*. This chain of equivalences becomes a collective demand that confronts power, where a frontier is created between power and the demands that have been rejected” (Laclau 2011). This means that all the demands that are not heard by those in power will eventually become strong and cohesive enough to act as a whole collective movement by those who are governed under such power.

Furthermore, Laclau states that these demands begin to acquire a centrality where the more central they are, the less of a relation exists with the original demand. This emerges because the demands become “a collectivity in its conjunction,” what Gustav LeBon, Georges Sorel and Sigmund Freud called a “mass mentality” crowding out the individual ego. In other words, the more demands are similar to each other, the more they lose their individual significance, yet such indistinction allows for the collective demand itself to become social

psychologically the predominant experience supervening in the “People’s” confronting the governing institutions.

As well, Laclau argues that these collective demands are empty in the sense that they have to represent the totality of the chain of demands, and not the demand that was initially generated. The problem of the empty signifier commences (due to) these signifiers each time becoming emptier, because several other demands are under it. The other perspective, from the content of the demand is that these demands must encompass a totality of the series, which makes them empty in logic and distinguishable intentionality (Laclau 2011).

In other words, the more the demands have in common with each other, than the more generalized they turn out to be; as an individual demand and its content, they become insignificant. Consequently, the movement of all these generalized demands has nothing to do with the original purpose of each individual demand, making it *empty*. Therefore, the movement as a whole may have the affective intention and enthusiasm to achieve a goal, yet at the individual level, the movement may become unaware of the original request that is no longer being signified. Essentially, a movement may stand for something that has nothing to do with what it originally demanded, and instead conveys superficial significance, which has no real meaning at the individual level.

VI. Development of Left Populism within the Pink Tides in Latin America & Spain

Left Populism is evident in the nations of Bolivia, Venezuela and Spain, which greatly differ in terms of politics and governance, but even more so in the way they resolve the demands from the people. The *Pink Tide* movement comprises *the emerging assemblage* towards this form of populism. Moreover, the development of the Pink Tides can be understood at the same time the shift to the left where there is a focus toward alternatives to neoliberalism. Moreover, developed

countries, such as the U.S, criticize underdeveloped Latin American countries for their center left populist movements, as if it were particularly a negative asset. According to Enrique Jorge

Mendez:

Europeans and North Americans call these (populist) governments center left, but they instead are governments that are minimally elected by the people, that not more than 30% have gone to vote; while the majority of the people are uninterested in public policy. This means that those countries have more of a representation, than a democracy. This is the moment where we ask ourselves: where democracy plays the best, in underdeveloped populist nations where the masses accept charisma of certain leaders and go to the streets to join them, or in a fully developed world where they only elect representatives of a small minority (Mendez 2014).

This puts into place the effectiveness of populism since Latin American countries, especially ones like Bolivia and Venezuela, are criticized for unconventional anti-neoliberal policies, which focus on the satisfaction of the masses rather than that of corporations. Populism has been a beneficial asset to underdeveloped countries, because it enhances and ensures more democratic values due to the ongoing participation of the masses. This is apparent in Evo Morales' Bolivia, where after more than ten years of government, these Indigenous have been criticized and humiliated amongst its European counterparts for having the audacity to consider the Europeans as colonizers and exploiters of our America. Morales is "once more elected not only by the indigenous people, but also by those who are white, which is a clear acceptance of Morales' democratic government" (Mendez 2014).

Under the current Evo Morales government, the significance of this is that Populism in Bolivia has symbolized the effort of the demands of the masses being heard, which reflects the democratic values of this government. Morales rose to Presidency in 2005, as the leader of the political party MAS/Movimiento al Socialismo -- *Movement towards Socialism*-- becoming the

first indigenous president in the history of Latin America. These type of ethno-populist parties have succeeded because of the broadened bases that goes beyond indigenous platforms, and has developed a cross-ethnic appeal due to populist rhetoric and the lack of ethnic polarization since such racial identities are ambiguous and fluid (Madrid 2006). Moreover, the MAS criticized traditional parties and elites, denounced market reforms and foreign intervention into the country, and used an inclusive pro-indigenous discourse that attracted not only indigenous people, but also “leftists, statists, nationalists, the politically disenchanted, nationalists, the politically disenchanted, subaltern organizational activists and poor people” (Madrid 2006). MAS built up its power between 1999 and 2000, and not only because of its syndicalist views and the cocalero movement of indigenous farmers protesting US pressures to burn and decrease production of coca leaves. The rhetoric was one that was not exclusive to the indigenous people, but one where it would include whites and mestizos, making it a party open to everybody.

In order to achieve its power of appeal to all people of Bolivia, MAS opted to electing leaders that would represent all ethnicities. Due to the need of diversity in representatives of the MAS party, Morales was elected as the perfect candidate due to him being able to speak Quechua and Aymara, which are the main dialects prominent from the two main indigenous groups of Bolivia (Madrid 2006). As well, Morales was an appealing leader because he headed unions that consisted mostly of Quechua speakers. These unions had characteristics that were typical of a Bolivian *mestizo* such as preferring to speak in Spanish rather than indigenous languages. Yet, these unions still had the fluidity of appealing to the two main indigenous groups of the country, which essentially made Morales an outstanding and distinguishable leader (Madrid 2006).

The MAS party, along with Morales, grew strong amongst neoliberal disenchantment, which commenced after the demise of such implementation. In 1985, the government of Bolivia had “implemented sweeping market-oriented reforms, ranging from the elimination of subsidies, credits, and price controls to trade liberalization and the privatization of state-owned companies” (Madrid 2006). Initially, these policies generated significant benefits, but between 1998 and 2002 Bolivia was experiencing economic hardships like the decline of their GDP per capita and the incline of poverty and unemployment (Madrid 2006).

As a result, to the implementation of neoliberal policies, the people of Bolivia became disenchanted with the economic policies the government had in place, and at this point, the MAS party used this dissatisfaction of neoliberal sentiments as a signifier in their campaign with the Bolivian electorate. The MAS party appealed to the people of Bolivia because it had proposed applying an interventionist State in economic policies “including the recuperation of privatized companies, in order to redistribute income and generate an economic recovery.” This drew support from those who were directly affected by the previous privatized trends, who essentially were the very poor and politically disenfranchised (Madrid 2006).

The MAS was successful due to the different social demands it reached. This group went beyond the politics of the country, and it assimilated different social demands in a way where democracy would supersede ideology, which brought up a nationalist yet tolerant environment to the people and government of Bolivia. Even though Morales’ government symbolizes the values of a democracy, many find the Morales government to be immature due to his humble background, race, and anti-capitalist resentment. However, this is the exact reason why such populist current arose in Bolivia, for the demands were not solely based on the discomfort and dissatisfaction with the neoliberal state, but also on the demands that reflected the background

and race of the population. For this reason, in the discourses of prominent center left leaders, a capitalist language and mentality is not highly acknowledged as much as that of socialist/syndicalist discourse, which is evident in Morales' government that stirs away from the elites doing the decision making and instead the masses are involved in almost all political processes.

Even though populism struck Bolivia in such a positive tone, it is viewed quite negatively in Venezuela due to the repressive and dangerous government that it has transitioned from Hugo Chavez to Nicolas Maduro. The political environment in Venezuela is currently hectic and unstable after the succession of President Maduro after Chavez' death, who has ultimately tried to maintain the policies of the Bolivarian Revolution that Chavez used to prominently proclaim in order to gather the poor masses. Currently, Maduro has diminished Chavez's legacy, and has brought the country into an impending chaos where the population cannot even purchase simple household items.

Moreover, many believe that the discourse Chavez had was very misleading and confusing, for he claimed Venezuela to have the Socialism of the twenty-first century. However, this is not understood in the sense of social democracy, which emphasizes reforms to capitalism in order to promote equality. Instead, "the sense of the word is explicitly used as anticapitalistic" (Arenas 2006). In this sense, there is no doubt that this is characteristic of Chavez' government, which is mainly driven by the idea of denouncing globalization and free enterprise like that of the U.S., but this becomes hypocritical because Venezuela is dependent on petroleum revenue, which makes it mandatory for it to maintain its ties with the US. The dependence of Venezuela's revenue to petroleum is that of how "the State does not live off of society, but it's society that lives off of the State, where as long as there is rent to distribute, populism will be less costly than in other societies" (Arenas 2010).

The politics of Venezuela is very different from that of Bolivia. Venezuela like Bolivia is mostly favored from the poor and politically disenfranchised, but it currently fails to meet the needs of the youth and the middle classes who do not coincide with the Bolivarian-Chavista rhetoric. They are tired of the people being victimized and the conspiracy theories that Chavez always brought up of imperialism and foreign domination, prominently that of the US. For this reason, many of Venezuela's youth had protested in 2013, where Maduro's government had oppressed them and their peaceful objection. Even though some do recognize Maduro's weak government, the poor and disenfranchised who had followed Chavez still believe that Maduro should remain in power. This is an illustration of how people will follow leaders, regardless of their accomplishments; for they believe in the collectivity of the social demands, but tend to forget the essence of their individuality demands. In Venezuela, the poor think that they will all be guaranteed something by siding with Maduro, but they themselves are the ones who are being affected the most due to food shortages and the absurd increase of the cost of living.

Another country that is suffering by the lack of good governance is that of Spain, which has high rates of unemployment amongst its youth. Spain, although it may not conventionally be thought of as a country where populism would emerge, is one where it has had to do so because of the socioeconomic and political circumstances it currently confronts. A result of this distress has been the upbringing of the Podemos movement, which has enormously affected the politics of Spain. Furthermore, Podemos is a clear example of a populist movement that has taken charge in such a short amount of time, where they have managed to go from being a movement to an institutionalized party of regional and municipal government as well as with 22 % of the seats in the national parliament. This is reflected in recent elections where Podemos has been able to obtain 80 seats in the legislature of Spain, becoming known as "the third political force [...] with

its alliances in Cataluña, Galicia and the Valencian Community” (Manetto 2015). Furthermore, this achievement, which has occurred so rapidly, was symbolic to the rupture of the old politics of Spain, and the commencement of a politics where the demands of those in need will finally be heard. The main reason why Podemos exists in the first place is that it wants labor reforms to occur, austerity measures loosened, and, as well, they want to see several amendments to the Constitution of their nation-state: e.g., a United Kingdom of the Spanish Peoples.

Ultimately, Populism is a movement that will resurface from time to time due to its appeal to the masses with their particular social demands. These movements have emerged in different countries for various reasons, and in the case of Bolivia, Venezuela, and Spain, as each country has its own history and set of issues that makes them so unique, and yet such factors make it hard to conceive populism itself as a stringent particular ideology. With this in mind, Populism is not meant to be associated with a specific set of beliefs, rather it is meant to be a tool that is used to accomplish and meet all social demands while ensuring democratic values. In addition, it is clear to remark that Populism is evident in the Pink Tides, which are against any neoliberal policies, and are considered to be Left to Center movements.

Both Bolivia and Venezuela have lacked a transition from liberalism to democratic values; however, Spain, on the other hand, has been an outlier to this situation. Spain, even though it failed to have a democratic revolution, has undergone a 40-year post-Franco “Democratic Transition. Podemos has been able to challenge the Socialists who have accommodated neoliberal austerity demands of the European Union and to tap in to the almost two centuries old of anarcho-syndicalist *municipalismo*.

This comparison among all three countries proves how populism has no concrete ideology, and yet it can still have a positive or negative impact within their borders. Overall,

despite Laclau's convoluted post-Marxist way of explaining the importance and emergence of populism as a discursive register rather than an ideology, it is evident that populism is indeed an important factor to the politics of the 21st century.

VII. Authoritarian Populism Contra Working-Class Authoritarianism

The xenophobic and racist rants we heard during the 2016 presidential race in this country is reminiscent of a Right Populism. Lipset tried to show how this sort of rhetoric was that of Working Class Authoritarianism. Another measure is the concept of Authoritarian Populism articulated by Stuart Hall, who explains such through Margaret Thatcher's rule of Great Britain. Further, it emphasizes radical change from Social Democratic values to Conservative anti-entitlement values. It is based upon the deterioration of an old ideology to another that attempts to look for an immediate solution.

VIII. S.M. Lipset's Concept of Working Class Authoritarianism

Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) claimed that "the lower-class way of life produces individuals with rigid and intolerant approaches to politics." In other words, Working Class Authoritarianism exemplifies how the lower strata of society has the tendency to support authoritarian movements as a result of the lesser amount of education they receive; the resentments developed toward elites and the new middle classes; and the prejudices of the everyday life in a working class neighborhood. Lipset found working class authoritarians tending to heed extremists, show intolerance, as well as haphazard picking and choosing what they desired from religious identity.

Lipset notes that, historically, the lower strata "have been a major force in extending political democracy and in waging progressive political and economical struggles." For this

reason, it is presumed that the higher classes resist these sort of actions (Lipset 1959). Lipset demonstrates that before 1914, the differences between both the working class, which was Leftist, and the higher circles, which were of the Right, were not solely based on strata issues such as “redistribution of income, status, and educational opportunities, but also rested upon civil liberties and international policy issues” (Lipset 1959). This meant that the working class was responsible for greater political democracy, religious freedom, minority rights, and great international peace while the middle and higher classes were the ones who would favor more extremists’ policies that went against the quality of life for the disfranchised, and would favor more intolerant policies against foreigners.

However, after 1914, Lipset claims that this pattern had changed, and now the lower strata began to support nationalist values and behaviors. Thus, Lipset (1959) argued, “in a number of nations, they have clearly been in the forefront of the struggle against equal rights for minority groups, and have sought to limit immigration or to impose racial standards in countries with open immigration.” Additionally, Lipset claims that the Working Class has supreme loyalty to the organizations they are in affiliation despite their own individual and personal beliefs. He mentions how “the lower strata are relatively more authoritarian, that they will be more attracted toward an extremist movement than toward a moderate and democratic one, and that once recruited, they will not be alienated by its lack of democracy, while more educated or sophisticated supporters will tend to drop away” (Lipset 1959, 84). This means that their attachment to their assimilations are so strong that even if it goes against their beliefs, they could still support such extremist nativist and right populist politics. Mainly, this is due to their strong allegiance and isolation from other sources of information.

Furthermore, Lipset noted that the lower classes often are more prone to “easy and quick solutions to social problems,” instead of understanding that reform can only occur gradually and that along with it must come thoughts of rationality and tolerance. As well, he mentions that the democratic ideals which the lower classes develop in the organizations they assimilate within. These ideals are what define their political behavior and personal values, and how at the same time their loyalty to their groups is what makes it hard for them to change their allegiances, and therefore, their way of thinking. For this reason, socio-economic class is correlatively seen to define an individual’s allegiance to a specific party or movement.

Lipset refers to Theodore Adorno’s F-Scale from the Authoritarian Personality Test, and concludes that the lower strata is less committed to democratic norms than the middle classes are, and that “tolerance increases with moves up the stratification ladder” (Lipset 1959, 486). Lipset mentions that lower class individuals have these authoritarian predispositions because they have “low education, low participation in political organizations or in voluntary organizations of any type, little reading, isolated occupations, economic insecurity, and authoritarian family patterns” (Lipset 1959, 489). This means that the individual's relation to society and how it is assimilated to things, such as organizations and educational institutions, have a predisposed way of “being” due to the individual's frequency and quality of interaction. This, in turn, constructs a set of either political and ideological factors that may be very democratic or the complete opposite. In addition, Lipset mentions how economic insecurity can bring an individual down the socioeconomic ladder, which is “reinforced by the particular patterns of family life associated with the lower strata” (Lipset 1959, 492). Here Lipset argues how the family values in the lower class household is more linked to frequent use of physical

punishment, while the middle class families resort to reasoning, isolation, and love oriented techniques of discipline” (Lipset 1959, 492).

IX. The Critique of Working Class Authoritarianism Arguments

Not everyone agrees with this approach of Working Class Authoritarianism that Lipset argued. One of the arguments against Working Class Authoritarianism is that the middle class is not necessarily less authoritarian than the working class, and as Lewis Lipsitz (1965, 109) noted “A comparison of those in both strata with high school education or less reveals that workers tend to be less authoritarian on questions more closely related to politics,” This argument is strong for Lipsitz has statistical evidence that goes against the expectations that Lipset had argued. That is how the Working Class is more authoritarian than the Middle Class due to it having less access to an education, greater economic insecurity, and are prominent of authoritarian family backgrounds. As well, Lipsitz argues that there may be “factors in working class life that mitigate the other elements conducive to authoritarianism [...] [and that] certain aspects of middle class life, of which we are not fully aware, may contribute to authoritarianism with this stratum” (Lipsitz 1959, 105). This means that if you are to control for only one measure, such as economic insecurity, then you might see that perhaps it could have more of an impact on middle class individuals than to the working class.

Another prominent argument is from S.M. Miller and Frank Riessman (1961, 273), who believe that that personality data is not exactly what makes a worker authoritarian, for the development in childhood could lead to many other conclusions that are not strictly affixed to a specific pattern. Miller and Riessman mention how the F (for Fascist Personality) –scale of Adorno and his associates- does “not appear to have the same meaning as for those in the middle class” (Miller and Reissman, 1961, 273).

X. Stuart Hall's Concept of Authoritarian Populism

According to Stuart Hall, Authoritarian Populism is “an exceptional form of the capitalist state-which, unlike classical fascism, has retained most [though not all] of the formal [liberal] representative institution in place, and which at the same time has been able to construct around itself an active popular consent” (Hall 1979). This means that Authoritarian Populism -- although making the State impressively powerful in restraining racial minorities and immigrants -- still poses as the will of the populace: that even though it weakens democratic values, it does not mean that such values are completely liquidated. Moreover, the “authoritarian: signifies the Neoliberal States magnifying power – despite the rhetoric of cutting down the size of the State and public spending. Moreover, Authoritarian Populism is best understood through the governance of Margaret Thatcher.

This movement surged in Britain, according to Hall, because of the decay of the post-war settlement under Conservative hegemony in the fifties and the subsequent failure of a Labourist corporatist alternative. By 1966, the social democratic alternative was so exhausted that crisis management through whatever means became more urgent than reconstituting consensus. There was a growing ideological polarization for tougher social discipline under the Thatcher's radical Right capture of the leadership of the Conservative Party (Jessop et. al. 1974). Essentially, the crisis Britain underwent was not meant to be solved through social democratic principles, rather through new measures that only the Radical Right could endure, and that only the Right with its radical Neoliberal ideology could convince the populace of such an anti-entitlement strategy that Britain had been accustomed to ever since 1945.

Hall (1983) did not precisely define Authoritarian Populism. Rather he uses Thatcherism to explain the movement, which blossomed with Thatcher's racist, nationalist and neo-liberal

rhetoric and how it influenced and modified a more tolerant social democratic popular opinion. Hall claims that “the swing to the Right” occurred due to the British Labour Party’s failure in realizing Social Democracy: how they “failed to find strategies capable of mobilizing social forces strong enough in depth to turn its flank,” meaning that Labour lacked a counter- strategy that Thatcherism used against them (Hall 1979).

Stuart Hall emphasizes Thatcherism was more than a reflection of the crisis. He argues that it rather was a response to the crisis to create “a new balance of forces, the emergence of new elements, the attempt to put together a new historical bloc, new political configurations and philosophies, a profound restructuring of the state and the ideological discourses” (Hall 1979). In other words, the Thatcherite Right create a culture embedded in nationalist beliefs, and had to make radical efforts in order to pulverize the Labour ideology grounded in entitlement social programs. Thatcherite authoritarian populism aimed to make the populace believe that these new forces could potentially bring an immediate solution to the enduring crisis. In addition, by constructing such a radical position they had to ensure that the political and ideological stances of the time became disarticulated enough to mobilize a majority with a new stance.

Social Democracy, argued Hall, ended up disorganizing the Left and the working class’ perception of the crisis, meaning that instead of representing the interests of the working class and organized labor they merely contained their resentment and anger. The ideas expressed by the Thatcherite Right were things like “law and order, the need for social discipline and authority [...] the onset of social anarchy, the enemy within, and the dilution of British stock by alien black elements” (Hall 1979). In other words, the Thatcherite Right wanted to eliminate the entitlement mentality, and put the blame on racial minorities for the economic crisis Thatcherite ideology was articulated as a strategy to not solely be defensive about what interests they

represent. They constructed a new political radical form with right populist echoes that would represent the working class and organized labor (Hall 1979). Hall (1979, 1983) perceptively noted how Authoritarian Populism under Thatcher could be thought of as the Neoliberalism with a Populist Luster: it manages to mix what the people want, need, feel and aspire, and it imposes structures of an interventionist capitalist state.

XI. Critique of Authoritarian Populism Approach

Bob Jessop of Lancaster University (1984) believes that Hall is defining Authoritarian Populism (AP) solely and uniquely on Thatcherism. Jessop argues that the meaning of this populist turn needs to be clarified. While an improvement on Lipset's working class authoritarianism, it needed refining. According to Jessop, we do wish to reject the ideologism of the AP approach. Thus, we also consider the political and institutional context in which Thatcherism developed, as well as "the crisis of hegemony to which it represents one response."

In other words, Jessop believes that Authoritarian Populism cannot be understood solely in terms of hegemonic ideology/false consciousness among the submerged strata. It must be understood more through the economic and political background of the time and the specific strategies that were constructed in order to respond to the crisis. Jessop argues that Hall is basing Authoritarian Populism purely according to discourse theory – like Laclau --by deconstructing the Social Democratic framework, while also ignoring the intended social and political disenfranchisement in terms of a turn toward a new political economy (Jessop 1984).

Even though Jessop believes Thatcherism represents a more multi-level strategy of development, he still agrees with Hall in the sense that Authoritarian Populism is limited to Thatcherism, and not easily applied to any other type of populist developments. Jessop believes

that “behind this intuitive appeal [of the term Authoritarian Populism] lurk some significant inconsistencies and ambiguities” (Hall 1979). Hall’s new concept improves on Lipset’s too social psychologically cast “working class authoritarianism” in that it can be understood on two different levels:

- *the authoritarian aspect* which indicates institutional discipline and coerciveness, and
- *the populist aspect* emphasizes on popular demand and consensus.

Significantly, for Jessop both aspects contradict each other -- matter of inconsistency caused by the rise in power from the Capitalist State through coercive manipulation and steering of consent rather than the articulation of a popular consented demand. Agreeing with Jessop’s refinement of Hall, this paper opts for using the term “authoritarian populism” as synonymous with numerous varieties of right populism and folding Lipset’s analysis into this broader concept.

XII. Nativism as a Form of Authoritarian Populism

The United States is a country constructed and raised on the hard work that has been put in by immigrants. All the immigrants coming to this country have one way or another built the social, cultural, political and economic structures that we have today. However, despite the diverse physical and abstract perspectives immigrants bring to this country, they are time over time scrutinized by older Americanized generations of immigrants. Some of them believe that the newer generations are unable to adapt to the “American Culture,” while others embrace their versatility and endeavors.

What we will label *Nativism* involves the rejection of immigrants grounded in authoritarian populist prejudice. The resentment toward immigrants is a recurrent occurrence under American history. It is evident in the different waves of immigration and the respective political nativist

policy conflicts throughout the years. Some of the authoritarian populist and nativist prejudices were incorporated in the Alien and Sedition Act, Chinese Exclusion Act, and the 1921 Immigration Act Quotas; and one of the most popular nativist political party, Know-Nothings of the decade before the Civil War.

The policies that were put in place by the government resonated with the popular rhetoric and mass resentment against newer generations of immigrants it has been a sentiment repeated throughout different periods in American history. This appeal to resentment can easily be understood through the concept of Nativism and its recurring nature in American Society (Friedman 1967, 414). The general conceptualization of Nativism can be seen as having spatial quality that is applicable to one society, and a temporal quality that is representative of that which is historically recurrent.

Moreover, historian John Higham defines nativism as “a state of mind shared by segments of the dominant population”, or in other words, how the homogenous masses share the same ideology, which is “characterized by...expressions of anti-Catholicism, xenophobia, and racism directed toward other segments of the population within American Society” (Friedman 1967, 409).

This concept of Nativism demonstrates a clash of mindsets between the American and the Immigrant, which can be understood as

a deep-seated American antipathy for internal foreign groups of various kinds [national, cultural, religious], which has erupted periodically into intensive efforts to safeguard America from such perceived threats (Friedman 1967, 408).

In other words, nativism exemplifies the hatred certain groups of Americans have against any foreigner that does not align with their own Americanized standards or beliefs. As well, John Higham (1955) claimed that nativism is a reoccurring phenomenon in American history, for “[it]

has existed whenever and wherever there were sufficient numbers of immigrants to cause Americans to become aware of them” (Friedman 1967, 409). This means that the older generations build up confidence into this fear and resentment when they know their movement is invigorated.

However, nativism is not a single movement, rather it “may assume many forms, but structurally it is an attitude against ethnic immigrants, those who are of national backgrounds other than the core culture nationality which de Tocqueville called “Anglo-American” (Barry 1958, 140). For this reason, nativism is a pattern throughout American history, which is prominently expressed by those who are particularly white, Protestant, and North European. Moreover, nativism can be understood through organized movements that are rooted on the basis of religion, ideology, and race, and through a state of mind that is rooted in judgements that are based on the nature and rights of man (Barry 1958, 139-141). Regardless of the method used to understand nativism, it is evident that what truly drives this current is the resentment Americans have when they encounter those who do not resemble the “American” prototype.

Nativism has several antagonistic occurrences that are reflected through sentiments of anti-Catholicism in the colonial era, fear of foreign radicals during the 1790’s which brought about the Alien and Sedition Act; and finally the Anglo-Saxon superiority that has extended throughout several moments in American history (Barry 1958, 139). The Anti-Catholic prejudice was a motion that was steadily growing for more than two centuries before it even took place in the 1840’s with the Native American Outburst, and the 1850’s with the Know-Nothings (Billington 1938, 1). Further, the origin to this hate was predominant among the average Englishman of the early seventeenth century who looked upon Pope with suspicion -- for

Catholicism was feared not only as an antagonistic theology, but also as a force through which the English government itself was to be overthrown (Billington 1938, 2).

This illustrates the state of mind by which the prototypical White Anglo Saxon Protestant American was coming from. Their fear and hatred towards Catholicism is rooted back to the times even before they were settled in the colonies. For this reason, the first main groups of immigrants who were targeted were Irish and Germans, who were mainly Catholic. However, the Germans -- including the northern and western German Protestants-- were also persecuted due to them not adapting to the English language.

The isolation of the people, the introspection to which they resorted in their wilderness homes, the distance which separated the colonies from the mother country and from Europe, all fostered bigotry which they had brought from the old world [...] the colonies represented a form of intellectual inbreeding, where the worst as well as the best of the original characteristics of the people were unduly magnified (Billington 1938, 4).

In other words, the intolerance and hatred was not only rooted by the past experience from the settlers in the colonies, but also by the constant isolation in frontier America that conditioned them in these sentiments of suspicion. The settlers “attempted to protect their people from Romish influences by forbidding the importation of all Irish persons into the colony, by administering oaths of allegiance which specifically denounced the Pope” (Billington 1938, 8).

The No-Popery legislation had had no legitimate basis in most colonies, for Catholics were virtually non-existent and only the inherited bigotry of the Protestant settlers motivated their enactment of penal statutes, which means that even though most settlers had their minds set with nativist antagonisms the truth was that Catholics were not in every single colony, and therefore such sentiments have no validity for it once again is about the fear of the effects of having them in the country the first place (Billington 1938, 9).

The anti-Catholic spirit continued strong through the early years of the Revolution: Some of the colonies insisted on disarming Papists just as they had

when at war with France, and others exercised a rigid supervision over those serving with the militia ... It was evident that the popular fear of Catholicism was not being neglected by the patriots and that they intended to continue to stress the close association between papal and royal tyranny as a means of stirring sentiment against England ... Anti-Catholicism in America was too deeply rooted to expire even under the influence of the French alliance and the liberal spirit of the Declaration of Independence ...state constitutions which were adopted during the Revolution showed them still wary [...] [like in New Jersey with the] safeguarding clause that no Protestant could be denied enjoyment of his civil rights because of religion and barred Catholics from state offices. (Billington 1938, 19-21).

The nativist sentiments started to diminish once the Constitution took hold, which had a serious impact on the political environment of the time. Billington notes how Reformists of the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison

...through their efforts to establish religious freedom and equality in Virginia, set a pattern of toleration which other states could follow mainly because the rate of catholic immigrants, like the Irish, was at a standstill and seemed as a thing of the past (Billington 1938, 24).

Following the adoption of the Constitution, many settlers wanted to focus on building and developing their individuality. However, after the election of Democrat-Republican Party leader Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency in 1800, the Federalist Party revitalized nativist sentiments. They tried to propose barring naturalized citizens from being able to take office since they were disappointed that such naturalized citizens were joining the Jeffersonian party. A strike on the Jeffersonian government was understood to be as well an indirect strike against the Irish, which served both the political and ideological machinations of the Federalists

Nativism cannot be thought singularly through the pressure of an organized movement, but also as a distinctive pattern of *resentment* that re-emerges from time to time – regarding different policies and regulations that are perceived as attacking and affecting different groups of people. One of the first policies to have pushed forward by nativist sentiments was that of the

1798 Alien and Sedition Act, which came to existence because President John Adams along with the Federalist Party-- led by Alexander Hamilton -- ruled Congress at the time. The Hamiltonians wanted to make a government that was safe for business and the interests of private property, which was counterpoised to the Jeffersonians' constituency of mainly craftsmen, farmers and newly immigrated Western European immigrants (Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2016).

For this reason, the Federalists passed the Alien and Sedition Acts, which consisted of (1) the Naturalization Act, which increased the amount of years for immigrants to become citizens; followed by (2) the Alien Enemies Act, which posited that should war be declared, all male citizens of an enemy country would be liable to be arrested, deported or detained. Parallel to the Alien Enemies Act was the Alien Friends Act, which would allow for the government to deport any non-citizen suspected of plotting against the government; and the Sedition Act, which "outlawed conspiracies oppose any measure or measures of government"). The main group of immigrants targeted were those of French descent. (See Constitutional Rights Foundation, 2016.)

It was thought that the *nativist sentiment* was almost non-existent during the American Revolution, but after the 1820's this was clearly not the case. To cite again Billington (1938, 33), "the advent of foreign immigration on a large scale was probably the most important causal force leading to this revival" The revitalization of nativist sentiments led to the founding of a number of societies and publications that were meant to aid the anti-Catholic movements: e.g., in 1835 with the Native American Democratic Association (NADA) and 1844 with the Order of the Star Spangled Banner.

Having emerged in New York City, the NADA ran on a platform that "condemned the appointment of foreigners to office, the immigration of paupers and criminals to America, and

any encroachments from the Catholic Church” (Anbinder 1992, 10). The NADA did have major setbacks and died down very prominently due to lack of support by the Whigs in 1838. However, by 1839 with the election of New York Governor William H. Seward – to be Lincoln’s Secretary of State during the Civil War -- the nativist outburst re-emerged. Seward tried to impose domesticating “parochial institutions” for immigrants. Such proposal, which was not backed by the Whigs or the Democrats in New York (Anbinder 1992, 10-11).

Anbinder (1992, 14) observes that the problem with the nativist movements is their failure to realize that “voters supported their tickets in large numbers only when religious controversies erupted or ethnic violence flared.” Most nativist political organizations do not last because of the fluctuation in religious tensions. This was the case of the NADA, which died out by 1847. This occurred due to the lack of organization and the limp potency of this movement; they were incapable of institutionalizing themselves in any solid way.

Regardless of the organized movement they had, the support that any nativist group received was circumstantial or temporary. The majority of voters would eventually go back to their old political allegiances, despite their having a common nativist ideology of substantive content. This was more than a rhetorical style. Whether it be the Order of the United Americans in 1844, the United Sons of America or the Order of United Americans Mechanic in 1845, they still faced the same problems with Americans and their predispositions to their traditional political party allegiances. However, regardless of this fluctuation of support, the nativists would continuously re-emerge through organized political movements (Anbinder 1992, 14).

However, the wake of the demise of the Whig party in the 1850’s allowed for new nativist effervescence. The secretive fraternity of the Order of the Star Spangled banner emerged in 1849. This organization was indeed so secretive that when members were asked about their

nativist ideology, they would respond with saying that they “knew nothing.” For this reason, such secretive group became known as the party of the “Know-Nothings.” The Know-Nothings supported proposals like “stringent restrictions on immigration, exclusion of foreign-born persons from voting or holding political office and a residency requirement of more than 20 years for U.S citizenship” (Law Library-American Law and Legal Information, 2016).

As previously mentioned, the Whig Party began to collapse by 1850, and this was due to the recurrent fight between the North and the South about slavery. A good many members of the Northern Whigs were not content about the intensity of nativist and racist policies that were being generated by the implementation of the Fugitive Slave Law. This Law required that Northerners return runaway slaves to the South; this Act along with other congressional bills supported by -- with the sudden death of President Zachary Taylor -- the successor president, Millard Fillmore, and was influenced by the Gold Rush in California (Anbinder 1992, 15).

Several Northern Whigs despised the new Fugitive Slave Law and felt they had sacrificed too much for “the spectacle of black men and women being returned to the South without jury trial brought “ exhibiting in the North “for the first time the true barbarity of slavery.” This contributed to the division of the Whig party, for it began to obtain a more potent anti-slavery faction (Anbinder 1992, 15-16).

Another push toward the collapse of the Whig party was the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill led by Illinois Senator Stephen A. Douglas. This act was motivated by Illinois’s purpose in “speed[ing] construction of the transcontinental railroad through Chicago.” At the same time, Senator Douglas made an alteration to the Missouri Compromise Clause that would revitalize the Southern interest of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill due to its intent to dislodge attempts that “prohibited slavery in these territories” (Anbinder 1992, 18). The Southern interests

are clearly driven by nativist sentiments, for their policies and laws display the resentment, which would negatively affect the newer generations of immigrants after The Civil War. From this point onward, the Whigs of the North wanted nothing to do with the Whigs of the South, which led to several members of the North leaving the party and becoming more and more disenchanted from the established political parties of the time.

In 1854 nativist sentiments re-surfaced due to the increase of immigrants entering the country who were not able to easily assimilate. At this time, the Know-Nothings became the most recognized and prominent nativist group “intriguing about” as the “incipient collapse of the Whig party in the North, and anti-party sentiment ... offered nativist organizations the opportunity to steal disenchanted voters from their old parties” (Anbinder 1992, 19).

Mainly, the Know-Nothings were known for having Anti Catholic and Anti-Immigrant Sentiments (Billington, 1938). The Know-Nothing Party achieved significant results by winning several seats in local and state locations. They would even hold their one and only national convention in Philadelphia. However, the growing divide between antislavery and proslavery factions within the party became clearly visible as a dividing fissure (See Law Library-American Law and Legal Information 2016). The persistence of nativism continued as the Know-Nothings began to re-align themselves with the old parties. “Many antislavery adherents joining with remnants of the Whigs in the newly emerging Republican Party, while proslavery supporters joined the Democratic Party.” (Law Library-American Law and Legal Information, 2016). By 1859 “the Know-Nothing movement would lose support in all but a few Northern and border states and was no longer a continuing presence on the national stage.

Yet another wave of nativist emerges after the Civil War. Anti-Asian Nativism would drive the Chinese Exclusion Act signed by President Chester A. Arthur in 1882. This was one of

the first restrictive immigration policies this nation had faced. This act prevented “any Chinese without family already in the U.S. from immigrating,” and imposed a “10 year moratorium on Chinese Labor immigration [...] [which meant that the] Federal law proscribed entry of an ethnic working group on the premise that it endangered the good order of certain localities.” Even though the act expired in 1892, it was once again reinitiated by the Geary Act, which regulated Chinese Immigration until the 1920’s (Mears, 1989: The Northern California Citizenship Project; of National Archives and Records Administration, 2016).

By 1891, Nativist sentiments began reemerging. At the peak of war hysteria in 1917, Congress passed legislated literacy testing for immigrants. However, Democratic President Woodrow Wilson, who did not agree to the quotas they wanted to impose (Office of the Historian; Milestones, 1921-26), blocked Congress’s intention with a pocket veto. This latest Nativist uprising would be extended following the Wilson Administration to the development of the 1921-1924 Exclusion Quota Act that was signed by Wilson’s successor Republican President Warren Harding. The Exclusion Quota Act consisted of provisions geared to preventing “further immigration, especially Southern and Eastern Europe” – limiting immigration from Europe to “3 percent of the number of a nationality group already living in the U.S. as of 1910” (Mears 1989). Such legislation was meant to put an end “to the ideal of the U.S. as a refuge for those escaping their home country. (“Immigration Act of 1921 Imposes Quota System, 1921-1924” in *Historic U.S. Events* 2013.)

XIII. Nativism in post-1920s U.S. Politics of Immigration Policy

Currently, the contentiousness of immigration policy is dictated by continued authoritarian populism, feeding nativist sentiments through an *anti-immigrant infused rhetoric*. Explicitly, the Trump administration is using the executive power to attend to the nativist

demands promised during the campaign trail, therefore, using the will of the people to develop and impose policies of a nativist nucleus.

Nevertheless, since the cruel 1920s there would come legislative acts that welcomed immigrants like

- the 1953 Refugee Act that allowed for over 200,00 refugees with specialized non-quota visas permanent residency, or
- the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act which “replaced the national origins quota system with a seven-category preference system emphasizing family reunification and skilled immigrants” and moved beyond a preference for Western Europeans (Cohn 2015).
- As well, the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act “granted legalization to millions of unauthorized immigrants, mainly from Latin America, who met certain conditions.” After this Act, several more constraining/constricting reforms were made in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 (Cohn 2015).
- However, the outlier to this was in 2014 when President Obama used the executive order to allow the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals Act to surface, but this program has faced scrutiny from 26 states and its expansion has been put on hold (Cohn 2015).

Immigration policies fluctuate from time to time; however, our current immigration policies, which may have been in some ways refined and specific. Such policies have flaws like the lack of a pathway for undocumented immigrants to become legalized. The lack of a pathway to legalization and the fears surrounding the eruption of the terror attacks ever since 9/11 are reflected in the politics of U.S. Immigration Policy today. Witness the 2016 presidential

elections. All these immigration policies and organized political movements clearly exemplify this thesis project's argument about the persistent recurring pattern of authoritarian populism which in the U.S .constantly has nativist sentiments at its core.

Our current immigration situation has worsened with the terror that has been flourishing from ISIS, where President-Elect, Donald Trump, has used his populist rhetoric to awaken the nativist sentiments from those Americans who see themselves in precarious positions with regards to employment and often in situations of cast aside social abjection from the established politics. The re-awakening of nativist sentiments has put in danger the integrity and safety of the Latino and Muslim community.

The Know-Nothings did not last as an organized political movement. Nonetheless, their discriminatory convictions of nativism re-surface in times of American resentment and fear toward immigrants. It is evident that politically organized movements do not necessarily proclaim how they carry on persistent nativist sentiments, but will act silently and discreetly with such clearly connected beliefs. In America, unmistakable nativist rhetoric continues to matter. It continues to affect and agitate the discursive register of a recurrent pattern of authoritarian populism. Regardless of the way nativism is professed, it is apparent that it only lasts as long as there is enough mobilization; otherwise, it is a recurrent pattern that will dissipate yet re-emerge through time.

XIV. A Typology of Immigration Policy Politics in Liberal Democratic States

According to Gary Freeman (1995), there are different approaches in order to understand the development of Immigration Policy Politics. Freeman contemplates that these different approaches allow for diversity, which affect the institutionalization of migration policy and politics. He argues that there are three different types of Liberal Democratic States. First, there

are the English-speaking settler societies such as the U.S., Canada, New Zealand, and Australia, which are nations that have had positive periodic open immigration policies and regulations that have been critical to their foundation and national development. Simultaneously, these countries have organized interest groups ready to defy these policies.

In comparison, the second group of Liberal Democratic States are Western European countries like France, Britain, Germany, Switzerland, Sweden, Belgium and Netherlands. These are different from the first set of liberal democratic states due to their migrations being caused by the temporary labor programs after WWII (Freeman 1995, 881-882). They started to accept the temporary programs to overcome labor market shortages with an inflow of migrants prominently from Southern Europe and our overseas territories.

Finally, Freeman mentions the third set of Liberal Democratic states including such European countries of Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. Such countries are recently dealing with mass migrations that are being caused by asylum seekers, illegal and legal immigrants (Freeman 1995, 882). Eventually, Freeman argues that these European countries will end up taking the same approach as the first set of Liberal Democratic States in terms of how they handle their immigration policy. The immigration politics and policies in the first set of Liberal Democratic nations have characteristics that are common to each other, such as expansionist and inclusive policies, but differ greatly in their politics due to the intricacy of each single one of their unique histories (Freeman 1995, 882).

It is pertinent to our understanding that the most open-minded immigration politics is actually is delivered through an expansionary bias that is “more liberal than public opinion” (Freeman 1995, 882-883). He believes that even though such freedoms are granted, most of the time citizens are uninformed of the issues alone, and do not have the access to it (Freeman 1995

883). This first set of states that have been more tolerable and encouraging are grounded durably in Democratic Liberal States whose proceduralism is “characterized by free constitutions founded on individual rights, competitive party systems and regular elections” (Freeman, 883).

Moreover, Freeman emphasizes how in the 1990s the discussions on Immigration Policy was limited only to those in power to make decisions. In such process, policy-makers made it hard for the average citizen to have access to any accurate information on how policy was evolving. Further, he argues how in reality the public opinion only matters indirectly at times of elections, but issues as such are controlled by the prominent political parties of these liberal democratic states. Freeman points out that these groups attempt to reach a consensus around on the issue of immigration that is not too liberal or too conservative, making the issue itself often not sufficiently on any political agenda (Freeman 1995, 884).

Indeed, there seems to be a “wall” surrounding such policy-making even to those in Government: both with regard to congressional committees and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) within the Department of Justice. Often, they have often only “speculative information about the immigration intake, legal or illegal, its composition, or its effect on society and economy.” Frequently, the lack of accurate information fosters “misperceptions about their characteristics and consequences that amount to a systematic tendency toward ‘Temporal Illusion’” (Freeman 1995, 883). Moreover, the lack of accurate information propagates positive and negative stereotypes, which can demonstrate either: (1) how immigrants come to this country for a better life; or (2) how immigrants come to these countries to steal everything from the citizens.

Freeman concludes that in 1995 “public opinion in Liberal Democracies is slower to mobilize and crystalize, and more indifferent if not more favorable to immigration, than it would

be if more and better information were available” (Freeman 1995, 884). Further, Freeman often claimed in 1995 that right-wing anti-immigrant parties have tried to mobilize in several of these Liberal Democratic States and that even though they “have claimed few seats in national parliaments and have little or no chance of participating in or forming governments” (Schain, Messinam; Layton-Henry; Schoen; Cheles; West; Balwin; Edwards as mentioned in Freeman 1995, 884-885).

The main reason why these extremist politics have not worked is due to the significant Sub government --the term of the late Theodore Lowi -- on immigration and naturalization policy issues controlled by organized interest groups. These are the groups of people who are the ones who benefit the most from such policy sub government -- in contrast to those who bear the costs of it and have no say in this matter.

Those who benefit are the “employers in labor-intensive industries and those dependent on an unskilled workforce, businesses that profit from population growth, ...and the family and ethnic relations of those making up the immigrant streams” and those who bear the costs who are a “minority of the population competing with immigrants for scare jobs, housing, schools and government services” (Freeman 1995, 885).

Freeman argued that policymakers and those who make the decisions use anti-populist strategies and tend to use established politics and rhetoric that is not radical. Instead, they use a language this is moderate enough to mobilize a neutral political agenda. However, the Freeman argument that these right-wing groups are not as relevant due to their extremist policies is no longer the case. Freeman was writing two decades ago. What is happening now in the wake of Brexit, or in our country with the election of Donald J. Trump as president, has proven that the mobilization of extremist and radical America First populist policies has succeeded through the revitalization of nativist sentiments.

XV. Understanding Developments in the Politics of U.S. Immigration Policy as a Recurrent Pattern

In the U.S. we are told how important immigrants are to the social and economic fabric of this society. Immigrants come to pursue the celebrated American Dream, believing they will be welcomed. However, such a reception of immigrants is far from easy or positive when we review the context of immigration policy enacted as law. At different points in American history, the vaunted American Dream is not readily open for everyone. This paper has been detailing: (1) how American immigration policy has been made and shaped according to the political environment of the time; and (2) how we can show recurrent patterns of authoritarian populism and nativism in the politics of U.S. immigration policy.

Donna R. Gabaccia's significant 2005 article "Policy, Politics, and the Remaking of Immigration History" is centered on arguments made by Mae Ngai (1994) in *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens in the Making of Modern America*. Gabaccia notes how Ngai's arguments are focused on U.S. public policies of the twentieth century, which can be understood through that of immigration restriction. Such policies would create a problem for the U.S and the people the federal State wishes to govern and regulate (Gabaccia 2005, 533).

Gabaccia divides Ngai's immigration policy categories into four:

- immigration restriction;
- the racialization of immigration;
- alien-citizens; and
- a numerical restrictive system.

In summarizing immigration restrictiveness, Ngai conceptualizes "being an alien" as simply a person without citizenship residing in the U.S. She further argues that the term "alien" has always had a negative connotation -- ever since the 1798 Alien and Sedition Acts. It was not

until the 1830's, that they were considered "immigrants." However, with a turn in events in the 1870s. The term "illegal alien" was introduced, and with it came restrictive laws that passed in congress between 1917 and 1924. It was these restrictive laws that affected the immigrant that "in the past had entered freely-- without inspection or papers -- into lawbreakers and criminals, subject to deportation," and were even considered "people with contagious diseases, polygamists, anarchists, beggars and importers of prostitutes" (Gabaccia 2005, 534; and Cohn 2015). This point is crucial, because this transformation as a country into one with restrictive immigration laws is the reason why immigrants came to be termed as illegal. It is not that they were criminals or bad people, but it is the fact that they were illustrated as such in order to conform to the discontent of the puritan outrage, which was condoned by the U.S government.

Moreover, those affected by such a transformation were often those who worked on American soil, and those who were seeking asylum. Modifying Ngai, Gabaccia (2005, 534) claims that "defining behavior as illegitimate and illegal will not quickly eliminate such [alleged] behavior if those governed by law do not consent to the legal change or share its assumptions." This should not be surprising, for a people who have no say in who they are, will not conform to the standards to which they have been placed, and will not change their ways or point of views. The U.S. deemed them as illegal aliens, and therefore they were treated as criminals.

One of the most restrictive laws was that of the 1924 Johnson-Reed Immigration Act, or more commonly known as the Quota Law. Gabaccia claims that this 1924 Act reversed American public policy toward immigration. Besides, being restrictive, it *racialized immigrants*. Moreover, the racialization of immigrants under this Quota law particularly singled out Asians and Mexicans, and in turn deracialized European Immigrants. By doing so, Ngai remarks how

Asians and Mexicans became known as “illegal alien,” which literally means “undocumented immigrant.”

In California, Asians were deemed “aliens ineligible for citizenship.” Such status was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court the 1948 case *Takashima versus California* where such status was deemed a mighty “thin reed” upon which to prevent someone from getting a fishing license. This was, as well, a status where the immigrant has not undergone adequate inspection, or overstayed their visa (Gabaccia 2005, 535). Ngai points out that it was not only restrictive and racialized laws that added to the problem of poor immigration policy. There were also the effects caused by U.S territorial expansion. The expansion of U.S territory put into question several issues, but one significant one was that of the occupation of Mexican territory, and how such people would be treated. For this reason, Ngai coins the term “Alien Citizen.”

Gabaccia is not fond of this Ngai concept due to what she feels is its confusing “intricacy” (Gabaccia 2005, 536). Nevertheless, I believe the conceptual distinction that Ngai makes sense, because these people are native citizens to that land. However, once the U.S took control over such territory, in a way, such Mexicans were not merely reassigned as to U.S citizens. Therefore, the Mexican was transformed as “the Alien,” even though it was the U.S that had annexed formerly Mexican states.

Here is a tweaked modification of the perennial issue of “displaced people” because of war – which Hannah Arendt championed in the midst of World War II in her 1943 essay, “We Refugees,” *Menorah Journal* (69-77). The “Alien Citizen” as distinct from the Refugee. Effectively making someone illegal is making them criminal. The U.S made sure that such status would be for the conquered Mexicans.

In 1965, the U.S encounters more of a *numerical restrictive immigration system* with the Hart-Cellar Act. However, even though it limited the numbers of immigrants entering the country the effects would widen the pool. The purpose of this act was to “eliminate racially discriminatory national origin quotas and to bring immigration policy into line with domestic policies symbolized by Civil Rights Act [...] leaving in place numerical restrictions and a preference system for issuing visas that privileged family members and highly skilled over blue-collar workers” (Gabaccia 2005, 536).

The Hart-Cellar Act system shocked several American citizens. Even more shocked were immigrants from Mexico who had never been before exposed to a numerical restrictive system. Ngai (1994) claims that this reason led to an increase in illegal immigration from Mexico. As well, the 1965 Act intensified the specification of immigrants into illegal aliens, which increased racial scrutiny (Gabaccia 2005, 537).

According to Ngai (1994), the impact of this Act was felt more domestically within the U.S. in law enforcement, in welfare offices and in the complex hierarchies of courts. Such effects are still felt throughout our current restrictive immigration system. Gabaccia claims that after looking at Ngai’s arguments regarding American restrictive immigration policies, we can discern the relative limits to the image of the U.S “Statue of Liberty” welcoming immigrants. Gabaccia also questions: (1) how eastern and southern Europeans achieved whiteness and (2) how they passed along the myth of this country being open to immigrants when they sought to buy names from people who came from more “favored” nations with higher quota numbers. After the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act, the late 1980’s and early 1990’s immigration policies were captured by two main problems: (1) government inefficacy; and (2) decision-making process positioned away from the visibility of regular citizens (Tichenor 1994, 362).

In term of government inefficacy, there were too many competing agendas, not only in the legislative arena, but also in the administrative and judicial sectors. Nevertheless, the fragmentation between these institutions, in part, shaped the outcomes of immigration legislation mainly due to the “political system more responsive to broad ideas and social movements, producing unexpected bursts of dramatic policy change,” (Tichenor 1994, 347). Immigration decision-making process is left in the hands of a closed door and fragmented government – with a multitude of Immigration and Naturalization offices in many different states with different quotas and different time periods of waiting for interviews and processing. This widespread fragmentation not only encourages ambiguous policies. Moreover, Hart-Cellar Act reformers were allowed “to write competing policy designs into law and to employ the courts and the administrative presidency as their agents in ensuring political battles. The resulting policy outcomes were ambiguous, costly, and disconnected from public deliberation and accountability” (Tichenor 1994, 361). Only the immigration lawyers win.

The fragmentation during the late 1980’s and early 1990’s was met with contradictory political ideologies -- between expansionist’s policies and restrictionist policies (Tichenor 1994, 338). Some argued that the reforms that developed in this period were expansive and liberal: but others deemed it too restrictive, and conservative. The conservatives viewed immigrants as a threat to the American Society, for they “saw porous borders as a challenge to national sovereignty, calling for enhanced enforcement to seize and deport illegal aliens as criminals. Cultural protectionists worried that shifts away from traditional immigration would promote multicultural education, bilingualism, and an increase in welfare expenditure” (William F. Buckley as quoted in Tichenor 1994, 345).

On the other hand, the liberals vouched for “reform that reflected alliances of urban ethnics, organized labor, and civil rights activists [in order] to purge racist national origins quotas [and] limit temporary alien labor.” (Tichenor 1994, 343). Two of the most prominent policies between the 1980’s and 1990’s was the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), and the Immigration Act of 1990. Historically, policy makers have always targeted Mexicans, however, the system between this period enabled “Asian, Caribbean, and Latin American migrants to continue to dominate the nation’s immigration” (Tichenor 1994, 337). IRCA granted three million illegal immigrants legal status and it penalized employers who hired unauthorized immigrants; yet, they did not establish a reliable identification system, which in part is the main reason why fraud was a commonality (Tichenor 1994, 337).

The Immigration Act of 1990 law, on the other hand, put a cap on legal immigration; and developed policy that would grant special protections to refugees. It also drastically changed the racial makeup of immigrants. Immigration laws following the 1990’s were “responses to concerns about terrorism and unauthorized immigration” these “emphasized border control, prioritized enforcement of laws on hiring immigrants and tightened admissions eligibility” (Cohn 2015).

For the most part, the concern since then has been on refugees and asylum seekers, especially for immigrants prominent of Central American countries that suffer from several armed conflicts and natural disasters. Currently, this country is undergoing contentious immigration policies such as that of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), imposed under the Obama administration. Such a program grants young adults who had been brought to this country illegally by their parents “to apply for deportation relief and a work permit” (Cohn

2015). Although this program has helped several young undocumented immigrants, its lasting effect is worrisome.

With the current Trump Administration, it is hard to predict whether or not it will be abolished or worse yet if the Department of Homeland Security enforces deportations regardless of their DACA status. Some would argue that the Trump's administration harsh deportation enforcement is a benefit to the social and economic mobility of this country. Nils Holtug would agree with Trump's anti-immigration policies. In his December 2010 article "Immigration and the politics of Social Cohesion," Holtug mentions his distaste for ethnic diversity in liberal European nation states. He claims that "Ethnic diversity tends to undermine social cohesion (and) ... therefore, immigration tends to undermine the welfare state in liberal European nation states" (Holtug 2010, 436-437). Holtug's argument for this is prejudiced and generalizable, for he claims that individuals from different ethnic groups cannot assimilate with one another, and are therefore less motivated to practice justice towards each other. In matter of fact, he concludes that immigration does not help the poor in third world countries, except only the stimulus of local markets, and that the poor are not the ones migrating to liberal European countries (Holtug 448). Although Holtug is arguing in the case of liberal European nation states, the language he uses to describe immigrants, and the ideas derived from such connect to the sentiments of restrictive immigration policies. The state of mind Holtug exemplifies is clearly infused with nativist sentiments and in European homogeneous standards.

Tammy Gales, in her 2009 *Discourse and Society* article "'Diversity' as enacted in US immigration politics and law: a corpus-based approach," discusses how the legal and political language shape immigration policy. Furthermore, Gales argues how the media politicizes the language used by Congress when laws have been drafted and disperses negative connotation of

immigration, rather than spurring or incentivizing diversity and inclusion (Gales 2009, 224). As well, Gales claims that Congress molds the development of immigration policy through its discourse, which plays “an intimate role in shaping legal language. Both the implicit and explicit ideologies ... work towards the creation of laws, which are then legitimized, enforced, and disseminated through society” (Gales 2009, 238). This means that Congress’s legislative power and the language they use to write laws shapes not only the policy. There is here also the subliminal connotation that comes with policy change understood as negative or positive.

As well, Gales mentions how Congress has so much power that it is allowed to semantically re-write the meaning of diversity all in the name of national security, safety, and economy -the passage of these negative ideologies- will only continue the vicious cycle of anti-immigration metaphor, sentiment, and policies of assimilation as opposed to those of diversification (Gales 2009, 238). Therefore, it is crucial to understand that legal and political language in the politics of immigration policy have an impact on not only how immigration policy is drafted, but also how the message is conveyed through the media and interpreted by the public.

The public had a greater say in immigration policy throughout the late 1990s and early 2000’s than between the late 1980’s and early 1990s. It was the government’s closed door politics – noted by Freeman in 1995 – that disabled the public from any sense of transparency in INS decision-making. Additionally, language is crucial to immigration policy, for the development of terms such as “illegal alien” or “undocumented immigrant” have a connotation along with it, and for the most part, using illegal and alien has been detrimental to the image of the immigrant, whether legal or illegal. To claim that immigrants do not add to the social cohesion of a country is presuming that they have a say in the role they take, but the law is what

confines who they are. For this reason, an immigrant cannot be judged without taking into consideration how the government portrays them with the legal language, and how the media portrays them through their political language; the immigrant does not have a say in how to be portrayed, but congress has made sure their agendas can be followed time after time through American history.

XIV. Conclusion

A Historical Sociology infused with Sociology of Knowledge helps us comprehend varieties of emergent populism, but in the second half of this thesis paper also the persistent tropes of prejudice and discrimination in right populism. This is accentuated from a Historical Sociology framework in distinct recurrent patterns during periods of aroused right wing populist movements.

Further, in the second half, there is a focus on the Nativist rhetorical context in understanding of the politics of immigration policy here in the U.S. Such context is often discussed in terms of a populist discursive register that is rooted in prejudice. Nativism does not deal with heterogeneity of a people, rather it denies and dismantles any policy effort to actualize this conception of heterogeneity, cultural pluralism and multiculturalism. Such denial and dismantling intent is expressed through the resentment assimilated American immigrants have against the newer immigrant generations. At times, Nativism in the American context goes beyond a right populist rhetorical style and takes on the substance of a thin racialist ideology.

American immigration policy politics is indeed a difficult politics with constantly recurring authoritarian populism in periods of public fear and labor market discontent. For a time after the middle 1960s, immigration politics was infused with a great deal of hope and optimism in terms of a new cultural pluralism; but, in the present, all optimism in fair immigration policy is gone.

Donald Trump's administration is dictating immigration policies through a seemingly fascist and regressive discourse, which reveals the authoritarian populist syndrome. These nativist and populist urges tend to dissolve yet re-emerge again over time. How will we endure this dark turn political cycle? With time, will this country see itself through to necessary economic re-vitalization through new vital and necessary immigration reform?

References

- Abrams, Philip. 1980. "History, Sociology, Historical Sociology," *Past and Present*, no. 87: 3-16
<https://student.cc.uoc.gr/uploadFiles/1110-BE12K/ABRAMS%20History,%20Sociology,%20Historical%20Sociology.pdf> (March 1, 2017).
- Adorno, Theodor, and Ellen Frenkel-Brunswick. 1950. et. al., eds. *The Authoritarian Personality*. New York: Harper and Brothers.
- Althusser, Louis. 1974, "Ideology and Ideological State Apparata." In Louis Althusser, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. London: New Left Books.
- Anbinder, Tyler. 1992. "Nativism and Slavery : The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of the 1850's." New York: Oxford University Press. JSTOR.
<http://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/t/text/text-idx?c=acls;idno=heb00507.0001.001>
 (September 3, 2016).
- Arenas, Nelly. 2006. "El Regimen Populista de Venezuela." Gomez-Calcano World Press. Web. <https://gomezcalcano.wordpress.com/el-regimen-populista-en-venezuela/>
 (December 5, 2015).
- Arenas, Nelly. 2010. "La Venezuela de Hugo Chavez: rentismo, populismo y democracia." *Nueva Sociedad*. (September-October). Web.
<http://nuso.org/articulo/la-venezuela-de-hugo-chavez-rentismo-populismo-y-democracia/>
 (December 1, 2015).
- Barry, Colman J. 1958. "Some Roots of American Nativism." *The Catholic Historical Review*, Vol. 44, No. 2. *Catholic University of America Press*. (July): 137-146. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/25016351> (September 8, 2016).
- Berger, Peter L. and Thomas Luckman. 1966. *The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge*. London: Penguin Books.
<http://perflensburg.se/Berger%20social-construction-of-reality.pdf> (February 25, 2017).
- Billington, Ray Allen. 1938. *The Protestant Crusade 1800-1860: A Study of the Origin of American Nativism*. Chicago; Quadrangle Books. Print.

- Cohn, D’Vera. 2015. “How U.S Immigration laws and rules have changed through history.” *Pew Research Center*. 30 (September). Web. <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/09/30/how-u-s-immigration-laws-and-rules-have-changed-through-history/> (March 1, 2017).
- Constitutional Rights Foundation. 2016. “The Alien and Sedition Acts: Defining American Freedom.” Constitutional Rights Foundation. Web. <http://www.crf-usa.org/america-responds-to-terrorism/the-alien-and-sedition-acts.html> (August 31, 2016).
- “Chinese Exclusion Act (1882).” *National Archives*. Web. <https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=true&doc=47> (September. 11, 2016).
- Gabaccia, Donna R. 2005. “Policy, Politics, and the Remaking of Immigration History.” *American Quarterly*, Vol. 57, No. 2. Project MUSE. (June): 533-540.. <http://muse.jhu.edu.lic.idm.oclc.org/article/184028/pdf> (October 1, 2016)
- Gales, Tammy. 2009. ”’Diversity’ as enacted in US immigration politics and law: a corpus-based approach.” *Discourse & Society*, Vol. 20, No. 2. JSTOR. (March): 223-240. <http://www.jstor.org.lic.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/42889255.pdf> (October 1, 2016).
- Freeman, Gary P. 1995. “Modes of Immigration Politics in Liberal Democratic States.” *The International Migration Review*, Vol. 29, No. 2. JSTOR. (Winter): 881-902. <http://www.jstor.org.lic.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/2547729.pdf> (September 29, 2016).
- Friedman, Norman L. 1967. “Nativism.” *Phylon* (1960-), Vol . 28, No. 4. *Clark Atlanta University*. 408-415. JSTOR. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/274292> (Sep. 1, 2016).
- Gales, Tammy. 2009. “Diversity in U.S. Immigration Policies and Law,” *Discourse and Society*, 20 (2); 223-240.
- Hall, Stuart. 1979. “The Great Moving Right Show.” *Marxism Today*. (January):14-20. Web. (March 5, 2016).
- Hall, Stuart. 1983. *Policing the Crisis: Mugging, the State and Law and Order*. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Harvey, David. 2005. *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Higham, John. 1955. *Strangers in the Land: Patterns of American Nativism, 1860-1925*. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press.

Holtug, Nils. 2010. "Immigration and the politics of social cohesion." *Ethnicities*, Vol. 10, No. 4. JSTOR. (December): 435-451.
<http://www.jstor.org.ric.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/23890261.pdf> (October 10, 2016).

Ionescu, Ghita; and Ernest Gellner. 1969. "Introduction" in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (eds.). *Populism: Its Meaning and National Character*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson, pp. 1-5.

"Immigration Act of 1921 Imposes Quota System, 1921-1924." 2013. *Historic U.S Events*. Detroit: Gale. *U.S. History in Context*. 5 (February). Web. (August 31, 2016).

Inglehart, Ronald F; and Pippa Norris. 2016. "Trump, Brexit, and the rise of Populism: Economic have-nots and cultural backlash." Harvard University. Web. 31 (July): 1-43.
<http://bit.ly/2fT2iku> (October 25, 2016).

Jessop, Bob; Kevin Bonnet, Simon Bromley, and Tom Ling. 1984. "Authoritarian Populism, Two Nations, and Thatcherism." *New Left Review*, No. 147. 32-60. Web. (March 5, 2016).

Laclau, Ernesto. 2005. *On Populist Reason*. London: Verso.

Laclau, Ernesto. 2011. "Puerto Cultura – Ernesto Laclau" Interview. *Youtube Video*, 48:53. Published by Archivo TV Argentina on November 18, 2014. Web.
<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZOFnTNPipVY> (November 15, 2015).

Law Library-American Law and Legal Information. "Know Nothing Party." *n.d. Net Industries*. Jrank. (August 1, 2016).

Levitsky, Steven and Kenneth Roberts. 2011. "Latin America's 'Left Turn': A Framework for Analysis." In S. Levitsky and K. Roberts (eds.) *The Resurgence of the Latin American Left*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 1-28.

Lipset, Seymour Martin. 1959. "Democracy and Working-Class Authoritarianism." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 24, No.4. (August): 482-501. JSTOR. (March 5, 2016).

Lipsitz, Lewis. 1965. "Working-Class Authoritarianism: A Re-Evaluation." *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 30, No.1. JSTOR. (April 25, 2016).

- Madrid, Raul L. 2006. "The Rise of Ethno-Populism in Latin America: The Bolivian Case." *Department of Government University of Texas*. Web. <http://www.vanderbilt.edu/lapop/bolivia/2004-ethnopolulism.pdf> (December 1, 2015).
- Manetto, Fransesco. 2015. "Iglesias Rechaza Hablar de Pactos y Antepone la Reforma Constitucional." 21 (December). *El Pais*. Web. http://politica.elpais.com/politica/2015/12/20/actualidad/1450615036_446548.html (December 23, 2015).
- Mannheim, Karl. 1936. *Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge*, New York: Harvest Books. https://ia902605.us.archive.org/28/items/ideologyutopiain00mann/ideologyutopian00mann_bw.pdf (March 3, 2017).
- Mears, Katie. 1989. Northern California Citizenship Project. National Archives and Records Administration. http://btw.mayfirst.org/sites/default/files/resources/files/immigration_timeline.pdf (September 11, 2016).
- Mendez, Enrique Jorge. 2014. "La Bolivia de Evo Morales. Otra Vez el Populismo?" *Maldonado Noticias*. 28 (October). Web. <http://bit.ly/2eV4aoc> (December 20, 2015).
- Merton, Robert K. 1973. "Paradigm for the Sociology of Knowledge," in R. K. Merton, *The Sociology of Science*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 7-41 https://books.google.com/books?id=zPvcHuUMEMwC&printsec=frontcover&source=gb_s_ViewAPI#v=onepage&q&f=false (March 15, 2017).
- Miller, S.M., and Frank Riessman. 1961. "'Working-Class Authoritarianism': A Critique of Lipset." *The British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 12, No. 3. (September): 263-276. JSTOR. (May 3, 2016).
- Ngai, Mae. 2004. *Impossible Subjects: Aliens and the Making of Modern America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. (January 15, 2017).
- Office of the Historian. "The Immigration Act of 1924 (The Johnson-Reed Act)." *Milestones: 1921-1936*. Web. <https://history.state.gov/milestones/1921-1936/immigration-act> (September 11, 2016).

- Somers, Margaret. 1996. "What is Sociology after the Historic Turn: Knowledge, Culture, Narrativity and Historical Epistemology" in Terrence J. MacDonald, *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, pp. 53-90.
https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=a7noy6lcU7IC&oi=fnd&pg=PA53&ots=Q-LECS23r7&sig=3A76oY9M4Qjv-kO_pq1ZCjmqYMw#v=onepage&q&f=false
(March 18, 2017).
- Stanley, Ben. 2008. "The Thin Ideology of Populism," *Journal of Political Ideologies* 13(1) 106-109.
<http://web.a.ebscohost.com.eric.idm.oclc.org/ehost/pdfviewer/pdfviewer?sid=20ee9bc4-59ad-4a6d-8718-16e553d337f1%40sessionmgr4008&vid=1&hid=4104> (March 26, 2017).
- Tichenor, Daniel J. 1994. "The Politics of Immigration Reform in the U.S., 1981-1999." *Polity*, Vol. 26, No. 3. JSTOR. (Spring): 333-362.
<http://www.jstor.org.eric.idm.oclc.org/stable/pdf/3235150.pdf> (October 1, 2016).
- Wiles, Peter. 1969. "A Syndrome, Not a Doctrine: Some Elementary Theses on Populism." G. Ionescu and E. Gellner (eds.). *Populism: Its Meaning and National Character*, London: Weidenfield and Nicholson. 166-167. Print.
- Williams, Raymond. 1977. "Structures of Feeling," Chapter 9 in Raymond Williams, *Marxism and Literature*. New York: Oxford University Press.